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Abstract: Security is a priority to most, but studies show that users commonly fail to adopt 
recommended cybersecurity behavior.  Researchers have looked to user factors for explanations 
of this gap, finding security and convenience to be common considerations, along with 
perceptions of risks and past experiences.  Some have tried to alter user behavior, but are 
targeted at specific advice and focused on rational motivations to persuade users.   
 In this thesis, three expertly recommended cybersecurity advice (i.e., updating software 
regularly, using two-factor authentication, using a secure password manager) are deeply 
explored.  These results inform the design of videos in a systematic study of novel cybersecurity 
interventions aimed at altering users’ behavior around these advices.  First, users’ rational 
motivations around each, including social motivations are studied, and then each advice is 
studied with more in-depth instruments, including those that gathered users’ emotions in the 
varying contexts, which can influence decision-making. 
These studies found that those who do not follow expert recommendations commonly see 
the risks in their decision as lower than those who do follow.  Additionally, users rarely make 
social considerations in these contexts. Finally, negative emotions are found to be prevalent 
across many specific cases.  These emotions may influence and trigger perceptions of negative 
past experiences, which in-turn hinders adoption. With these leads, novel video-based 
interventions are developed that incorporate appeals which address social motivations and 
emotions around cybersecurity advice.    Awareness, perceptions, emotions, and behavior were 
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measured before, immediately, two weeks, and one month after an intervention was delivered 
aimed at altering their behavior around one of the three test advices.  This study finds that the 
emotion-based techniques may have merit since the groups which saw videos that used this 
approach had the largest and most sustained increases on variables that measured awareness and 
perceptions of benefits, costs, and risks.  Also, the data demonstrates the role social motivations 
may have in cybersecurity behavior, showing the importance of both of these alternative 
approaches in this field. 
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1 Introduction 
The Internet has only increased in pervasiveness over the years.  Today, the Internet-of-
Things has the potential to massively increase the utility of the tools and appliances we use every 
day, but the expansion of Internet connectivity to more devices presents a security challenge.  In 
addition to the number of devices connected to the Internet, the size of the Internet using 
population is expected to grow in the coming years as multiple organizations work to expand the 
network’s reach to currently underserved and “dark” parts of the globe [7,39,70].  As with 
devices, more users also means a new set of cybersecurity problems.  These combined trends 
have the potential to increase the pervasiveness and scale of threats such as phishing attacks, 
hacking or take-over of accounts, and development of botnets, just to name a few. 
Fortunately, many tools and techniques have been developed and deployed that can help 
users protect themselves, with new ones being developed to combat emerging threats.  
Unfortunately, studies have found wide divergence in what experts and non-experts do and think 
is safe online, following in the wake of earlier work that showed experts and non-experts 
harbored different mental models related to computer security [17,51].  Though it is easy to 
explain the divergence in behavior and perception as a result of knowledge gaps, researchers 
have increasingly begun to question this hypothesis, and instead look towards other reasons users 
could have to ignore good advice, including usability issues with particular behaviors/tools 
[25,40,56,59,63,66,67,96,99] and other rationally-based2 concerns [20,46,47].  Expanding on this 
understanding of users’ cybersecurity behavior, this thesis gathers data related to other influences 
on decisions that have not been as extensively studied in the field of computer science. In 
                                                 
2 In this thesis, “rational” is used to describe concerns and motivations that are based around explicit and direct 
costs, benefits, and risks.  More detail on this model of human decision-making is provided in 2.1. 
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particular, we use theory related to emotion’s role in decision-making and an understanding of 
the power of social motivations to explore and alter users’ cybersecurity perceptions and 
behaviors.  First, the core research questions and the general approach used throughout the thesis 
are explained in Section 1.1.  Section 1.2 outlines the specific work discussed in later Chapters.  
1.1 Research Questions and General Approach 
This thesis expands on prior work that has explored users’ motivations and behavior 
around the plethora of cybersecurity advice available to them to secure their data and accounts.  
The existing literature has focused on individualized, rational frameworks to analyze how 
general users think about expertly recommended tools and techniques such as secure password 
managers, two-factor authentication, and regularly applying software updates, to name a few.  
Based on existing theories of human motivation in the areas of emotions 
[10,14,16,35,53,54,62,64,98] and social motivations [9,11,27,49,91,95,101,102,106], this thesis 
explores these aspects of motivation to more effectively understand and change users perceptions 
and behavior around cybersecurity decisions.  To execute these approaches, though, the current 
state of users’ emotions, perceptions, and experiences must be explored and considered.  Overall, 
the work presented here approaches the following core research questions: 
RQ1: How are the user factors that influence behavior around different cybersecurity decisions 
similar and different? 
• What can we learn from these context specific concerns? 
RQ2: What differences in opinions and perceptions are there between those who adopt and fail to 
adopt various cybersecurity advices? 
RQ3: How does emotional context vary between different decisions? 
• How do emotions relate to behavioral outcome? 
RQ4: How are social considerations involved in personal security decisions? 
RQ5: Would appeals that address emotions or social motivations be effective in changing 
perspectives and/or behavior? 
 3 
 
These questions provide a framework to guide a series of investigations into users’ 
motivation around cybersecurity advice that is recommended by experts chosen based on recent 
work surveying cybersecurity experts [51].  Three advices were selected as test cases to provide 
grounded contexts in which to investigate and experiment: applying software updates, activating 
two-factor authentication, and using a secure password manager.  As suggested by RQs 1-4, a 
series of studies were performed to investigate the contours of Internet users’ perceptions and 
behavior around the three test advice, including experiments that measure previously neglected 
components of motivation (i.e., emotions and social motivations).  These informational studies 
build upon each other and paint a detailed picture of the perceptions and reasons that lead 
individuals to follow and not follow each advice.  Towards RQ5, the final experiment not only 
tests the impact of videos incorporating content that is developed using the lessons about 
perceptions and motivations from prior work, but also explores the applicability of novel 
methods of altering cybersecurity motivations. 
These results have value to the field in several notable ways.  First, they can inform 
experts in how users think about specific security advice and cybersecurity in general.  With this 
expanded knowledge, security experts may tailor their recommendations to take into account 
fuller models of user motivations.  Next, researchers can use these results as they devise new 
security techniques, allowing them to incorporate better alignment with users’ emotional and 
social motivations.  Finally, software developers and others involved with end-product creation 
and distribution can use the results to these questions to better assess the quality of user-interface 
and security options included in their products by considering how users’ may respond and 
interact with them on a deeper level than is currently used.  This group may also find value in 
these results when thinking how to encourage adoption of more secure products and features. 
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1.2 Summary of Work Presented 
To give the foundations of the work presented in the subsequent Chapters, Chapter 2 
presents a survey of pertinent prior work that was used in the execution of the studies contained 
in this thesis.  Notably, related studies in the field of usable security are discussed, along with the 
perspectives about cybersecurity decision-making that they put forward.  A model for 
understanding how humans process messages aimed at altering their behavior is also explained.  
Another behavioral model is introduced that explains how emotions can impact decisions.  
Finally, the foundations of social motivations are discussed, along with the intersections of this 
topic with emotions and usable security.  These starting points were used to design and execute a 
series of informational studies that gathered data about individuals’ perceptions and motivations 
around select cybersecurity advice. 
First, in Chapter 3, we present a study that looked to the rational side of users’ 
considerations through a web-survey delivered to Mechanical Turk participants (N = 215) [31].  
We start with rational motivations since this is a foundational part of decision-making, and has 
been the frame of numerous prior works in usable security.  To expand on the literature, which 
all focus on specific advice in their designs, participants in this study were grouped by reported 
behavior on each of 3 advices: to update, to use a password manager, and to use 2-factor 
authentication.  Participants in each group of followers and non-followers were asked to rate the 
individual and social costs, benefits, and risks of following and not following their group’s target 
advice.  Ratings mostly agreed with existing decisions.  For example, those who reported 
updating generally rated the risks avoided and benefits of their decision as higher than those who 
reported not updating.  Participants also provided open-ended responses explaining their 
decision, which revealed the common considerations of security and convenience, but also 
 5 
 
highlighted the differences in motivations between groups and advice.   Overall, these comments 
lacked indications of social motivations, and ratings of social variables were all significantly 
lower than ratings for individual variables, suggesting social motivations currently play a small 
or no part in these decisions. 
Though much was learned from the analysis of users’ rational motivations, as work in 
psychology and communications has argued, emotions can play a role in decision-making 
[10,14,16,35,53,54,62,64,98].  Thus, several informative studies were also performed that 
explored users’ behaviors, motivations, and novelly emotions in each of the three cybersecurity 
contexts targeted in the first study.  Chapter 4 presents a work where samples of users (N = 136) 
and non-users (N = 111) of secure password managers were collected from Mechanical Turk 
[30].  Each group was sent the same survey asking about computer and cybersecurity experience, 
as well as experience with, perceptions of, and emotions when using a password manager3.  In 
terms of computer and cybersecurity experience, both groups responded similarly.  When it came 
to opinions and perceptions of password managers, the differences were much more significant.  
Comments explain why participants chose to use or not use a password manager and ratings of 
anticipated emotions when using the tool reveal more differences between the groups, including 
differences in opinion on how password managers affect the balance of security and 
convenience. 
Though the results related to password managers provided valuable information about 
what users think of one kind of security advice, not all behaviors are the same, and some require 
repeated effort that is not as immediately beneficial as using a password manager.  In Chapter 5, 
                                                 
3 Note, non-users were asked to rate emotions they predicted they would feel if they used a password manager.  In 
the case of both users and non-users, participants rate the same concept (predicted emotions when using a password 
manager), but do so with different previous experience with the tool. 
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two-factor authentication is used as a case study of such a behavior.  Examination of a sample of 
2FA users’ opinions and emotions about the feature (N = 148) revealed differences in subgroups 
of users based on their perceptions of convenience of the feature, including stark differences in 
the emotion ratings from each subgroup.  Analysis of the small number of participants who 
reported knowing 2FA, but not using it (N = 22) also highlights the importance of perceptions of 
convenience and past negative experiences on motivations to adopt the feature.   Finally, 
differences between those who knew of 2FA, regardless of their behavior (N = 170) and those 
who did not know the feature (N = 125) revealed large gaps in users’ self-assessment of 
cybersecurity knowledge, awareness, and access to good advice, possibly explaining why they 
had not heard of or did not recognize the fairly common feature. 
For another perspective on emotions in cybersecurity, Chapter 6 contains an examination 
of users’ history with, opinions of, and emotions related to software updates and update 
messages.  Results for 2 surveys (N1 = 78, N2 = 172) showed that participants are commonly 
hesitant to apply updates [33]. Annoyance and confusion were cited by participants as common 
complaints about update messages they have encountered. Additionally, for some software, 
annoyance and confusion ratings correlated with participants’ rated hesitation in applying 
updates.   In the second sample (N = 172), after responding to the survey, participants viewed 
update and warning messages sampled from different systems and software [32]. The survey 
asked them to rate each of the messages on 4 emotional metrics: annoyance, confusion, 
importance, and noticeability.  Ratings for annoyance and confusions were correlated, as were 
noticeability and importance, suggesting a link in the resonance of these pairs of emotions.  
Additionally, through analysis of the ratings in connection with design features of the messages, 
some “good” and “bad” aspects were identified.  Open-ended responses from participants about 
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what they liked and disliked about each message highlighted several trends in participants’ 
opinions of the messages, including relationships between content of comments and emotion 
ratings.  Finally, a third and more targeted study of emotions (N = 400) was performed on 
MTurk.  The results show that users associate emotions with updates in ways that vary on four 
key emotional factors: positivity, anxiety, loneliness, and hostility related to update messages 
[13]. 
Chapter 7 presents the final study (N = 327) of this thesis, which involved the 
development of videos that aimed to change users’ minds about a specific cybersecurity decision 
they have made using the lessons from the prior chapters, as well as clues from the literature.  
For each of the three advices targeted throughout this thesis, three videos were created (i.e., a 
total of 9 unique videos were tested).  An initial video was created for each that presented the 
basic motivations to adopt the advice, as learned from the findings of prior studies.  Using these 
“basic” videos as a starting point, two additional interventions were also developed for each 
advice.  One highlighted the emotions users may feel around each advice, and explained why the 
possible negative ones are made up for by the positives when adhering.  The other experimental 
video highlighted social motivations to adopt each advice by explaining how the decision to not 
follow puts people the user may know at risk.  These videos were assessed using a survey that 
measured awareness, perceptions, emotions, and behavior, and the results show that the emotion-
based motivational concepts may have merit in these contexts since the video which incorporated 
it seemed to show the most consistent increases in perceptions further away from the 
intervention.  This shows possible lasting power of emotion-based appeals.  Additionally, the 
results of this final study show possible power in social motivations, though in an unexpected 
way. 
 8 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarizing the answers gathered related to the 
research questions, as well as outlining the specific contributions contained in this thesis.   
Finally, the final section discusses directions for future work on the topic of understand and 
changing users’ motivations, perceptions, and behaviors around various cybersecurity advice. 
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2 Background on Human Motivation 
This thesis draws on several existing tracks of research in the fields of computer science, 
psychology, and communications.  First, Section 2.1 presents a survey of usable security studies 
that have centered on rational factors of users’ behavior around cybersecurity, such as benefits, 
costs, and risk.  Since the goal of this thesis is to design interventions, a model to understand 
human processing of messages is also presented.  Next, in Section 2.2, the theorized connection 
between emotions and motivations is explained; with focus on how understanding emotions can 
help when trying to impact perceptions and influence positive behavior change.  Finally, Section 
2.3 discusses the theory of social motivations is, along with their application to cybersecurity, 
followed by a summary of this Chapter in Section 2.4. 
2.1 Decision-making and Persuasive Communication 
The role of the user in cybersecurity has been realized for some time, including the need 
to design with them in mind, informed by analysis of what motivates the diverse population that 
uses computing devices [3,29,41,77,85].  Though new technology can help increase security, as 
Forget, Chiasson, and Biddle remarked in a 2012 assessment of the learnability of a new 
authentication scheme, the ability for users to learn a new tool or technique is pivotal to their 
ability to adopt [37].  Beyond learnability, other users factors have been recognized as important 
towards security, including users’ awareness and attitudes [22,34,36,38,43,44,61,71,86,92,103], 
their mental models [2,6,17,55,97], past experiences [28,66,96], and social influences [23,24].  
Many of these and other works have incorporated key pillars of psychological theory in their 
application [50,58].  A common thread is the foundational view of users’ decisions as rational, 
with them efficiently balancing known costs and benefits of action versus inaction. 
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2.1.1 Rational Components of Decision-Making around Cybersecurity 
Human decision making is a complex mechanism encompassing a multitude of 
considerations.  One broad way to view human decisions is as a balance of costs and benefits, 
where humans are rational actors who choose to minimize cost and/or maximize benefit.  This 
view of computer security decision-making has been prominent.  Herley in 2009 suggests that 
users’ failure to adhere to good security behavior could be attributed to them finding the costs 
too high and/or benefits too low [46].  He supports this supposition by citing the low chance of 
an actual security breach for any given user and the high cost of daily security maintenance.  
Herley goes on to suggest that more data is needed to determine the actual costs and benefits of 
these decisions to better inform the advice experts give.  By 2014, Herley had found the 
approach of researchers had not changed much [47], leading him to say in an article that year: 
It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that if we can find the right words of slogan we 
can convince people to spend more time on security. … We argue that this view is 
profoundly in error.  It presupposes that users are wrong about the cost-benefit tradeoff of 
security measures, when the bulk of the evidence suggests the opposite. 
In short, what Herley argues is that rather than users being ill-informed about security, 
they could just be making a perfectly rational decision, at least in their eyes.  This view is echoed 
by a 2012 work, “Death by a Thousand Facts.”  Here, Stewart and Lacey suggest that approaches 
to changing perceptions and behavior that utilize traditional, “security-awareness” content have 
and will continue to fail because, unlike it is assumed by some researchers, users are not ignorant 
about  good security behavior [20].  More recent work also furthers this argument.  In 2016, 
Forget et al., using a mixed methodological design, found that simple user engagement (i.e., how 
aware the user was of cybersecurity and how much they reported caring about it) was not a 
strong predictor of good security outcomes for users [36].  This indicates that merely 
encouraging users to get engaged and pay attention to their security may not be enough to alter 
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their behavior in meaningful ways.  For instance, this study found that knowledge gaps may play 
a role in lack of good security behavior, with the example of users having browser extensions 
installed that they did not fully understand, and some not knowing basic terminology such as 
“web browser” [36].  With these knowledge gaps, it could be that users’ cost-benefit analyses are 
off due to fundamental misunderstandings around cybersecurity. 
More evidence for this is found in the case for applying software updates.  Wash et al. 
found that a significant portion of sampled Windows 7 users did not understand what updates 
were changing in their system and could not execute their intentions for computer management 
[99].  In 2016, these results were supported by Mathur et al.’s work that found users commonly 
lacked sufficient information to decide whether or not to apply software updates [67].  In 2017, 
this time in a work by Vitale et al., results of user experiences around operating system updates 
identified confusion and unclear mental models of changes being made by an update, calling 
back to the results of Wash et al. [97].  In addition to this deficiency in understanding how 
updates impact their system, Vaniea et al.’s study of updating behavior also suggests prior 
negative past experience could play a large role in users deciding not to apply updates [96].  A 
2017 study by Mathur and Chetty repeated these results, finding that users who do not activate 
auto-updating on software likely have past negative experiences with software updating [66].  In 
all, these results suggest that users may be underestimating the risks of not applying updates due 
to lack of knowledge about how updates help them, and may be inflating the risks of applying an 
update due to one-time negative past experiences. 
The balance of costs and benefits has also been seen in studies of user behavior around 
other cybersecurity tools and techniques.  Two-factor authentication can increase the security of 
accounts where the feature is activated, but as Krol et al. found in 2015, costs of the technique in 
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terms of added mental and physical effort presents barriers to adoption [59].  An earlier study by 
Gunson et al. in 2010 around 2FA in automated telephone banking also found that users consider 
the added security of the technique, but also the decreased usability [40].  A broader study of 
2FA published in 2013 by De Cristofaro et al. used both interviews and a survey distributed 
through MTurk to assess 3 types of 2FA (i.e., one-time passwords generated by a security token, 
one-time passwords received via SMS, and one-time passwords generated by a dedicated 
smartphone app) [25].  In addition to finding ease of use and the amount of required effort being 
a core concern around 2FA, trustworthiness of the method also came up, showing that users are 
considering many kinds of costs around cybersecurity behavior.   
Though costs and benefits are rational decision-making components that we all 
intuitively assess when faced with an option, humans have bounded rationality and must assess 
these components to the best of their ability, given limited information and cognitive capacity 
[88].  The results of prior work in usable security showing significant knowledge gaps between 
groups of users around cybersecurity [36,67,99] suggests that knowledge may alter perceptions 
of the costs and benefits of these decisions. Thus, it is possible experts and those who adhere to 
expert advice see the costs and/or benefits of adhering to good security behavior differently than 
those who do not follow such advice.  Supportively, prior work has found divergence in mental 
models [17] and behavior of experts relative to non-experts.  Notably, Ion et al.’s 2015 survey of 
experts and non-experts found that the suggestions experts had to stay safe online (e.g., update 
frequently, use 2FA) were vastly different than what average users thought was important to do 
(e.g., use anti-virus, only visit websites you know) [51].  Though these results may imply that 
knowledge is key in cybersecurity motivations since it seems average users might not know how 
to stay safe, other factors are also involved in these perceptions that may run deeper than simply 
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how much a user knows.  Recent work has shown stark differences in perceptions and behaviors 
of users from different countries [41,85], indicating that users may vary in behavior for 
demographic reasons, such as local custom and culture.   Part of these differences could be 
attributed not only to how different individuals see costs and benefits, but also other pertinent 
aspects of these decisions. 
Falling well in line with this conceptualization of security behavior, the literature also 
shows us that risk perception can be quite impactful.  Howe’s 2012 review of work towards 
understanding human psychology in the context of security identified security risks and risk 
perceptions as a key consideration for researchers [50].  Numerous studies into various aspects of 
usable security since have also looked to risk, including those that have investigated mental 
models [2,6,17,55,97], perceptions [38,44], and awareness of users [43,61,71].  Recent work, 
such as Kraus et al.’s 2016 work has demonstrated that the desire for security, which is related to 
risk, has power towards cybersecurity motivations [58].   
Specific studies of adoption of particular secure behaviors have also found risk to be 
involved.  A 2010 study of password manager usability published by Karole, Saxena, and 
Christin showed that when comparing three forms of password manager (i.e., online, phone-
based, and USB-based), users opted for the phone manager, partly due to their discomfort in 
giving password control to an online entity [56].  This highlights how users sometimes worry 
about the risks in adopting actions that are recommended by experts.  These worries may not be 
unfounded, though, since researchers have noted the possible risks in some password managers 
[63].  Thus, since good security behavior is always changing, users have to be informed by 
experts in novel ways to keep them up to date on how to stay safe. 
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Multiple methods have been attempted to inform users and encourage good behavior.  In 
2010, Albrechtsen and Hovden explored the use of small-group, activity based sessions towards 
impacting cybersecurity perceptions and behavior [5]. In these sessions, among other tasks, 
participants discussed various security scenarios involving risks to information and data.  These 
interventions were found to significantly improve reported adoption of some secure behaviors, 
such as locking computers when they step away, as well as many aspects of awareness, such as 
responsibility and perceived skill [5]. More recently, in 2015, Larson assessed the impact a 
cybersecurity fair has on security perceptions [61]. Here, booths were set up that were aimed at 
teaching users about the risks to various systems and software, as well as ways to stay safe.  
Cybersecurity awareness scores before and after the fair were not significantly different, but the 
researcher identified that confusion due to the format of the fair and some of the content 
presented may have contributed to this lack of change in scores [61].   Using a more direct and 
issue-tailored intervention method, more success has been found by other studies, such as 
Harbach’s 2014 work that leveraged personal information to highlight the effect of Android 
permissions on user’s data [42].  This was meant to alter their perception of the risks associated 
with each permission, hopefully making them better realize what is at stake.  The study found 
that users made more privacy-conscious decisions when presented with such information at app 
installation.  Finally, in 2017, Albayram, Khan, and Fagan’s study of video-based interventions 
towards encouraging the adoption of two-factor authentication (2FA) had a strong risk 
component in its analysis, finding that a thematic focus on risk made videos more interesting, 
informative, and useful,  while those who saw the risk theme were also more willing to try 2FA 
[4].  Following all these prior works, the studies in this thesis prominently incorporate analysis of 
users’ risk perceptions around cybersecurity behavior. 
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As the background work presented has shown, the task of altering behavior is one that 
depends on many factors to be successful.  Organized models are needed to best understand how 
cybersecurity related messages (i.e., software update and warning messages, cybersecurity 
interventions) are received by users.  We will use one particular model of communication that 
had been shown useful in decoding why a message may fail if the desired behavior change is not 
achieved.  
2.1.2 Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP) Model 
When humans are delivered a message, there are several conditions that must be met if 
the message or warning is to be successful at changing perceptions and/or altering behavior.  
Multiple studies in this thesis are grounded using a communication human-information 
processing model that lays out how information is processed by individuals and demonstrates the 
places where there may be an issue with the message or delivery that results in non-compliance 
[21].  Figure 2-1(a) shows a visual representation of the C-HIP model. 
 
Figure 2-1: Visual representations of the (a) Communication-Human Information Processing model and (b) Affect-Reason 
Involvement model. 
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In the model, sources use channels in an attempt to elicit behaviors from receivers.  When 
a message is sent through a channel, it is processed, according to the model, in several stages by 
the receiver, all of which can feed back to prior stages.  First, the receiver must be paying 
attention to the channel to properly receive the message.  For example, in the context of an 
update, this means the user has to see the update message if they are to be motivated to apply it.  
Next, the receiver must understand the message and comprehend what they are being told.  If 
understood, the message’s content and delivery must align with the receiver’s attitudes and 
beliefs.  This is a somewhat broad, but important stage.  It is here that social motivations, 
emotions, values, and other deep-seated considerations can play a part in decision-making based 
on a delivered message.  Finally, the message must properly inform a user how to utilize the 
provided information and motivate them to act.   
This model is aimed at understanding how humans process a message and where the 
processing can go awry [107,110].  It has been used in the foundational design of all of the 
studies presented, even those which did not directly involve messaging.  In particular, attitudes 
and beliefs are believed to play a key role in the efficacy of messages aimed at altering behavior, 
suggesting that the influences of this stage may impact decision-making generally, not just in 
response to direct messaging.  Thus, understanding attitudes and beliefs about cybersecurity 
advice can help illuminate the complexities of users’ motivations.  Additionally, since a core 
goal of this thesis is study how to alter users’ perceptions and behaviors through direct 
intervention, the experiments in Chapters 3-6 examine users’ attitudes and beliefs about 
cybersecurity advice to understand how messages can be designed that are informed by the status 
quo, but also aim to alter perceptions in the minds of users. 
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The C-HIP model provides a grounding to guide this thesis’ investigations into users’ 
motivations and design of interventions to alter them, but expansion of “attitudes and beliefs” to 
identify specific components beyond the traditional rational perspective is needed to best 
approach the research questions.  In particular, this thesis builds on two prior tracks that have not 
been studied previously in the context of usable security extensively. 
2.2 Emotions and Motivations 
The prior section presented the predominant method of understanding cybersecurity 
motivations, and is the grounding for numerous studies in the field of usable security, but 
emotion has gained increasing prominence in the understanding of how messages can be best 
communicated to individuals.  The source and nature of emotions have been examined by 
researchers [15,16,45,73,74,100].  Emotions have also been studied for their theorized 
interaction with other constructs, such as societal behavior [10] and decision-making 
[53,62,64,14].  Simply, emotions are understood to manifest in individuals due to signals sent 
from the brain.  Emotions can be labeled and categorized in many ways, but the most basic is by 
valance, which refers to whether the emotion makes the individual feel good or bad.  An emotion 
that is “good” is said to have positive valence, while a “bad” emotion has negative valence. 
Studies have found that the communication of good behavior also needs to consider 
emotions as they can impact decisions individuals make, particularly in charged and stressed 
situations [35,53,64].  Therefore, a pillar of this thesis’ design and approach is the emotions users 
may feel in the context of cybersecurity decisions.  Though the scope of research into emotions 
is very broad, this thesis draws on two theories in particular.  First, the impact of emotions on 
behavior is formalized using the Affect-Reason-Involvement (ARI) model.  Second, prosocial 
emotions are considered, as they may possess particular power towards influencing behavior. 
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2.2.1 Affect-Reason Involvement (ARI) Model 
The Affect-Reason-Involvement (ARI) model argues that behaviors are motivations by 
one of three routes: rational, affective (emotional), or some combination [14].  A visual 
representation of the model can be seen in Figure 2-1(b).   
Rational appeals are those that address the logical and logistical reasons an individual 
should change behavior.  For example, common arguments individuals hear regarding the need 
to eat healthy and exercise is that doing so will improve one’s overall health and longevity.  This 
reasoning relies on informing individuals of the impact of their behavior and how changing can 
benefit them.  Rational appeals are a dominant form of persuasion in our society from a public 
policy standpoint.  Campaigns in various public policy fields, such as around the consumption of 
tobacco and alcohol, [8,106,108,109] have relied on rational and fear-based appeals to impact 
change among the population.  Though the success of these campaigns, in some cases, cannot be 
denied, it can be argued that relying solely on rational perspectives puts public policy at a 
disadvantage relative to other sources of motivation individuals may have. 
Emotional appeals differ from these rational appeals in a key way.  Rather than 
concerning what an individual has to gain from a behavior change, these involve how the 
individual may feel, in terms of emotions around the behavior.  This includes emotions that they 
may feel when considering a change in their behavior.  For example, though speaking up in a 
meeting may help one in one’s career, the not so uncommon fear of public speaking may 
overpower this rational reasoning.  Of course, the emotions we feel are not this limited, and so 
emotional appeals may also address the feelings one may have at other stages of the decision or 
behavior.  For example, some who do not quit smoking, despite decades of informational 
campaigns regarding the dangers and costs of the habit, may cite emotions of anxiety and 
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frustration felt after quitting as their reasons for not trying to quit smoking (or failing to quit) 
[18].  In this case, the anticipated emotions the individual expects to feel, either from direct 
experience or from feedback from others who’ve made the same decision hinders their adoption 
of a rationally better-for-them behavior. 
The power of emotions has been known for some time and harnessed before, notably by 
advertisers.  The cliché “sex sells” relates to this knowledge, but the power of emotion in 
advertising is not limited to those of sexual desire.  For quite some time, savvy businesses have 
harnessed the emotions we feel to influence our decisions to buy products and services.  On the 
surface, this can be an appeal to how one would feel when consuming the product or service.  
For example, the slogan, “I’m lovin’ it,” from McDonalds, tries to convince the consumer that 
the food from the restaurant is flavorful and satisfying through the emotions evoked by the 
thought of love.  Since emotions are involuntary and not fully understood in their manifestations, 
emotional appeals can also take more subtle forms.  For example, a large number of corporations 
utilize blue in their logos (e.g., IBM, Chase Bank, Boeing, Ford Motors, AT&T, Amtrak several 
airlines), which has been shown to be associated with confidence, success, and reliability when 
used in this context [82].  Thus, intentionally or not, these corporations use colors that positively 
impact consumers’ opinions of their brand through the emotional responses to the colors they 
see. 
As indicated in the Figure 2-1, both of these vectors to motivate a behavior, according to 
the ARI model can be at work at the same time.  This combined vector is most influential 
towards behavior since both the logical and subconscious reasons an individual may have are at 
play, and may work in a complimentary way.  When thinking of how to use these vectors in an 
intervention, it is important to consider how context may frame the decision.  Not only can the 
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rational considerations of various behaviors be different, but the emotions involved may also 
vary 
2.2.2 Prosocial Emotions 
Emotions can impact us to act in ways that are more or less socially preferred.  
Essentially, when an emotion elicits socially preferred actions, they are categorized as prosocial 
[52].    For example, when two friends are bickering, one may scold the other for starting the 
fight in the first place, which causes feelings of guilt in the other.  These feelings of guilt are 
considered prosocial since the subject is being motivated away from a behavior (i.e., whatever 
started the fight) by their friend instilling the emotion in them.  Example negative prosocial 
emotions are embarrassment, shame, and as we saw, guilt.  Please note that negative, in the 
context of prosocial emotions, refers to the valence of the emotions (i.e., whether the emotions 
makes one feel good/positive or bad/negative) and not the direction of the motivation.  In all 
cases for prosocial emotions, the subject is being motivated towards socially positive behavior. 
A positive prosocial emotion could be respect or trust.  The literature on prosocial 
emotions shows that they develop in childhood and are impactful on behavior from several 
societal levels [76].  Cybersecurity behavior can also be interpreted through this lens.  For 
example, some studies have shown that users cite bad past experiences with software updates as 
a reason for them to avoid future patches [96].  It could be that the past negative experiences 
eroded users’ trust in the updates, thus reducing the prosocial emotions they felt to apply 
subsequent updates. 
Though prosocial emotions are important to behavior, they have not been studied much in 
the context of cybersecurity in prior work.  Thus, this thesis takes on prosocial emotions, along 
with emotions in general, as a core component to the studies presented in the proceeding 
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Chapters.  Motivations that involve other people are not limited to feelings of prosocial 
emotions, and they may manifest in more direct and rational ways than through feelings.  Social 
motivations have been studied and discussed broadly in the literature. 
2.3 Social Motivations 
It has been argued that when a social value is involved in the decision being made, social 
dynamics are much stronger than any external manipulations in effect through incentives or 
disincentives [95].  For example, if a decision involves one’s moral convictions or social 
identity, then that can greatly impact the outcome of the decision.  Volunteering and donating to 
charity are some actions which have more apparent social motivations to them since they involve 
directly helping others for little or no direct benefit to the actor, but decisions that do directly 
benefit the individual may also have social motivations behind them. 
Actions to protect one’s safety, for example, commonly involve the safety of others, and 
can therefore be partly socially motivated as well.  This adds a new dynamic to the decision and 
behavior models we have discussed to this point.  Social motivations fit inside the structure of 
rational decision-making; doing good onto others helps convince them to do good onto us.  In 
fact, some argue that social motivations are merely a kind of individual motivation. That is, they 
argue, people engage in socially positive behavior because they want to get something from 
other people.  This idea is debated in the literature [95], but for the purposes of this thesis, the 
difference is moot.  Social motivations, whether they are truly distinct or not, are a discrete 
motivation that is an influence on the behavior of humans [9,11,27,49,91,95,101,105], and so 
have value in helping our understanding of users’ motivations around cybersecurity. 
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In the frame of social motivations, some cybersecurity experts could be prone to secure 
behavior because for them a breach of security means an embarrassment of their social identity 
as an expert, while an average user would suffer no such status loss if they experienced a 
comparable attack, leading them to less secure behavior.  It could also be that experts are more 
cognizant of social impacts of decisions.  Thus, like with many decisions, it is possible to see 
social sides to what users do or do not do to protect their data and security.  It may also be 
possible to better convince users to adopt expert advice through more targeted interventions that 
incorporate social cues.  The use of social motivations has been studied [49], and was found to 
be impactful when used in interventions targeted at employees dealing with interpersonal office 
conflicts [91] and at-risk students in the school environment [104].  Researchers in usable 
security have also looked to social motivations to help understand and alter users’ behavior.  
2.3.1 Social Motivations in Cybersecurity Behavior 
The use and study of social motivations around behaviors that involve cybersecurity is 
not new, but prior work in this field is limited.  Das et al.’s 2014 work hinted to possible power 
in social motivations, finding that social persuasion was reported as a source of security behavior 
and advice [23].  A recent related work by Redmiles, Malone, and Mazurek further found that 
these sources of advice are commonly judged based on not only the sources’ trustworthiness, but 
also base their assessment of the content of the advice itself, such as if the advice seems biased 
by marketing or may pose a risk to privacy [81]. 
Though social sources may be a place users go to for advice, how this advice is received 
depends on many factors, and, as a follow-up study by Das et al. found, leveraging social 
motivation to impact behavior change may be difficult [24].  Here, announcements on Facebook 
that did and did not incorporated social cues were used to encourage secure behavior, but found 
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no significant difference in effectiveness of messages between those that has these social cues 
and those that did not [24].  These mixed results in the literature come in the wake of strong 
arguments made by some scientists as to the power and importance of social motivations in 
decision-making [9,11,27,49,91,95,101,105].  Notably, this prior attempt to harness social 
motivations relied on observability of users’ decision by others.  Though this observability 
argument has been shown to influence behavior in other game-based studies [87], it’s possible 
that it may not be appropriate for the context of cybersecurity behavior.  Therefore, social 
motivations constitute the final pillar of this thesis as it sets out to better understand the impact 
and influence of these vital components to behavior. 
2.4 Summary 
To expand on the current literature on applying emotional and social approaches towards 
increasing adoption of good cybersecurity behavior, this thesis presents several reports of 
original research that are influenced by and follow on the prior work discussed in this Chapter.  
In subsequent Chapters, a rational framework is used to understand motivations, as is the case in 
numerous prior studies of usable security and user behavior, but new lenses are also used to view 
users’ motivations and behavior.   
In particular, the studies expand on prior work through investigation of the emotions 
users report feeling around sample cases of good security behavior, like updating, using two-
factor authentication, and using a secure password manager.  Other studies incorporate an 
indirect or direct social component that offers additional clues towards how social motivations 
may interplay with motivations around these decisions.  Exploring these aspects allows us to 
support prior work, while also generating new insights as to why users do what they do.  
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3 Understanding Users’ Motivations from 
a Rational Perspective 
A majority of research into cybersecurity, usable security, and users’ decision-making 
has focused on a rational perspective of their decisions.  In most cases, it is assumed that users 
make their decisions based on a balance of costs, benefits, and many times, risks.  Prior work has 
taken this frame and used it to study actions around updating [66,67,96,99], password 
management [89,92], use of password managers [56,63], as well as adoption of these behaviors 
more generally [46,47,86], but in all these cases, the investigations were limited in scope to 
individual behaviors or concepts of cybersecurity very broadly. 
Thus, in this Chapter a study is presented which takes the lead from the literature and 
specifically investigates the rational components of users’ motivations around several 
cybersecurity behaviors.  This is a novel investigation for the field that also helps inform the 
interventions that will be studied in a later Chapter.  This Chapter begins with Section 3.1, which 
describes the design of the study, including how these rational components and clues from prior 
work are incorporated into this design.  The results of this study support arguments in the 
literature [20,36,46,47] that motivating users to take up good cybersecurity behavior requires 
more than informational-based campaigns and/or improved engagement, and provide the initial 
foundation towards the paramount goal of designing interventions that aim to increase adoption 
of cybersecurity advice.  Specifically, in Section 3.2, we see how specific perception gaps around 
risks and costs may play a role in users’ motivation to follow the tested advice.  Section 3.3 
presents users’ motivations, in their own words, using qualitative data collected for this study.  
Here, the balance of security and convenience is prominent, as is the importance of past 
experience towards current behavior.  Section 3.4 discusses how social motivation, though 
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applicable in the contexts tested, are not very prominent in our data.  The results of this study are 
discussed related to prior work in Section 3.5.  Finally, the Chapter is summarized in Section 3.6. 
3.1 Experimental Approach 
A rational decision framework (i.e., benefit/cost/risk) was used to design the quantitative 
instruments for this study, but social motivations were also added to the structure.  This was 
inspired by the prominent track of literature arguing for and demonstrating the potential of 
attention to social considerations [9,11,23,27,49,91,95,101,106].  Additionally, these perceptions 
of individual and social costs, benefits, and risks all tie into users’ attitudes and beliefs about the 
advice tested.  As we know from the C-HIP model [21], any messaging aimed to increase 
adoption of these advices, such as those tested in a later Chapter, must conform with and/or 
manage users’ attitudes and beliefs about each to be successful. 
To execute this study, an initial screening sample was collected from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) that asked basic demographic questions and if participants followed 
the 3 target pieces of advice: 
• Keeping your software up to date 
• Using a password manager 
• Using two-factor authentication 
This survey was advertised on the MTurk service to users who resided in the United 
States and were 18 years of age or older.  An information sheet explained the study and 
participants who agreed to move forward where then delivered the screening survey.  Upon 
completion of the survey, these participants were compensated $0.25.  
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Two groups were formed for each advice where all participants in one group reported 
following the advice, while the other group reported not following.  All groups, across all 
advices contained 50 unique participants whom were contacted with the follow-up survey.  One 
group (those who did not update) only had 48 eligible participants in the entire screening sample, 
so only this number of participants was contacted for follow-up.  These groups were contacted 
with another web-survey through MTurk that first asked in an open-ended format why the 
participant chose to make the decision they did as per the group they were assigned.  Next, 
participants were asked to rate on a 4-point Likert scale how much benefit, cost, and risk they 
feel they get from their decision to follow or not follow their groups’ target advice and how 
much they think they would be benefited, cost, and put at risk if they changed their behavior and 
made the opposite decision.  In addition to these individual phrasings (i.e., how much the 
decisions benefit/cost/out at risk the participant), we also asked how much the participants felt 
users of other computers are benefited, cost, or put at risk by their decision or would be by the 
opposite, thus incorporating the social aspects of the considerations the participants are making.  
Each respondent was compensated $4 for their complete response to this survey.  Not all fifty 
participants contacted for each group responded, but final sample sizes were in the range of 30-
41 participants for each group.4  The format of all survey instruments from this study, and the 
basic demographics of all samples can be found in Appendix A.   
The data collected from these follow-up participants was analyzed for clues into why 
some follow and others do not follow the advice tested in this study.  Quantitative data was 
tested using Mann-Whitney U-Tests [65] to compare the differences in ratings for each variable 
                                                 
4Update: Follow = 39; Not Follow = 30 
2FA: Follow = 36; Not Follow = 31 
Pass. Manager: Follow = 41; Not Follow = 38 
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collected from those who reported following and those who reported not following, within each 
advice.  The qualitative data was coded using a Grounded Theory approach [90].  The codebook 
was developed by the author, initially populated with deductive codes selected based on the 
study design and pertinent literature prior to data collection.  These codes focused on broad 
concepts like “avoid risk” or “increase security” since context specific codes would be best 
developed inductively, while working with the data.  A total of seven deductive codes were 
developed. 
After data was collected, a random sample of one third of all comments from each group 
was gathered.  These samples were then used to develop inductive codes that focused on more 
specific concerns extracted from user comments. Some examples of codes developed though 
inductive coding are “I don’t want to” and “increase financial security,” showing the range of 
reasons given by participants. Since the kinds of reasons varied from group to group and advice 
to advice, many codes did not apply across all comments, but some did. For example, “Low/no 
risk/Don’t care if hacked” was applied to comments across multiple advices. A total of 32 
inductive codes were created for all groups and included in the updated codebook. 
These codes (deductive + inductive) were used as the codebook by a researcher other 
than the developer of the codebook, who was less involved in the study and its design.  Through 
coding, additional codes were developed in-vivo by this other researcher and included in the final 
codebook used to interpret all qualitative data. In all, an additional twenty-four in-vivo codes 
were created. 
 The motivations of the sampled users around the tested advice can be best interpreted 
from the data collected from them through the mixed methods procedures employed in the study.  
First we will look to the quantitative data to see the most significant differences between those 
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who follow each advice and those who do not (please note, the complete results of statistical 
testing, on all instruments in this Chapter, can be found in Appendix A).  Next, the qualitative 
data will be used to give more depth to the motivations revealed by the quantitative analysis.  
Finally, a particular feature of both the quantitative and qualitative data is highlighted: the lack of 
social motivation. 
3.2 Perception Gaps between Followers and Non-Followers 
The most apparent result in the quantitative data overall was the propensity for 
participants to rate the costs, benefits, and risks of each decision as favoring their reported 
behavior.  For example, for all advice, participants in the group that followed the advice rated the 
benefits to them of doing so as significantly higher than the groups who did not follow they 
thought they would experience if they changed (p < 0.001).  The reverse was the case as well; 
those who did not follow each advice rated the benefits they got from this decision as higher than 
the groups who followed each projected they would get if they did not (p ≤ 0.002).  It is natural 
that individuals would see benefits in their decision, regardless of what it is, since individuals are 
prone to stick with their current behavior when faced with a decision to change that involves 
uncertainty.  Known as status quo bias, studies have shown that individuals are prone to these 
rationalizations generally [84], as well as in the context of IT systems [57].  Instead, we must 
look beyond benefits to learn more about what motivates some and not others to adopt secure 
actions. 
3.2.1 Risks Related to Following and Not Following 
Analysis of participants’ risk ratings showed similar results as seen for benefits.  For all 
advice, those who followed rated the risks of not following as significantly higher than those 
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who reported not following each (p ≤ 0.003).  For the risks to others of not following, moderately 
significant (p ≤ 0.044) differences were found for 2FA and strongly significant (p ≤ 0.002) 
differences were found between followers and non-followers for the other two advice (i.e., 
updating and using a password manager).  This shows that users who end up following these 
advices may see risk in their prior behavior that other users do not.  Since the risks of not 
following each of these advices are demonstrable, this finding is a strong lead on how to 
communicate with users in the hopes of having them take up these behaviors.  It’s possible that 
an intervention which incorporates a carefully toned discussion of the risks of not adopting good 
security behavior may be effective at changing users’ perceptions and actions around such 
decisions. 
Interestingly, only one advice had a significant difference on the risk of following 
between those who follow and did not follow: using a password manager.  For the risk to the 
user of following, as Figure 3-1 shows, those who report not using a password manager see 
significantly more risk than those who report using the tool (p < 0.001). 
 
Figure 3-1: Response distribution of ratings from users and non-users of password managers for the risks of using the tool. Pass. 
Man. Yes = Participants who use a password manager, Pass. Man. No = Participants who do not use a password manager. 
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The pattern seen in Figure 3-1 highlights the importance of properly communicating all 
the benefits of a cybersecurity tool, especially those which bear a reputation for insecurity like 
password managers.  Since many non-users rate the risk in adopting the tool as much higher than 
users, and since it is known that experts recommend the use of a secure password manager, 
increasing knowledge around this particular aspect for this tool may help encourage more to 
adopt.  Naturally, this approach is context specific to password managers, and it may not carry 
for other advice.  Nonetheless, this demonstrates the importance of considering cybersecurity 
behavior as a whole as well as around individual advices.  As was the case for risks, other costs 
may vary in the eyes of average users between different behaviors they can adopt. 
3.2.2 Costs of Not Following 
The final component of the rational decision framework used to structure this study was 
cost of following and not following each of the advices tested.  The most informative result here 
is on the costs of not following each advice.  For the individual costs of not following, all groups 
that followed provided significantly higher ratings than those who reported not following (p ≤ 
0.003), except for using 2FA, where the differences were not significant.5  Thus, for all advice 
except 2FA, it could be that those who follow feel they would lose something if they did not 
adhere.   
For updating and using a password manager, the costs to users of other computers by the 
participants not following were also significantly higher when rated by those who followed 
compared to those who do not (p ≤ 0.001).  This shows possible social motivations related to 
                                                 
5 It should be noted here that the followers and non-followers for 2FA did test significantly different in their ratings 
of the risks of not using 2FA, so this lack of significance in cost of not following does not represent a similarity in 
thinking between followers and non-followers about the dangers of not activating 2FA. 
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these advices, though subsequent analysis presented in this Chapter will call into question the 
strength of these social motivations. 
3.3 Users’ Motivations, in their Own Words 
Despite the data showing an undeniable gap between those who follow each advice and 
those who do not when it comes to how they rate the benefits, costs, and risks of their decisions, 
to best understand specific motivations, which can further inform our approach to interventions, 
we turn to the qualitative data collected.  Through coding of the comment given by each 
participant where they explain the reasons for their decision in their own words, several patterns 
were found.  First, as we have seen in the analysis of prior studies presented in Chapter 2, there 
are several context specific concerns in the comments when looking from advice to advice.  
Despite these context differences, strong common trends did emerge as well, providing more 
valuable insight into user motivations.   
3.3.1 Security and Convenience 
Security, convenience, and the balancing of the two were apparent in numerous 
responses.  Almost all those who reported using a password manager (37 of 41) mentioned the 
added convenience as a reason for them doing so, while just over half of comments from the 
same group mention security benefits as part of the motivation (22 of 41).  For other advice, 
security was the top reason for users to adopt, such as comments gathered from those who use 
2FA (31 of 36).  A smaller portion of those who reported updating said security was a reason 
why than for these other two advice (19 of 39). 
Looking to those who do not follow each advice, security and convenience continued to 
play large roles in participants’ rated motivations around their decisions.  Seventeen of the 38 of 
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those who do not use a password manager report security as their reason for not using the tool.  
Convenience was more important to non-followers across other groups, being cited in comments 
from 15 of the 31 2FA non-users and 7 of the 30 of those who do not update regularly.   
In all, these results demonstrate the important balance users are striking between security 
and convenience when considering following these and similar advice.  Interventions would be 
wise to consider this in the specific context being targeted since the subject’s perceptions, 
attitudes, and beliefs around the advice may have to be addressed before any change can be 
expected.  In this case, that may mean, for example, interventions that encourage users to use 
2FA by acknowledging the inconvenience of using the tool that some users see and countering 
with the importance of the added security of this setting.  Other appeals should be adapted as 
appropriate for each context to maximize impact. 
Though security vs. convenience proved a strong trend in the qualitative data, comments 
were not limited to this dynamic.  The number of codes added in-vivo demonstrates the diversity 
in responses from participants, but one in particular is notable in its relation to prior work. 
3.3.2 Power of Past Experiences 
For some of the advices tested, users mention their past experiences as a reason for their 
decision one way or the other.  For example, 7 of the 31 of those who do not use 2FA mentioned 
not doing so because they did not see any risk in that action.  Even more, 8 from this group said 
their decision was driven by a confidence in current approach.  Half of the 38 who do not use a 
password manager mention this same reason.  These comments may reflect a lack of negative 
experience related to these participants’ current, insecure behavior.  If and when these negative 
experiences are had, these participants’ minds may be changed, as could be reflected by 
comments from security-minded participants in groups that follow each advice. Additionally, 3 
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of 30 participants in the group that reported not updating said their decision was driven by a past 
negative experience with a software update.  Prior work has found this a common reason users 
avoid updates [96].   
Though security was a top reason given by those who adhered to the advices tested, past 
experience was not directly cited in any comments as reasons for the decision to update.  On the 
flip side, negative past experiences were mentioned by some non-updaters, as predicted by prior 
work [28,96]. In addition some comments reflected a lack of negative past experiences by 
expressing confidence in techniques known to be insecure.  It can also be argued that those who 
adhere to some advices and cite convenience as their reason for doing so are acting out of 
positive past experiences of convenience. Together, these trends show the overall power of past 
experiences in shaping current decisions and motivations around cybersecurity.  Harnessing 
these experiences can be a way to promote adoption of these behaviors, either by addressing the 
negative experiences some may have had, or more effectively warning users of risks due to 
current actions.  For example, those who do not update can be reminded that in doing so, even 
though they are avoiding a possible inconvenience, they are also introducing a security risk that 
may result in much more inconvenience if compromised.  Included in this inconvenience is a 
possible risk to other computer users since a compromised machine could be used in an attack on 
others (e.g., as a member of a network of compromised machines executing a distributed denial 
of service attack [94]).  As the final trend in the data will show, participants across advice did not 
pay much mind to this risk, or any social considerations. 
3.4 Social Motivations to (Not) Follow Cybersecurity Advice 
Despite the existence of risks to others by not updating, a small number overall 
mentioned any kind of social motivation in their reasoning.  Of all comments, less than 10% of 
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the 215 received were coded as social.  It should be noted, though, that all were from those who 
adhered to their group’s advice, falling in line with work demonstrating the power of social 
motivations towards moderating behavior, as presented in Chapter 2. 
To better see this possible deficit in social motivations overall, for each variable (e.g., 
Benefits of Following, Risk of Not Following), the ratings for that variable across all advice were 
averaged and plotted in Figure 3-2, which shows that individual phrasings, garnered a higher 
average rating than social phrasings.  This suggests that individual considerations are stronger 
than social in the tested cases. 
 
Figure 3-2: Plot of average ratings for each rational component showing the difference between Individual and Social ratings for 
benefits, costs, and risks. 
Further testing of the data confirmed this interpretation. For all variables, the results of a 
Sign Test [26], which compared individual and social ratings to determine which is more likely 
to be rated higher yielded a p-value < 0.001, showing individual ratings were consistently rated 
higher than social.  Thinking to the literature [9,11,23,27,49,91,95,101,106], this deficit in social 
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motivation may help explain users’ lack of adoption of cybersecurity tools and techniques.  The 
desire to protect and help others can be a powerful regulator of action, but for the cybersecurity 
advice tested here, no such consideration of others exists.  If the deficit can be reduced through 
intervention (e.g., by highlighting how cybersecurity actions can affect other computer users), 
more users may take up better behavior as suggested by experts. 
3.5 Discussion 
Rational concerns among users are common in the literature, and many of our results echo 
prior findings.  For each advice, the reasons given by users in our study were similar to those 
reasons explored in other studies.  Password managers, for example, were found to suffer from 
some fear among non-users of the tool that adopting could pose a security risk.  This similar 
sentiment was seen in the results of Karole et al.’s analysis of password manager usability, where 
participants steered aware from online password managers like those asked about in our study 
due to concerns about the tool’s security [56].  Negative past experiences, which have been 
found in multiple prior studies to be hindrances to individuals applying software updates [66,96], 
were also found in the data for this Chapter around updating.  Additionally, a confidence in 
current approach, which could reflect a lack of negative past experiences related to their current 
behavior, was a reason given by some non-users of 2FA and password managers.  Two-factor 
authentication was also noted as being inconvenient by non-users, but secure by users, which is 
similar to finds from Gunson’s 2011 study of 2FA [40]. 
In many cases, these responses seemed to follow the rational framework of balancing costs 
and benefits that Herley has called for in exploring users’ motivations [46,47].  Chief benefits 
and costs, in the case of cybersecurity advice, are convenience and security.  The results in this 
Chapter show how users balance these two aspects in sometimes counter-intuitive ways, such as 
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the security concerns mentioned around using a password manager.  These results follow the 
many studies that have shown and theorized such a balancing among users [46,86,92,103].  
Understanding the power of this dynamic is important towards learning how to change 
perceptions and behaviors, especially in light of the quantitative data presented in this Chapter.  
As the C-HIP model explains, messages aimed at changing behavior must conform to the 
receiver’s attitudes and beliefs, which currently differ between users and non-users of all the 
advice tested according to these results.  Since experts are likely to be adherents to an advice 
when recommending it [51], they must consider that those they are trying to convince probably 
see the costs and benefits involved differently. 
One finding from prior work, the power of social motivations [23,95], was not found in 
this data.  According to the ratings of costs, benefits, and risks, individual concerns seem to 
dwarf social considerations made by most users.  The qualitative comments also generally lacked 
mentions of social considerations.  It’s possible that increasing the instances of these social 
considerations in the minds of users can make them more apt to adopt good behavior since 
psychologists have shown the power of social motivations [49,91,104].  Care must be taken, 
though, to avoid the traps of relying solely on informational and awareness based approaches in 
these interventions, as some have questioned the efficacy of this in the context of cybersecurity 
decisions [20,36,46,47].  Addressing components of motivation not studied here, such as 
emotions, will provide greater insight into how users think about these decisions. 
3.6 Summary 
In this initial study into users’ motivation, we learn much about why some decide to 
follow and not follow a range of cybersecurity advice.  As expected, perception gaps exist 
between adopters and non-adopters, but these gaps varied between advices.  Qualitative data 
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identified two trends that will come up in future Chapters.  First, security and convenience are 
commonly balanced by users in their decisions.  Second, past experiences can play a role in how 
users behave.  These issues are all possibly addressed through directed interventions that take the 
existence of these concerns into account.   
This study’s data also offered another possible clue towards users’ non-compliance with 
these and similar advices: social motivations are seemingly lower for these contexts.  These 
motivations apply in all these cybersecurity contexts since the compromise of one machine or 
account on the network puts others at risk in many ways.  Since the power of social motivations 
has been argued in other contexts [23,95], increasing how socially users thinking about these 
decisions may help encourage more of them to take up good behavior.  
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4 Emotions and Cybersecurity Behavior: 
Case Study in Password Manager 
Adoption 
The results of the study discussed in the prior Chapter revealed multiple reasons users 
may have for the decisions they make, but as some argue [10,14,16,35,53,54,62,64,98], non-
rational factors like emotions can also impact motivations.  Thus, understanding the emotions 
users feel in the contexts of the advices explored in Chapter 3 will best inform researchers about 
how and why they make the decisions they do and help design videos that use emotionally 
informed approaches in a later Chapter.  Emotions around these advices will be investigated 
through in-depth case studies since the prior work on this subject is limited.  
The details of the present study into password managers are described in Section 4.1.  In 
the next section, 4.2, we will see how users and non-users of the tool differ in their knowledge, 
opinions, and conceptions of password managers.  In Section 4.3, we will see how feelings of 
convenience can play a large role in this particular context, offering a lesson as to how these 
benefits may be used in conjunction with security-focused appeals to more effectively influence 
individuals towards adopting good behavior.  In-depth data collected about emotions around 
password managers is presented in Section 4.4, and reveals the concerns about security some 
individuals feel around the tool, despite expert recommendation.  This clue points to the 
importance of proper communication to effectively explain to users the functions and security of 
these kinds of tools towards cybersecurity.  The results of this study are discussed in relation to 
prior work in the usable security field in Section 4.5, followed by Section 4.6, which closes this 
Chapter. 
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4.1 Experimental Approach 
In this study, two groups of participants were collected from Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
using a single survey that automatically grouped participants based on their response to a 
screening question.  One group was comprised of password manager users (N = 137) and the 
other of those who reported not using a password manager (N = 111).  A survey was developed 
that asked about the participants’ opinions of and experiences with password managers, based on 
prior work [89].  These instruments were presented as statements which the participant could 
agree with on a 5-point Likert scale.  Statements were arranged in grids to allow participants to 
answer them quickly and efficiently.   
In addition to the grid-based statements, participants were also asked to rate on a 5-point 
Likert scale how much they would feel each of 45 emotions when using a password manager.  
These instruments were developed using prior studies of emotional hierarchies [15,74] and scales 
[45,100]: 
• One might feel CONFIDENT (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
• One might feel CONFUSED (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy the 
password manager is to use). 
• One might feel AFRAID (e.g., because one's time is being used by the password manager). 
• One might feel RESPECTFUL (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
• One might feel SCORNFUL (e.g., because the danger is easily countered). 
• One might feel POWERFUL (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking 
precautions).               
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Finally, participants were asked in an open-ended format “Why do you choose (not) to 
use a password manager,” phrased appropriately for their reported use of password managers.  
All survey instruments used can be found in Appendix B. 
This survey was distributed on MTurk and was available to users 18 years or older living 
in the United States.  Participants viewed the study information sheet and, if they agreed to take 
part in the study, were then shown the grid of general cybersecurity perception statements, and 
finally asked to report whether they used a password manager or not.  Each group was then asked 
the qualitative instrument and shown the password manager specific grid statements, followed by 
the in-depth emotions instruments.  All participants were compensated $1 for their complete 
response to the survey.  Basic demographics were also gathered from respondents and are 
presented in Appendix B. 
By looking at the differences on the grid-based questions and qualitative reasons for 
behavior, more detail will be gathered related to users’ attitudes and beliefs about using a 
password manager.  According to the C-HIP model [21], understanding these attitudes and 
beliefs is imperative towards design of messaging aimed at turning non-users into users.  
Relatedly, this study also gathers in-depth data about users’ emotions around using password 
managers.  Though we know much about rational reasons users may have around using a 
password manager from the investigation in the last Chapter and in prior work, the ARI model 
and theory of emotion more generally predict that emotions may also play a role 
[10,14,16,35,53,54,62,64,98]. 
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4.2 Users vs. Non-Users 
The first goal of this study’s analysis is to compare differences between users and non-
users of password managers to help understand why they made the decisions they did.  The value 
of comparing these two sub-populations lies in their juxtaposition in behavior, despite 
similarities in several other ways.  In the previous Chapter, by examining the broad differences 
in perceptions of benefits, costs, and risks between followers and non-followers of sampled 
advice, many insights were gained, but as the qualitative data showed, considerations varied 
between different advices.  Thus, we must look closely at differences between users and non-
users of password managers on aspects to their decision that were not targeted specifically in the 
last Chapter’s study. 
4.2.1 Differences in Knowledge and Opinions 
The first set of grid-based instruments can be seen in Table 4-1, which focused on 
participants’ knowledge/opinions of and experience with security generally.  Differences 
between each sample’s response distributions are compared using a Mann-Whitney U-Test [65]. 
Statement 
Users Non-Users U-Test 
Mean (Med.) Mean (Med.) U Sig. 
I am doing a good job of protecting my 
computer security. 
4.05 (4) 3.77 (4) 6241 0.005 
I could do more to protect my accounts. 3.56 (4) 3.68 (4) 7352.5 0.628 
I do not have time to pay attention to 
security. 
1.96 (2) 2.09 (2) 7030.5 0.266 
I do not feel my accounts are likely to be 
hacked. 
3.23 (3) 3.15 (3) 7100 0.472 
I do not know where to get computer 
security advice.  
1.83 (2) 2.08 (2) 6603 0.084 
I am knowledgeable about computer 
security. 
3.91 (4) 3.64 (4) 6469 0.031 
I care about computer security. 4.16 (4) 4.19 (4) 7297 0.625 
I trust my computer. 3.66 (4) 3.72 (4) 7315.5 0.58 
Table 4-1: Average and median rating of agreement with each general statement about computers and cybersecurity on a scale 
of 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree” from users and non-users of password managers, along with the results of 
Mann-Whitney U-Tests comparing the distributions for each group. 
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Other than how good a job they say they are doing at protecting their computer security 
and their knowledge of computer security, ratings for these statements were not significantly 
different between groups, suggesting the sets of users are mostly similar other than their behavior 
around password managers.  It is particularly interesting that there was no difference found on 
the statement “I could do more to protect my accounts,” since using a password manager is 
meant to further protect accounts. It could be that non-users take other steps that they feel brings 
them an equal amount of protection as users feel they get from password managers, but it could 
also be that non-users do not see a need for the added security given by password managers. 
The significantly higher rating users aggregately gave in their assessment of how good of 
a job they think they were doing in protecting their computer security relative to non-users is 
notable, especially considering the strength of the significance (p = 0.005).  This difference 
could possibly be an impact of users of the tool experiencing the security benefits first hand, thus 
being more likely to give a higher rating here than non-users.  Since users also gave moderately 
higher (p = 0.031) ratings of their knowledge of computer security relative to non-users, it could 
be that the users sampled simply better understand computer security, and thus know they are 
doing a better job than non-users at protecting it. 
It’s also somewhat notable that the differences in rating distribution for both groups were 
marginally significant (p = 0.084) for responses to the statement “I do not know where to get 
computer security advice.”  Normally, significance this low would not be considered in the 
analysis, but given the other statements of significance, this result may give more insight.  By the 
means seen in Table 4-1, non-users had a slightly higher mean for this rating, representing a 
higher magnitude agreement with the statement.  If some non-users do not know where to get 
cybersecurity advice, this may explain their lower ratings of their overall computer security 
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knowledge and confidence in security, as observed.  Thus, for these users, interventions could be 
effective at altering their perceptions and behavior around using a password manager since such 
interventions can help increase their knowledge of security and provide them a good source for 
computer security advice. 
4.2.2 Different Conceptions of the Tool 
To understand further the differences between users and non-users, the second set of grid-
based instruments asked about the tool in particular.  The statements and statistics for responses 
from both groups can be seen in Table 4-2. 
Statement 
Users Non-Users U-Test 
Mean (Med.) Mean (Med.) U Sig. 
I trust password managers. 3.77 (4) 3.05 (3) 4422.5 <0.001 
Password managers are more secure.  3.58 (4) 2.98 (3) 5125 <0.001 
Password managers help people. 4.28 (4) 3.85 (4) 5231.5 <0.001 
Password managers are easy to use. 4.19 (4) 3.87 (4) 5742 <0.001 
Password managers are more convenient. 4.16 (4) 3.84 (4) 5966 0.002 
I understand the theory behind password 
managers. 
4.14 (4) 3.89 (4) 6606.5 0.053 
I understand why password managers are secure. 3.78 (4) 3.05 (3) 4580 <0.001 
I worry that accessing my accounts may be more 
difficult with a password manager. 
2.31 (2) 2.69 (2) 6063.5 0.004 
Table 4-2: Average and median rating of agreement with each statement about password managers on a scale of 1 = “Strongly 
disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree” from users and non-users of password managers, along with the results of Mann-Whitney U-
Tests comparing the distributions for each group. 
These statements produced more significant differences between users and non-users.  
Users agreed more with trusting password managers, finding them secure, helpful, easy to use, 
and convenient (p ≤ 0.002).  In addition, users agreed more with the statement “I understand why 
password managers are secure,” (p < 0.001) a possible clue as to why non-users have not 
adopted; they may not see the same benefits.  Overall, these differences show that users have a 
much better view of the tool than non-users, particularly in areas such as trust, which are related 
to emotions and are important towards adoption. 
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Interestingly, non-users rated their agreement with the statement “I worry that accessing 
my accounts may be more difficult with a password manager,” significantly higher than users (p 
= 0.004).  This provides another clue as to why some choose to use the tool while others do not.  
It could be that some portion of non-users worries that the tool will be a detriment to their device 
use.  This highlights the importance of usability towards security.  If computer scientists desire 
adoption of security improving tools and techniques, it is unquestionably imperative for these 
solutions to be usable to individuals of average knowledge of computer science, as these results 
demonstrate.  As seen in prior work and the last Chapter, negative past experiences are 
commonly cited by those who do not follow cybersecurity advice, so even small flaws in 
usability can have far reaching consequence due to the primacy that users seem to give their 
convenience.  In addition, this highlights the avoidance of even perceived inconvenience that is 
not necessarily related to direct past experiences as a motivator of user’s cybersecurity behavior.   
4.3 Power of Convenience 
Further exploration of the differences between users and non-users focused on the 
responses they provided explaining why each group of participants made the decision they did 
around using a password manager.  Inductive coding was used to extract information from 
responses.  The codebook was developed through sampling comments and having multiple 
researchers develop codes for their sample.  These individual codebooks were then merged and 
the unified codebook, which contained a total of 19 codes, was used to code all comments.  After 
coding, codes were conceptually merged to discover trends in the reasons given for using or not 
using a password manager.  Table 4-3 below shows the summary of these trends and sample 
comments from the data. 
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 Reason Count Sample Response 
U
se
rs
 Convenience 49 (80.0%) “It’s convenient and easy to use.” 
Security 15 (24.59%) “It makes my password use more secure.” 
Other 1 (1.6%) “Work related purposes.” 
N
o
n
-U
se
rs
 
Security Concerns 51 (49.94%) “I feel they aren’t secure.” 
Lack of Need 47 (42.34%) 
“I can remember my passwords without 
the use of one.” 
Lack of 
Time/Motivation 
12 (10.81%) 
“It’s sometimes a hassle and I’m in a 
hurry.” 
Inconvenience and 
Usability Concerns 
10 (9.0%) “It seems inconvenient.” 
Table 4-3: Counts of comments from users and non-users of password managers explaining their behavior that was assigned 
each code indicated. 
For users, their reasons for using a password manager revolved mostly around the added 
convenience of the tool.  Some also mentioned the security they felt they got from using a 
password manager, but this number was dwarfed by convenience.  Most user participants 
mentioned convenience in their comments, showing the power this can have in motivating the 
adoption of a new technology.  For non-users, security concerns about the safety of password 
managers and a lack of need for the tool were the chief reasons given for not using it.  This 
highlights the constant balance of security and convenience, and how some are occasionally 
skeptical of convenience due to the possible security risks inherent in it.  Also, some participants 
cited a lack of time or motivation to use the tool, which is interesting considering the added 
convenience many users report.  It’s possible that some of these non-users may be turned into 
users if these benefits were effectively communicated. 
Repeating some of the findings from the prior Chapter, the data for this study showed 
participants’ motivations generally revolved around the convenience they get from using the tool 
and, as is the case for non-users, concerns about security.  As seen in Table 4-3, a relatively 
small portion of sampled users citied security in their comment compared to the number who 
mentioned convenience.  These shows how benefits other than security can be very powerful at 
encouraging users to adopt secure tools and techniques.  Developers should take note of this in 
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the design of future security products to help encourage the adoption of this software, as 
recommended by experts.  Additionally, in the design of interventions aiming to persuade 
subjects to adopt good security behavior, it would be pertinent to leverage and highlight any of 
these non-security benefits secure behavior may have as they may be powerful in leading more 
to be convinced by the appeal.   Finally, there may be additional emotions users associate with 
password managers beyond security (or lack thereof) and convenience. 
4.4 How Users Feel About Secure Password Managers 
In addition to the previous quantitative and qualitative data, participants were also asked 
to rate the degree to which they anticipate they would feel each of 45 emotions when using a 
password manager.  Mann-Whitney U-Tests were used to compare the distributions of ratings for 
each emotion given by users and non-users.  When looking to the emotion ratings given by 
participants, there are some significant differences in the ratings given by users and non-users, as 
seen in Table 4-4. 
Emotion 
Users Non-Users U-Test 
Mean (Med.) Mean (Med.) U Sig. 
Secure 3.80 (4) 3.50 (4) 6148 0.01 
Energetic 2.58 (3) 2.21 (2) 6111 0.01 
Admiring 2.66 (3) 2.32 (2) 6305 0.017 
Suspicious 2.39 (2) 2.80 (3) 5788 0.01 
Table 4-4: Average and median rating of the strength participants say they would feel each emotion when using a password 
managers on a scale of 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree” from users and non-users of password managers, along 
with the results of Mann-Whitney U-Tests comparing the distributions for each group. 
Though users rated feeling more secure, energetic, and admiring than non-users rated 
they would feel when using a password manager, non-users rated they would feel significantly 
more suspicious.  As with the comments and trust ratings seen in prior sections, there seems to 
be a difference in opinion between the samples over the security of password managers.  Also, 
these results suggest that users of password managers may be externally motivated to adopt the 
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tool, as shown by their higher ratings for energetic and admiring, but these feelings could also be 
a result of them having experience with the tool and liking it. 
Rank 
Users Non-Users 
Emotion Mean Emotion Mean 
1 Secure 3.80 Secure 3.50 
2 Confident 3.54 Confident 3.35 
3 Trusting 3.49 Trusting 3.29 
4 Happy 3.46 Happy 3.26 
5 Grateful 3.42 Grateful 3.23 
6 Cared-For 3.03 Powerful 2.83 
7 Proud 3.00 Suspicious 2.80 
8 Welcomed 2.97 Cared-For 2.77 
9 Powerful 2.91 Proud 2.76 
10 Triumphant 2.90 Welcomed 2.71 
Table 4-5: The ten emotions that received the highest mean rating from password manager users and non-users.  
Looking at the means of all emotions for both groups, a trend appears.  As seen in Table 
4-5, for both users and non-users, the emotions that received the first, second, third, fourth, and 
fifth highest mean ratings were the same.  Secure was the only one of these that was significantly 
different between groups (as seen in Table 4-4).  The other emotions, despite their high 
magnitude, were rated similarly between users and non-users, according to inference testing.  
Interestingly, secure was the highest rated emotion for both groups, showing that many non-users 
may acknowledge at least some of the security benefits of the tool, even if they do not feel 
motivated enough to adopt.  Additionally, the rest of the top 10 emotions from each group by 
mean contained several of the same emotions, albeit in differing orders, with one notable 
addition for non-users: suspicious, which was the seventh highest rated emotion for this group.  
These combined results could reflect similar emotions associated with password managers 
between the groups, with key differences around security and suspicion that may be the hinge of 
behavior change.  Addressing these limited emotional gaps between users and non-users may 
help turn more non-users around on their decision. 
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4.5 Discussion 
These findings related to specific emotions around the use of password managers are 
novel for the field of usable security.  Some prior studies have looked into the security of 
password managers [63], finding that there are some legitimate security concerns with some 
implementations of the tool.  Our results possibly reflect this, with non-users rating suspicion 
much more highly than users of password managers did. Relatedly, a usability assessment of 
three types of password managers found that users opted for phone-based applications relative to 
online versions of password managers [56].  Again, this may be reflected in the higher suspicion 
rating from non-users in the current study.   
Despite this focus on security for non-users, qualitative results for this study found that 
convenience, rather than security was a key reason users cite for adopting a password manager.  
Considering other advice people can adopt, such as updating software, these results contrast with 
the inconvenience non-updaters report as a reason to not want to update [66,67,96,97,99].  
Inconvenience in using 2FA has also been noted in prior work [25,40,59].  Convenience 
continues to be a theme in users’ considerations, even annoying those who are security conscious 
and knowledgeable.  Since some security protocols, tools, and techniques require inconvenience 
to be traded for security, security researchers would be wise to take note of these results.  They 
show, as prior work has argued [46,47], that users’ decisions not to adopt cybersecurity advice, 
in some cases, boil down to avoiding extra effort. 
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4.6 Summary 
The results of this Chapter further our understanding of users’ perceptions and motivation 
around the adoption of password managers.  Users of the tool like the convenience they get from 
it, sometimes without even thinking of the security.  It’s possible this added convenience may 
also put some users off since a good number of those who do not use the tool report worry about 
security.  This thinking is bolstered by emotion analysis that shows that suspicion and security 
are among the emotions rated most differently between users and non-users.  These security 
concerns are important to address in interventions to encourage password manager use, but the 
results of this Chapter can also inform motivations around cybersecurity advice more generally.  
 The balance of security and convenience, as seen in many studies [46,47,86,92,103], may 
also reflected in the emotion ratings seen in this study.  In addition to suspicion and security, 
other positive emotions were also rated significantly differently between users and non-users, 
with users feeling more admiring and energetic than non-users.  This divergence could be related 
to the commonly cited convenience enjoyed by users of the tool.  Interventions that highlight this 
aspect of password managers to non-users may be effective for that context, but not all advice is 
the same.  Exploring emotions around additional cybersecurity behavior will further inform our 
understanding of how they may interact with security decision-making more broadly.  
 50 
 
5 Emotions and Cybersecurity Behavior: 
Case Study in 2-Factor Authentication 
Though the added security is obvious to many experts, the results in Chapter 3 showed 
two-factor authentication (2FA) is also perceived as a high-cost way to preserve security that 
non-users worry is inconvenient.  Unlike password managers, despite both protecting account 
security, 2FA requires semi-regular effort when logging in from new devices or when accessing 
accounts that require the regular use of feature.  To best understand how these differences in 
context impact motivation around 2FA compared with other advice, this Chapter presents a study 
that investigated emotions individuals associate with 2FA. 
Section 5.1 will present the design and execution of the study used to collect the data 
analyzed in this Chapter.  These procedures resulted in a sample which was divided and analyzed 
as three sub-groups: users (N = 148), non-users who are aware of 2FA (N = 22), and those who 
had not heard of 2FA at all (N = 125).  Though the prior Chapter focused on analyzing 
differences between users and non-users of password managers, the sample collected for this 
Chapter related to 2FA was more complex, with many reporting not having heard of the feature.  
For this reason, the analysis in this Chapter will divide the data differently to extract findings 
related to individuals’ emotions around 2FA and how they may impact decisions to use the tool 
or not.  In this vein, Section 5.2 discusses how even those with the same behavior around 2FA 
differed in their perceptions of the tool.  Next, Section 5.3 explores the reasons non-users report 
for avoiding 2FA, along with a description of the emotions this group associates with the feature.  
Finally, a third group of general users, those who do not know 2FA, are investigated in Section 
5.4.  All of these results are discussed next to prior, related studies in Section 5.5.  The Chapter is 
finally summarized in Section 5.6. 
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5.1 Experimental Approach 
One survey was used on Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to collect 3 samples totaling 295 
participants.  The survey was advertised to users of the service who are 18 years or older and 
reside in the United States.  First, the study’s information sheet was shown to participants.  If 
they agreed to continue and take part in the study, participants then responded to a grid that 
presented a series of statements about computers and cybersecurity that they were asked to agree 
with on a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., the same statements as used in the initial grid in the last 
Chapter’s study).  Then they were asked if they knew what two-factor authentication is, as well 
as if they currently use the feature.  These instruments served as branching questions where those 
who said they knew 2FA were shown another grid of statements, this time about 2FA in 
particular, as well as instruments designed to gather participants’ ratings of 45 emotions they 
may feel while using 2FA.  These instruments asked about 45 distinct emotions and prompted 
participants to imagine they were using.  Finally, those who know what 2FA was were also asked 
to report, in open-ended format, why they decided to follow or not follow the advice, as 
indicated by their responses to the earlier instruments.   Those who reported not knowing 2FA 
were not shown additional instruments.  All participants were compensated $1 each.  All survey 
instruments as well as statistical summaries of basic demographic instruments are included in 
Appendix C. 
Like with the last Chapter, the grid-based quantitative instruments, emotion instruments, 
and qualitative reasons for using or not using 2FA will help inform users’ attitudes and beliefs 
around this particular advice, as defined in the C-HIP model [21].  Unlike the study presented in 
Chapter 3, more specific perceptions than basic cost, benefits, and risk can be assessed.  In 
particular, we focus on emotions, which we have seen can be very informative to understand 
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motivations overall.  The findings from this study can help build informed interventions that aim 
to alter users’ perceptions and behavior around 2FA by looking at how different users see the 
feature and how that may influence decisional outcome. 
5.2 Same Behavior, Different Perceptions 
In the previous Chapter, the differences between users and non-users of password 
managers were examined.  In the case of using 2FA, though, relatively few of those who had 
heard of 2FA report having never used the feature compared to those who had never used a 
password manager.  Statistical testing yielded no significant differences between the responses of 
users and non-users of 2FA on any of the study’s survey instruments.  This could show similar 
thinking among both groups, but the lack of results could also be related to the stark imbalance in 
sample size between users (N = 148) and non-users (N = 22). 
To best understand users’ considerations around the use 2FA, another breakpoint for the 
sample was selected.  Non-users of the tool were removed so that only those who reported using 
2FA were analyzed from this point.   Next, the distribution of responses for each instrument was 
examined to find instruments that received divided responses from participants.  In this process, 
most were found to be heavily skewed towards one end of the scale or the other, showing general 
agreement among all participants in their ratings on these instruments.  Ratings for one 
statement, though, were found to be more evenly distributed across the possible responses.  The 
response distribution for this statement is shown in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1: Distribution of agreement with the statement “two-factor authentication is more convenient,” for those who reported 
using 2FA. 
As seen in the figure, based on agreement ratings with the statement “two-factor 
authentication is more convenient,” two, roughly even groups of users can be created.  One of 
these groups all disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that 2FA is more convenient (N 
= 71), while the other are indifferent or agree with that statement (N = 77).  This breakpoint also 
has contextual significance in that convenience is a core trade-off with security, and 
inconvenience, as seen in Chapters 3 and 4, and in prior work [46,47,86,92,103], is a common 
reason non-users of the feature have to not adopt.  Thus, it is important to compare users that also 
think 2FA is inconvenient with users who do not hold this opinion.  In doing so, we can best 
understand how users view 2FA more broadly to inform intervention approaches for this advice. 
On statements about their history with computers and cybersecurity generally, there was 
no differences between these two groups, indicating similarities in their self-perceptions.  On the 
set of statements about 2FA specifically, responses between the two groups were only different 
for one: “two-factor authentication is easy to use” (U = 1608.5, p < 0.001).  This result is not 
surprising since perceptions of how easy the tool is to use are closely related to overall views on 
convenience.  In fact, agreement with the statements “two-factor authentication is easy to use” 
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and “two-factor authentication is more convenient,” were strongly correlated (r = 0.477, p < 
0.001).  Comparisons of the 45 emotion ratings yielded further significant results. 
A total of 17 emotions had distributions test significantly different between those who 
rated disagreement with the statement “two-factor authentication is more convenient” and those 
who were indifferent or agreed with the statement, showing a large divergence in the emotions 
different groups of users feel about 2FA.  As seen in Table 5-1, there was a mix of emotions that 
had different distributions, but across all, those who were indifferent or found 2FA to be more 
convenient rated the emotion higher than those who did not find 2FA more convenient.  This is 
particularly interesting since differences spanned both positive and negative emotions, as well as 
those that are individualistic and prosocial, suggesting that the group who is indifferent or finds 
2FA more convenient have generally stronger emotional reactions to using the tool.   
Emotion 
Not More 
Convenient 
Indifferent/More 
Convenient 
U-Test 
Mean (Med.) Mean (Med.) U Sig. 
Friendly 2.28 (2) 3.06 (3) 1682.5 < 0.001 
Energetic 2.14 (2) 2.92 (3) 1726.5 < 0.001 
Respectful 2.63 (3) 3.26 (3) 1792.5 < 0.001 
Admiring 2.21 (2) 2.83 (3) 1860 0.001 
Welcomed 2.56 (3) 3.25 (3) 1864.5 0.001 
Contemptuous 1.52 (1) 2.04 (2) 1927.5 0.001 
Cared-For 2.77 (3) 3.30 (3) 2002 0.003 
Dishonored 1.28 (1) 1.70 (1) 2095.5 0.004 
Humiliated 1.27 (1) 1.66 (1) 2117.5 0.005 
Isolated 1.51 (1) 1.90 (2) 2088.5 0.006 
Proud 2.70 (3) 3.26 (3) 2053 0.007 
Lonely 1.35 (1) 1.78 (1) 2129.5 0.008 
Afraid 1.51 (1) 1.94 (2) 2132 0.011 
Triumphant 2.69 (3) 3.19 (3) 2100.5 0.012 
Happy 3.01 (3) 3.44 (3) 2085 0.013 
Grateful 3.19 (3) 3.56 (4) 2095 0.014 
Ashamed 1.46 (1) 1.84 (2) 2175 0.018 
Table 5-1: Average and median rating of the strength participants say they would feel each emotion when using 2FA on a scale 
of 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree” from those who do not find 2FA more convenient and those indifferent or 
who do find it more convenient, along with the results of Mann-Whitney U-Tests comparing the distributions for each group. 
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Also, as seen in Table 5-2, the list of top ranked emotions from both groups share many 
of the same emotions, but overall, the mean magnitude of emotion ratings for the 
indifferent/more convenient group were higher.  Notably, several of the emotions whose 
distributions were found to be significantly different, such as cared-for, happy, and respectful are 
also in both groups’ list of top rated emotions.  If, as these results suggest, those who do not find 
2FA convenient are also generally less emotionally impacted by the tool, this adds color to the 
picture of 2FA motivations by implying a strong focus on convenience that predicts other aspects 
of perceptions around the feature.  On the surface and at a minimum, this shows the balance of 
security and convenience that users make, but also that this balance is not always seen the same, 
even among those who share the same behavior.  Looking to the results in the prior Chapter, 
users of both 2FA and password managers seem to rate emotions similarly around each 
respective advice.6  Notably, emotions of security, confidence, and trust are all prominent among 
users of both advices, possibly reflecting the added security these users experience as a result of 
their decision to follow.  This similarity across two different advices further confirms the 
centrality of security in these decisions, and how emotions related to security seem to be 
associated with following.  Despite these similarities, each advice does present a different 
context for users, and digging deeper can better inform about how these contextual differences 
may impact emotions around 2FA in ways not seen for password managers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Looking to the emotions listed in Table 5-2 and Table 4-5, many of the same entries appear, such as secure, 
trusting, confident, grateful, and cared-for, among others.  Also, the mean ratings for these emotions were similar 
between the two advices. 
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Rank 
Not More Convenient 
Indifferent/More 
Convenient 
Emotion Mean Emotion Mean 
1 Secure 3.90 Secure 3.86 
2 Trusting 3.55 Confident 3.68 
3 Confident 3.48 Grateful 3.56 
4 Grateful 3.19 Trusting 3.49 
5 Happy 3.01 Happy 3.44 
6 Powerful 2.93 Cared-For 3.30 
7 Cared-For 2.77 Respectful 3.26 
8 Proud 2.70 Proud 3.26 
9 Triumphant 2.69 Welcomed 3.25 
10 Respectful 2.63 Triumphant 3.19 
Table 5-2: The ten emotions that received the highest mean rating from those who do not find 2FA more convenient and those 
indifferent or who do find it more convenient. 
Low emotional arousal, especially on positive emotions such as happy and grateful 
means that the 2FA users sampled who say they do not think 2FA is more convenient may be on 
the edge of becoming non-users of the feature.  By the ratings in Table 5-2, the top emotion for 
both groups was secure, and this emotion was rated similarly by each.  Therefore, though all 
users see the security in using 2FA, those who find it convenient, or at the least, not inconvenient 
are likely to more strongly associate positive emotions with use of the feature, which can then 
better regulate their motivation to continue using the tool despite the continued effort.  The 
differences among users show how complex these decisions can be, with even those who follow 
the same advice having drastically different views on it.  This complexity is only increased when 
looking to the motivations of non-users of 2FA, including both those who are aware of the 
feature, and those who are not. 
5.3 Non-Users: “Haven't needed it, nor has it been offered” 
Unlike with password managers, where all participants analyzed had heard of the tool, 
the balance of users and non-users who were also aware of 2FA was not even.  Despite 295 total 
responses to our survey, only 22 reported knowing about 2FA while not using it.  Likely because 
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the sample size of those who use 2FA was much greater than the sample of non-users, statistical 
testing yielded no significant differences on responses to the various quantitative instruments 
used.  Qualitative data from non-users in response to the question asking them to explain why 
they choose not to use the feature is quite telling about this group.  These responses were 
reviewed for themes by the head researcher due to the small number of comments gathered, and 
the small length of each response which would make full inductive coding relatively unhelpful. 
Many participants were blunt in their responses.  For example “sounds inconvenient,” 
“not wanting to spend the time,” and “just too much,” were all short comments from non-users 
that expressed similar sentiments about the time and effort needed to use 2FA.  These comments 
support the findings on similar data presented in Chapter 3, and show continued contrast with the 
reasons given for non-followers of other advice.  For example, as seen in the prior Chapter, fears 
about security risks were a common reason for non-users to avoid password managers, but a 
desire for convenience was cited as a benefit by many users.  Here, for 2FA, inconvenience is a 
prime motivator for non-users, showing how ostensibly similar concerns can be anchored in 
varying ways depending on the context of the decision. 
Beyond inconvenience, participants citied other reasons to explain their non-adoption of 
2FA.  Some report that they have not been compelled to use the feature, either due to their own 
lack of motivation, a lack of external suggestion to activate it, or both.  For example, one 
participant summed their reasoning as “because I don't use a lot of things that have it,” while 
another said, “haven't needed [2FA], nor has it been offered.”  In both of these cases, 
proliferation as well as better communication of 2FA and its availability may encourage these 
individuals to activate the feature, as experts recommend. 
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Better communication may also clear up some points of confusion users reported that 
motivated them not to use 2FA.  For example, one stated “two-factor authentication is no 
replacement for a strong password.”  In this case, though the user shows understanding of the 
importance of a strong password, they seem to miss that 2FA can be combined with a strong 
password and the added security should be considered independent of the password strength.  
Other participants were upfront with their lack of awareness as a reason to not use 2FA: “[I do 
not use 2FA] because I'm not sure exactly how it works or what to do.”  Increasing awareness 
may help in some of these participants’ cases towards motivating them to use 2FA, but not every 
non-user can be turned by these means. 
Some comments revealed very legitimate reasons for avoiding the tool.  One participant 
shared a story showing the possible risks of using 2FA if things go drastically wrong: 
My son had 2 factor authentication on his Gmail account and lost access to his cell 
phone. Consequently, it took him 6 months to regain access to his Gmail account. This 
was an unusual situation, but made me nervous. 
Other participants stated they could not easily use 2FA because they did not have ready 
access to a cell phone.  These cases highlight how accessibility and usability may limit users’ 
motivations to adopt some advice.  Though the population without a cell phone may be small, as 
shown in these comments, users may still worry about if they lose access to their cell phone and 
how that may impact their ability to use other services.  As with other advice such as updating, 
these personal negative experiences as depicted in the longer participant quote above can have 
drastic impacts of users’ attitudes and beliefs about particular advice, lowering motivation for 
them to adopt.  Management of these negative experiences, either through communications or 
improved usability is an important step towards improving overall cybersecurity behavior. 
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Rank 
Users Non-Users 
Emotion Mean Emotion Mean 
1 Secure 3.88 Secure 3.73 
2 Confident 3.59 Confident 3.64 
3 Trusting 3.52 Grateful 3.50 
4 Grateful 3.38 Trusting 3.45 
5 Happy 3.24 Happy 3.27 
6 Powerful 3.06 Cared-For 3.09 
7 Cared-For 3.05 Proud 2.91 
8 Proud 2.99 Powerful 2.86 
9 Respectful 2.96 Triumphant 2.77 
10 Triumphant 2.95 Respectful 2.71 
Table 5-3: The ten emotions that received the highest mean rating from 2FA users and non-users. 
Despite compelling negative reasons to avoid using the feature given by some non-users, 
their response to the emotion instruments told a slightly different story.  Though no statistically 
significance was found in the differences in distributions of individual emotions for users of 2FA 
versus non-users, non-users had notably lower ratings for emotions, as seen in Table 5-3.  This 
was true despite a similar ordering of emotions by mean for each group.  In all, this indicates that 
though users and non-users associate the same emotions with using 2FA, non-users rate the 
magnitude of those emotions lower.  This contrasts with the case of password managers as seen 
in the prior Chapter, where users and non-users differed on core emotions associated with using 
the tool.  Here, the difference seems to be mainly around how strongly the emotions are felt 
rather than which.  Like with those who thought 2FA was not more convenient, low arousal of 
emotions may be part of non-users’ lack of adoption of the feature and interventions that address 
this arousal gap may be successful in changing perceptions of 2FA as well as encourage more to 
adopt it.  Though these results show the complexities of users’ considerations around this advice, 
for some participants, their decision to not use 2FA was driven by other, more direct forces, 
specifically, a lack of awareness of the feature. 
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5.4 What’s Two-Factor Authentication? 
In addition to users and non-users of 2FA, this study also collected a third, group of 
general users: those who do not know what 2FA is at all.  This group was (N = 125) comparable 
in size to the group of participants who had heard of the feature, regardless of their behavior (N = 
170).  Considering this, responses to the initial grid statements, which were the only instruments 
those who did not know what 2FA was were presented besides the branching question asking 
them about their knowledge of the feature. Table 5-4 shows the mean and median ratings of 
agreement for the statements found to be significantly different between the two groups. 
Statement 
“Know” “Don’t Know” U-Test 
Mean (Med.) Mean (Med.) U Sig. 
I am doing a good job of 
protecting my computer security. 
3.92 (4) 3.62 (4) 8508 0.001 
I do not have time to pay attention 
to security. 
1.98 (2) 2.24 (2) 8797 0.007 
I do not know where to get 
computer security advice.  
1.94 (2) 2.33 (2) 8269 < 0.001 
I am knowledgeable about 
computer security. 
3.91 (4) 3.35 (4) 7190.5 < 0.001 
Table 5-4: Average and median rating of agreement with each general statement about computers and cybersecurity on a scale 
of 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree” from those who know of 2FA and those who do not know what 2FA is, along 
with the results of Mann-Whitney U-Tests comparing the distributions for each group. Note: only significant results are shown. 
Overall, those who did not know what 2FA was also reported doing worse of a job 
protecting their computer security, having less time to pay attention to security, know less about 
where to get advice, and are less knowledge about computer security compared to those who at 
least heard of 2FA, including non-users.  This suggests that there could be a correlation between 
how “plugged into” cybersecurity a user is (i.e., how much awareness and engagement they 
have) and users’ knowledge of and ability to recognize basic security advice such as 2FA.  
Though increased engagement has not been shown to increase security outcomes [36], and some 
have questions the efficacy of increasing users’ awareness as a way to increase cybersecurity 
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adoption [20,46,47], it does seem that for some advice, lack of awareness plays at least part of 
the role for non-adoption. 
5.5 Discussion 
Prior work [46,47,86,92,103], including the study in Chapter 3 has found a centrality of 
security and convenience when it comes to cybersecurity, but in those cases, the division was 
centered around followers and non-followers of good advice.  Here, for 2FA, differences around 
convenience were found even among those who exhibit the same behavior.  When thinking to the 
prominence of convenience in the rationale of the small number of non-users of 2FA examined 
in this study, it could be that these users who do not think there is convenience in using 2FA are 
on the verge of becoming non-users.  These results also follow those of prior studies that have 
identified usability and convenience as core concerns around 2FA [25,40,59].  Since using 2FA 
requires at least some regular effort and many users at least perceive added effort due to the 
feature, managing these attitudes and beliefs about cost may help encourage adoption and 
continued use.  This challenge is distinct from the lessons learned for password managers, where 
security concerns among non-users were most apparent.  These differences in advice context also 
seem to impact the emotions users associate with each, though patterns between advice are 
becoming apparent, namely the prominence of security and trust across multiple behaviors. 
Emotional perceptions can only be formed, though, if users are aware and informed about 
the decision and/or behavior.  As seen in this sample, many users are not aware of 2FA, and so 
have no chance to use the tool until some form of messaging or intervention changes that.  This 
is not to suggest that the task of encouraging users to adopt 2FA is as simple as informing them 
of its existence.  Prior work has argued against this approach [20,36,46,47], and as seen in the 
qualitative data from non-users of the feature, use of 2FA may be impeded by users’ 
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circumstances, such as access to an independent device on which to receive the second factor.  
Additionally, negative past experiences, as well as general perceptions of inconvenience may 
also hinder the motivation of some to activate 2FA. These issues require more sophisticated 
intervention approaches than simply informing users of 2FA since users’ attitudes and beliefs 
and emotions are also different between groups that are informed about and use the tool. 
5.6 Summary 
Two-factor authentication proved different than password managers in many respects 
related to perceptions and emotions.  Password managers are, based on the sample analyzed in 
Chapter 4, fairly known by users on MTurk, but stark divisions exist between users and non-
users.  For 2FA, many participants did not know of the advice, though most that knew 2FA 
reported using it.  Also, in this sample, differences were much more apparent between different 
groups of users than between users and non-users of the feature.  In particular, those who rated 
that they disagreed with the statement “two-factor authentication is more convenient,” had 
significant differences on ratings of many emotions compared with those that were indifferent or 
agreed with the statement.  This could reflect an important divergence based on convenience for 
even many that follow the advice.  In all, though, these results continue to support the 
importance of convenience in both use of 2FA and password managers, tools/features that aim to 
increase account security, but in different ways. 
Not all good behavior is directly related to accounts and security.  For example, software 
updates, which are needed across many devices and software, do not always contain security 
patches, though vital fixes are delivered from time to time.  Updates are also different than 
password managers and 2FA in that they are usually prompted by messages (if not just automatic 
entirely), which presents a unique vector for motivations.  
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6 Emotions and Cybersecurity Behavior: 
Case Study in Software Updates 
As the results presented in the prior two Chapters demonstrate for password managers 
and 2FA, the emotional perceptions of users can vary between different cybersecurity advices, 
just like rational considerations.  Studying emotional responses to various cybersecurity advices 
will not only help us understand individuals’ motivations around these decisions, but will also 
inform the design of emotionally aware videos targeted at changing individuals’ behavior.  
Behavior change will be the goal of the next Chapter, but first, in this Chapter, people’s 
emotional perceptions of the last of the three core advice focused on within this thesis will be 
studied.   
Section 6.1 explains the experimental design of each of the two separate studies discussed 
in this Chapter, including the two-phased survey of University students discussed in the first 
subsection, and the larger study using Mechanical Turk presented in the second subsection. 
Section 6.2 highlights users’ reported hesitation to apply updates, Section 6.3 talks about the 
importance of emotions such as annoyance and confusions to updating behavior,  and Section 6.4 
presents analysis of in-depth ratings from participants, were we find strong trends in the variance 
of users’ ratings of positive emotions and negative emotions.  These results are discussed with 
relation to prior work in Section 6.5, followed by a closing summary in Section 6.6. 
6.1 Experimental Approach 
Two survey-based studies were performed to better understand why users choose to 
update software or not when prompted.  Each study targeted different aspects of participants’ 
decision and experiences around software updates, including messages used to deliver them.  
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Therefore, they all give insight into disparate components of motivation around this key 
cybersecurity behavior, while also building upon the findings of each towards a broader 
understanding of what motivates users.    
Since software updates are contextually different than adoption of other tools and 
techniques, such as using a password manager and activating 2FA, our investigation into users’ 
background with this advice had to be different from the approaches used in the prior Chapters.  
Notably, since update messages are a key aspect of apply software updates and are seen by 
many, they are studied specifically, along with users’ general history and opinions around 
updating.  We investigate the attitudes and beliefs of users around updating and update messages.  
In addition to this, the comprehensibility and noticeability of particular messages, both key 
aspects of the C-HIP model [21], was also examined through the data.  Finally, by gathering 
users’ emotions in response to actual messages, and emotions users predict they would feel when 
faced with an update, we can better understand the emotional vectors to users’ decisions around 
updating, as predicted by theory on emotions and motivation [10,14,16,35,53,54,62,64,98]. 
6.1.1 Two-Phased Survey of Experience 
The first study performed around updating encompassed two stages that gathered 
separate samples.  First, a short survey was developed and sent to a sample of users at a 
University campus (N=78). These participants were not compensated The survey was hosted on 
a University web-server and was advertised using regularly distributed University email digests 
that contained information about the procedures, as well as a link to the hosted survey.  Table 6-1 
below shows the complete content of this initial, short survey, other than the basic demographic 
questions asked. 
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Question Notes 
For each of the following, rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how 
knowledgeable you are in using each software or device. 
Microsoft Windows, Apple Laptops 
or Desktops, Linux, iPhone, Android 
How much do you worry about your computer’s security? 
> Rate from 1 to 7 How much do you care about keeping your software up to date? 
How much do you worry about your computer’s privacy? 
Have you ever been hesitant to apply an update? 
> Yes, No, I don’t know Have you ever been annoyed by an update message? 
Have you ever been confused by an update message? 
Table 6-1: Content of short survey distributed to the initial sample of participants.  These instruments were also used as the base 
of the extended, follow-up survey distributed to a larger, additional sample. 
After the initial pilot sample was collected, the survey was extended to include more 
instruments and a new sample from the same University campus was gathered (N=172).  In 
addition to the initial survey instruments, participants were asked to report from a list the 
software which they used, and they were then delivered surveys similar to the initial survey, but 
phrased for each of the software the participant reported using.  The same methods were used to 
collect this sample as with the last survey (i.e., an advertisement posted in University email 
digests with a link to the survey hosted on a University web-server).  Through this, we were able 
to identify trends in behavior and experiences around updates between different types of 
software.  Table 6-2 below shows the software asked about on the extended survey. 
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Software Category 
Microsoft Windows 
Operating Systems Apple laptops or desktops 
Linux 
iPhone 
Mobile OS 
Android 
Mozilla Firefox 
Web Browser 
Google Chrome 
Internet Explorer 
Safari 
Microsoft Office 
Productivity Software 
OpenOffice 
Adobe Acrobat 
Libre Office 
iTunes 
Media Software 
QuickTime 
Windows Media Player 
VLC 
Skype Communication Software 
Norton products 
Security Software MacAfee products 
Malwarebytes 
Table 6-2: List of software packages asked about on the extended follow-up survey.  For each software, participants were asked 
to report their frequency of use of the software, how often they saw updates from the software, as well as to report their 
hesitation in applying updates for each.  Finally, they were asked to rate how annoying, confusing, important, and noticeable 
they generally found the software’s update messages to be. 
In addition to the specific software on the list in the table above, participants were asked 
if they reported playing video games and about their updating behavior around video games.  For 
each of the listed software a participant reported using, they were also asked how annoying, 
confusing, important, and noticeable they found that software’s update messages.  
Finally, after the software-based instruments, all participants were shown sample update 
and warning messages taken from disparate types of software across many systems and asked to 
rate how annoying, confusing, important, and noticeable they found each message to be.  A 5-
point Likert scale was used on this survey, similar to those used for in-depth emotion instruments 
in Chapters 4 & 5, but only for four emotions to reduce the overall length of the survey since 
these instruments were asked for a dozen sample messages.  Participants were also offered the 
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opportunity to provide positive and negative open-ended feedback about each message.  The 
sample messages used, as well as all survey instruments, and the basic demographics of samples 
collected can be found in Appendix D. 
6.1.2 Surveying Reported Emotions When Faced with an Update Message 
The second update related study was executed using Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and was 
targeted at gathering participants’ emotions around updating with increased granularity. Four 
hundred participants were gathered through the service.  Any member of the MTurk population 
was eligible to participate as long as they were at least 18 years of age and resided in the United 
States.  Interested eligible participants were shown the information sheet for the study.  If they 
wanted to participate after reading the sheet, participants would then begin the survey.  After 
completing the survey, each respondent was compensated $1.00 for their participation.   
Similarly to the in-depth emotion instruments used in the previous chapters, each 
participant was asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale, anchored from “never,” to “all the time,” 
the degree to which they think they would feel each of 45 emotions when encountering an 
unexpected software update message while using the computer.  Participants were asked to rate 
the emotions in both of two cases: one where the update message interrupted casual web-
browsing (representing the relaxed state), and another where the message interrupted them as 
they worked on an important deadline (representing the pressured state).  Specifically, 
participants were asked to “imagine a situation where the warning to update software appears 
while you are (surfing the web with no specific purpose/hard at work on an important project 
with a looming deadline).”  In these contexts, participants were then presented with the 
instruments asking them to rate how much they anticipate they would feel each of the emotions.   
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With this data, we can dig deep into what emotions users associate with updating, and use 
these findings to understand not only how and why they may make the decisions they do, but 
also help improve how we measure emotional response in these contexts.  By looking at the data 
collected in both of the studies discussed in this Chapter, a detailed and broad picture of 
motivations around updating becomes apparent. 
6.2 Prevalence of Hesitation 
As expected, numerous participants in both rounds of the first study indicated that they 
have hesitated to update in the past.  Figure 6-1 shows the number who say they have ever 
delayed an update. 
 
Figure 6-1: Frequency of responses to the question “Have you ever been hesitant to apply an update?” DK/NA is the category 
used for missing responses or responses of “I don’t know.” 
Most participants had some history of hesitating to apply an update, but the longer second 
survey dug deeper by asking participants to report their hesitation to apply updates for the 
particular software they use.  Table 6-3 below shows the reported delay to respond to each 
software’s update messages generally, as reported by users of each software. 
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Software Immediately Within… Never 
1 day 3 days A week A month  
Windows (%) 11 24 13 23 16 13 
Apple PC (%) 5 16 7 30 39 4 
iPhone (%) 21 21 22 11 18 6 
Android (%) 21 18 18 12 18 15 
Firefox (%) 26 17 7 9 17 24 
Chrome (%) 14 20 11 8 4 43 
IE (%) 9 0 19 9 25 38 
Safari (%) 4 8 6 12 8 62 
MS Office (%) 17 16 10 12 15 30 
Acrobat (%) 13 15 10 13 18 31 
iTunes (%) 13 10 7 13 32 24 
WMP (%) 14 16 10 8 6 47 
QuickTime (%) 12 0 8 16 16 48 
VLC (%) 14 6 9 9 14 49 
Skype (%) 20 10 7 14 14 34 
Video Games (%) 38 12 12 4 10 24 
Norton (%) 19 19 13 23 3 23 
MacAfee (%) 11 14 17 14 11 31 
Malwarebytes (%) 50 19 6 6 6 13 
Table 6-3: Response rates for each software representing the reported average delay in applying an update after seeing an 
update message.  Note: Distributions are shown as a percentage of all those who reported using each software, and samples with 
size < 15 are not shown. 
The table shows hesitation, though common, varied between software.  In some cases, 
such as Malwarebytes, many participants reported applying updates quickly.  In others, such as 
Safari, most participants reported never applying these updates.  There are several explanations 
for the tendency of users to hesitate.  As seen in prior work [46,47,86,92,103] and the results in 
previous Chapters, security and convenience are common considerations for users.  In Chapter 3, 
many users of 2FA, for example, mentioned the added security in their reasons why they used 
the feature.  In a similar vein, users may be more attentive to Malwarebytes’ updates since this is 
an anti-virus software that has direct relations to security overall.   There are many other reasons 
that may explain this hesitation, though. 
 70 
 
6.3 Prominence of Annoyance and Confusion 
Prior work has pointed to negative past experiences as a reason for neglecting to update 
[66,96].  We hypothesize that annoyance and confusion could be an emotional result of these 
negative experiences with updates.  Our survey asked participants if they have ever been 
annoyed by an update message.  As can be seen in Figure 6-2, a large majority of our participants 
said they had.  Similarly, Figure 6-3 shows that a large number of participants also report being 
confused by an update message, though in not nearly the unanimity as with annoyance. 
 
Figure 6-2: Frequency of responses to the question “Have you ever been annoyed by an update message?” DK/NA is the 
category used for missing responses or responses of “I don’t know.” 
 
Figure 6-3: Frequency of responses to the question “Have you ever been confused by an update message?” DK/NA is the 
category used for missing responses or responses of “I don’t know.” 
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Again, the extended second survey expanded on these concepts by phrasing them for 
specific software.  Table 6-4 below shows the average annoyance and confusion rating (on a 7-
point scale) for each software package, as rated by the participants who reported using each.  In 
addition, the table shows the correlation between participants’ annoyance and confusion rating 
for each software with their reported length of hesitation in applying the software’s update, using 
Pearson’s R-value [75]. 
Software Average Rating Correlation w/ Hesitation 
Annoyance Confusion Annoyance Confusion 
Windows 4.5 3.1 0.40 0.31 
Apple PC 4.0 2.8 0.38 0.26 
iPhone 3.6 2.5 0.35 0.23 
Android 3.3 2.6 0.22 0.24 
Firefox 3.4 2.5 0.09 0.06 
Chrome 2.4 2.0 0.07 0.11 
IE 3.5 3.1 0.16 0.03 
Safari 2.5 2.3 0.08 0.12 
MS Office 3.1 2.6 0.07 0.07 
Acrobat 3.7 2.5 -0.02 -0.01 
iTunes 4.3 2.8 0.44 0.25 
WMP 2.9 2.6 -0.04 -0.02 
QuickTime 3.5 2.6 -0.10 0.07 
VLC 2.6 1.9 -0.36 -0.39 
Norton 4.0 3.3 0.15 0.06 
MacAfee 3.2 2.3 0.19 0.60 
Malwarebytes 2.7 2.0 0.36 0.33 
Table 6-4: Average ratings of annoyance and confusion resulting from each software’s update messages, as reported by users.  
Correlation between annoyance and hesitation, as well as confusion and hesitation is shown using Pearson’s R-value.  R-values 
≥ 0.1 in magnitude are marked. 
For some software, annoyance and confusion were rated prominently (i.e., an average 
rating of 4 or above).  In some of these cases, ratings to these emotions were found to be 
correlated with how long participants reported delaying applying that software’s update when 
presented with a message.  This suggests some connection in hesitation and these emotions, 
which can help inform why users hesitate.  If they are confused, they may not understand why 
the update is important.  Annoyance and other negative emotions will also dissuade users from 
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updating since people try to avoid these negative feelings instinctually.  To gain more insight 
into emotions around updating, we next look to a core component of update delivery: 
update/warning messages.  
6.4 Emotions Elicited By Software Update and Warning Messages 
To see how users react to messages in a more direct and immediate way, participants in 
the second phase of the first study rated sample real-world update and warning messages on 4 
emotions: annoyance, confusion, importance, and noticeability.  Through analysis of the 
gathered rankings, overall, confusion and annoyance were found to be correlated with Pearson’s 
r = 0.50.  Importance and noticeability were also correlated with an r = 0.42.  Thus, to rank the 
emotional impact of each image, we summed the average negative valence ratings (i.e., 
annoyance and confusion) and subtracted this from the sum of average positive valence ratings 
(i.e., importance and noticeability).  Equation 4-1 below details how these ratings are calculated. 
Rank = 
(Rating𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + Rating𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡) – (Rating𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑦 + Rating𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓)
7
 
Equation 6-1: Definition used to calculate a comparative rank of each image that considers the four ratings gathered from users. 
In the equation, the combined magnitude of the ratings is divided by 7 to normalize on a 
scale of 0 to 1 since all ratings were given on a 7-point Likert scale.  Table 6-5 shows the 
average rating for each emotion, for each image, along with the resulting rank. 
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Image # Important Annoying Confusing Noticeable Rank 
04 3.6 4.5 4.2 4.1 -0.15 
06 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.5 0.06 
14 3.0 3.8 2.2 3.4 0.06 
10 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.9 0.07 
13 3.5 4.0 3.6 4.6 0.07 
07 3.6 4.3 3.0 4.8 0.13 
01 3.7 3.5 3.4 4.6 0.18 
08 4.6 3.9 3.5 4.8 0.28 
03 3.6 3.8 2.5 4.9 0.29 
09 3.6 3.4 2.3 4.8 0.33 
12 3.8 3.3 2.3 5.0 0.39 
02 5.4 4.3 3.1 6.0 0.51 
05 5.9 4.1 3.6 6.3 0.58 
11 4.8 2.8 2.2 4.8 0.61 
Average 4.1 3.9 3.1 4.8 0.24 
Table 6-5: Average ratings of each emotion for each image along with the resulting rank as calculated using Equation 5-1. 
As the table shows, there was a large spread in the ranking each message received.  Some 
came out high (> 0.5), such as Images 11, 5, and 2, while others, such as 4, 6, 14, and 10 came in 
very low (< 0.1).  When looking to these images, it is apparent that certain features are shared by 
each group of images.  Based on the open-ended comments, the “good” messages (i.e., those 
ranked highly) provided the user with the necessary information they needed to understand the 
content.  In addition, most of the “good” messages contained bright and noticeable features, 
though these came at a trade-off, causing some participants to question the messages’ legitimacy.  
For “bad” messages that ranked low using the rating-based metric, comments showed common 
complaints of uninformative or confusing messages, flat and boring designs that go unnoticed, 
and in some cases, confusing options being offered. 
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6.4.1 Extended Qualitative Analysis 
Inspired by the usefulness of the participants’ comments towards helping understand 
which message features were possibly responsible for the ratings seen in the data, the qualitative 
data was further analyzed.  In all, the participants provided 809 positive comments and 866 
negative comments.  Bottom-up inductive coding was used to categorize them, with no deductive 
codes developed a priori.  Initial coding was performed by a team member who had not been 
involved with the execution or design of the study.  Fifty-two codes were assigned to positive 
comments, while negative comments were assigned 38 unique codes.  The lead researcher then 
reviewed this schema and performed further analysis using the emotion ratings for each image. 
Correlation analysis was used to gain further insight into the features mentioned in 
comments and their relationship to participants’ reported emotions.  Table 6-6 shows Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients [75] between the frequency of a code being applied to an image and that 
magnitude of each emotion’s average rating for that image.  For each image, counts of all 
positive design/layout codes were summed and used to determine the correlation between the 
application of codes in this category with the average rating for each emotion.  This process was 
repeated for positive content codes, as well as negative design/layout and content codes with the 
results for all being highlighted in Table 6-6. 
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 Code/Comment Type Confusion Annoyance Noticeability Importance 
C
o
d
es
 f
o
r 
P
o
si
ti
v
e 
C
o
m
m
en
ts
 
Tells the importance/benefits -0.45 -0.56 - - 
Easy to understand -0.58 -0.54 - - 
Concise -0.69 -0.74 - - 
Looks trustworthy/legitimate -0.45 -0.65 - - 
Cleaner looking - -0.51 - - 
Button/link for more 
information 
- -0.54 - - 
Brand effect - -0.72 - - 
Simple language - - 0.51 0.41 
Alerting design - - 0.57 0.63 
Choice of color - - 0.54 - 
Makes the user want to take 
action 
- - - 0.72 
 All positive design/layout -0.14 -0.24 0.55 0.57 
 All positive content -0.31 -0.36 0.41 0.41 
C
o
d
es
 f
o
r 
N
eg
a
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e 
C
o
m
m
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ts
 
Too technical 0.82 0.64 - - 
Too much content 0.70 0.60 - - 
Ambiguous language 0.67 0.55 - - 
Unpleasant color  0.49 - - 
Boring 0.65 0.48 -0.37 - 
Confusing 0.53 0.47 - - 
Annoying  0.42 - - 
Fell of authenticity 0.44 0.36 - - 
Charging money for the update 0.34 0.31 - - 
Makes users worried regarding 
adverse consequences of 
applying update 
0.48 - - - 
Use of scare tactics/threat - 0.27 - - 
Use of hard-to-read font size - 0.53 -0.45 -0.38 
Does not explain the benefit of 
the update 
- - - -0.40 
Not noticeable - - -0.71 -0.46 
Pops up/interruption - - -0.43 -0.48 
Negative attitudes towards the 
software brand 
- - -0.59 - 
 All negative design/layout 0.53 0.61 -0.10 0.23 
 All negative content 0.61 0.45 -0.35 -0.43 
Table 6-6: Correlation using Pearson’s R-value is shown between the frequency of application for each code, along with the 
ratings of confusion, annoyance, noticeability, and importance across the 14 images tested.  Overall correlation between the 
frequency of application of all positive and negative comments with each emotion is also shown. Note: Only correlations of 
magnitude > 0.10 are included in this table. 
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As seen in the table, negative codes were strongly correlated with annoyance and 
confusion overall.  This trend continued for many of the individual codes used to categorize the 
negative comments.  Positive codes, on the other hand, were correlated strongly overall with 
ratings of importance and noticeability.  Though some of the codes applied to positive comments 
also correlated with importance and noticeability when counted individually, several codes 
correlated strongly with confusion and annoyance, showing the complexity of participants’ 
emotional response to the tested update messages. 
These results all show the interplay of emotions when individuals are presented with an 
update or warning message.  These emotions can impact their eventual decisions to apply the 
update, as possibly indicated by the correlations between annoyance/confusion and hesitation 
across software.  Emotions span much more than just annoyance, confusion, importance, and 
noticeability, as seen in the in-depth studies of 2FA and password managers in prior Chapters.  
Looking to more detailed data will unlock new findings about how individuals react to 
notifications for software updates. 
6.4.2 A Broader View of Emotions Related to Software Updates 
To gather more in-depth ratings from a sample of Internet users, after the data presented 
in prior sections was collected, another study was executed that refocused away from specific 
software and towards updates in general.  As described in Section 3.1.2, this study collects two 
sets of 5-point Likert scale ratings for 45 emotions from a total of 400 participants. To 
understand the structure of participants’ set of ratings for each task (i.e., relaxed and pressured), 
two methods of analysis were used. 
Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling (ESEM) is a method of analyzing data which 
combines the techniques of Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis [68].  It is a useful 
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technique when there is limited knowledge and prior measurement of a component, as is the case 
for emotions in the context of updating.  ESEM Factors were calculated on the data for both 
tasks separately.  The loadings of the ESEM were analyzed to discover each factor’s structure.  A 
summary of the resulting ESEM factors for both tasks are presented in Table 6-7 (please note: 
the full ESEM results can be found in Appendix D).   
 1. Positive 
 
2. Anxiety 
 Relaxed Pressure  Relaxed Pressure 
Confident 0.822 0.853 Nervous 0.692 0.749 
Secure 0.813 0.858 Anxious 0.680 0.723 
Grateful 0.811 0.816 Confused 0.610 0.535B 
Happy 0.781 0.803 Afraid 0.573 0.727 
Respectful 0.771 0.788A Freaked out 0.534 0.654 
 3. Loneliness  4. Hostility 
Ashamed 0.825 0.823 Disdainful 0.821 0.717 
Abandoned 0.824 0.761C Scornful 0.747 0.751 
Lonely 0.821 0.833 Contemptuous 0.676 0.659 
Humiliated 0.802 0.767 Hostile 0.634 0.573 
Isolated 0.787 0.774 Resentful 0.574 0.600 
Table 6-7: Factor loadings for the best five items of the four identified factors resulting from the ESEM analysis on data 
collected for both the relaxed and pressured task.  The full factor loadings are included in Appendix D. Notes: A: Cared-for 
loaded higher, .799; B: Dismayed loaded higher, .644; C: Embarrassed loaded higher .795 
 A picture begins to appear that describes the nature of users’ emotion around updating.  
The Positive emotions factor was the first in the ESEM and encompassed the positive emotions 
included in the total list of 45 in strong and significant loadings.  This is interesting as it could 
indicate that some users see updates in a positive light, while others do not, which would produce 
the strong variance on this initial factor.  This is also reminiscent of the results in the prior two 
Chapters related to password managers and 2FA.  For password managers, users and non-users 
differed on specific positive emotions (i.e., admiring and energetic), while for 2FA, the 
magnitude of ratings on several positive emotions was much lower from participants who also 
rated 2FA not convenient.  In all three case studies, it seems that differences between different 
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groups of individuals around ratings of positive emotions may be related to their behavior around 
following each advice.  That is, those who see each advice in a more positive light are found to 
be more likely to also be a follower of the advice.  Though interventions may find success in 
highlighting these positive emotions, as seen in the prior Chapters, other kinds of emotions are 
also involved. 
The other three factors from the ESEM analysis, which explained the rest of the variance, 
all point to different, but all negative themes.  Anxiety is a logical second strongest factor since 
the surprise of an update, and repeated worry about possible negative consequences from the 
update may produce anxiety in some, but not others.  This is reminiscent of the extra suspicion 
that non-users of password managers reported relative to users of the tool.  The final two factors 
point to two other kinds of negative emotions, one based around sadness and isolation, with 
emotions like lonely, abandoned, and ashamed, the other based around anger, with emotions like 
scornful and contemptuous.  This shows the complexity in how users feel about unexpected 
updates.  In some cases, users rate that they feel lonelier and more abandoned due to the 
appearance of such a message, while other users seem to feel hostility in response to those 
messages. 
 Thinking to the other results in this Chapter, there are clues that help understand these 
trends.  The anxiety users feel may be related to the issues they report having in the past with 
updates.  Previous negative experience may also explain the abandonment some report feeling in 
response to updates.  These past bad updates may have caused the user to feel abandoned in the 
moment, and they are remembering this experience now.  Chapter 3, for example, found that 
negative past experiences were a reason from non-updaters in particular, as has prior work 
[66,96]. Addressing these issues through better, less intrusive updates as well as better 
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communication to assuage these concerns for users, is vital to increasing the number of users 
who regularly apply software updates.  Also, as seen in the data for 2FA in Chapter 5, one 
participant reported a similar negative past experience that led them to avoid 2FA, so negative 
past experiences are not limited in effect to updating, but span to other cybersecurity advice. 
Another particular aspect of updates may also help explain these emotion results.  This 
Chapter and prior studies [96,99] have found that interruption plays a factor in users’ decisions to 
update in response to messages.  This may explain the hostility some users feel.  Hostility may 
be a natural extension of the common annoyance and confusion participants in the prior study 
reported.  Here, again, the design of update messages and mechanisms, as well as the approaches 
of persuasion to update must be precisely tuned to repair these negative impressions some users 
have to maximize the overall likelihood of update application. 
6.5 Discussion 
Updating is an important behavior for users to adopt as it helps keep all software free of 
known security vulnerabilities, which protects individuals and the network from attack.  Thus, it 
is imperative that we understand if users update, why they do and do not, if they don’t.  Their 
responses to the messages used to convince them to apply an update (i.e., software update 
messages).  Hesitation was common in our results, as was annoyance and confusion with 
updates, which follows on the heels of prior work that has shown users commonly do not know 
what updates are changing in their systems [99] nor have necessary information to properly 
decide to apply an update or not [67].  It’s possible that these issues with updates manifest in our 
data as confusion, annoyance, and hesitation to apply.  Analysis of in-depth emotion ratings 
found that much of the variance in ratings was based around ratings to positive emotions, 
showing that some participants rate these high, while others rate these low.  Further variance was 
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explained through ratings of negative emotions, again with some participants rating these higher 
than others.  High instances of negative emotions and low instances of positive emotions around 
a decision may lead an individual away from adopting that behavior [16].  Thus, interventions 
that address these divergent emotions, particularly instances of negative emotions, may be 
effective at encouraging users to more frequently apply software updates in response to 
messages. 
The source of the negative emotions, though, is likely disparate, as indicated in the 
qualitative analysis and findings of prior work [66,67,96,97,99]. Past negative experiences 
certainly play a role [66,96].  Experiences with updates are not all related to negative outcomes 
of an update.  In fact, users have an experience with updates every time they see an update 
message.  Our results show that update messages commonly contain poor wordings and bad 
designs that instill negative emotions in users.  If users see many of these “bad” messages, it will 
degrade their expectations about updates generally, which may be reflected in the instances of 
negative emotions observed in our data.  This aspect is somewhat specific to updating since the 
other advices tested in this thesis (i.e., use of 2FA and password manager) generally do not have 
regular, associated messaging like software updating does with update messages, but our results 
also finds commonality in the considerations users make around all three of these decisions. 
The time and effort needed to update, such as a system restart, is enough to put some off 
from updating.  This kind of inconvenience also stands in the way of systems that encourage the 
activation of automatic updating, as Mathur et al. found recently [66].  As seen in prior Chapters 
and prior work [46,47,86,92,103], convenience/inconvenience plays an important role for other 
decisions as well.  Therefore, any intervention aiming to alter perceptions and behavior around 
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any cybersecurity advice would be wise to consider how convenience/inconvenience is involved 
in the advice. 
6.6 Summary 
The three studies described in this Chapter all explore users’ emotions around updating, 
as well as software update and warning messages.  Negative emotions are common around 
updates.  Namely, annoyance and confusion were reported by large swaths of users. These 
emotions were correlated with design features mentioned in user comments, and the emotions of 
users as reported in a more directed study varied primarily on how much users felt positive 
emotions (indicating a strong variance on how different users felt these emotions and possibly 
indicating that users feel negative emotions around updating).  The other three factors that 
described the variance in this data also all focused on negative emotion sets, showing the strong 
interplay of these towards updating.  These results illuminate the emotions individuals feel 
around the final of the three advices used as case studies in this thesis.  The next Chapter will use 
these results, as well as the results from Chapters 3-6 to design informed video-based 
interventions targeted at the same three advices.  
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7 Cybersecurity Interventions Using 
Novel Emotional and Social Content 
The previous chapters have demonstrated several key leads towards new methods of 
encouraging more user adoption of good cybersecurity behavior.  First, clear perception gaps and 
motivation gaps were found across multiple samples of cybersecurity advice followers and non-
followers.  Next, additional data showed that social motivations around many of these decisions, 
at least in the eyes of participants, are low.  This is true despite the demonstrable impacts one’s 
cybersecurity behavior has on others due to the interconnectivity of the Internet and computer 
networks more generally.  Finally, it is clear that emotions play a role in motivations around all 
the advices sampled in our studies.  The prevalence of certain emotions over others allows a 
deeper understanding of these users’ motivations, but exploring current emotions and perceptions 
can only go so far.   
 As prior work has shown and argued [35,53,54,60,98], interventions which address these 
gaps in perceptions and negative emotions can increase the likelihood of users adopting these 
kinds of behaviors, possibly through novel approaches such as emotional inoculation and social 
motivation.  To test this, a final study was performed that utilized video-based interventions to 
deliver similar, but varied content that incorporated appeals which highlighted the emotions the 
viewer may feel around the decision or social-based reasons that exist in support of them taking 
up good security behavior.   
Prior studies used to inform the approach of intervention in this study, as well as a 
specific technique that harnesses emotions towards persuasion are discussed in Section 7.1.  
Using this prior work as a base, Section 7.2 describes the design of the videos and the study 
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procedures in detail.  Section 7.3 presents the hypotheses of how the videos may impact 
participants.  Statistical analysis and visualization of the differences in measured variables, for 
each group, throughout the study, are presented in Section 7.4.  These results are then discussed 
in Section 7.5, with focus on the performance of the experimental emotionally and socially aware 
videos, as well as comparisons to prior work.  Finally, Section 7.6 closes the Chapter. 
7.1 Literature for Intervention Design 
The studies presented in prior chapters have been exploratory in focus, but the study in 
this Chapter looks to alter users’ perceptions and behavior around following sample 
cybersecurity advice.  Thus, some additional related work was drawn upon for this study that 
was not used extensively or at all in the design of the previous studies.  First, an overview of 
literature supporting the use of video as the method of intervention communication is discussed.  
Next, a particular emotionally aware communication technique known as emotional inoculation 
is introduced along with background on its use in other contexts. 
7.1.1 Interventions in Cybersecurity 
Researchers have looked to the impact of various interventions styles on security 
behavior and perceptions, including small-group sessions [5], cybersecurity fairs [61], and 
alteration of existing interfaces with personal examples [42].  Though there are merits to these 
targeted and tuned approaches, they are also logistically intensive and, in the case of altering the 
delivery of messages in software, hard to duplicate across many current and future cybersecurity 
behaviors.  A more modular and efficient method of intervention was called for to maximize the 
scope of the experiment and adoptability of materials developed therein. 
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Video-based interventions have been studied and identified as more effective than other 
means possible for our overall experimental design [48,69,78,79,93].  One recent prior work 
investigated three delivery methods for security awareness information and found that video out-
performed text and game-based approaches [93].  This follows on the several studies in other 
domains that have shown that video is more effective than text [48].  For risk communication 
generally and the teaching of new authentication methods, video was also shown to be effective 
in recent work [78].  Newer studies have begun to explore the applicability of video in 
persuading users to take up expertly advised computer security behavior. One such effort 
designed video interventions to promote use of two-factor authentication, finding correlations in 
decisions to use two-factor authentication and how interesting/informative/useful the viewers 
found the videos [4].   
The study in this Chapter also incorporates two persuasive approaches that have been 
used in the past to understand and frame users’ cybersecurity behavior, but has not been 
extensively explored for interventions aimed at changing perceptions and behavior.  One of these 
approaches, use of social motivation, is relatively straight-forward to incorporate into existing, 
informational-based video approaches since its possible power was inspired by the general lack 
of social consideration found in prior data. Thus, videos which used social motivations were 
developed by explaining possible social impacts of the users’ behavior in each cybersecurity 
context which users are less likely to be aware of.  The other approach, motivation through 
emotions, required more due diligence to properly execute since this is a more experimental 
method for cybersecurity. 
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7.1.2 Emotional Inoculation 
The connection between cybersecurity decisions and emotions is a newer track in the 
broader literature of cybersecurity and usable security.  Thus, to understand how to incorporate 
emotionally aware appeals in the interventions for this study, it is necessary to look to other 
fields to find comparable applications of such appeals that may be adapted for the contexts here.  
Emotional inoculation is one such practical application of emotionally aware persuasion that has 
been shown to be effective in other decisions that involve risk when used in interventions 
[53,54].    Prior studies found emotional inoculation important towards reducing stress in surgical 
patients [60], encouraging individuals to be physically active [98], understanding individuals 
perceptions of crisis [10], and encouraging condom use [35]. 
Emotional inoculation is the theory that people can be introduced to the emotions they 
may feel in certain situations, which will help them overcome these emotions when faced with 
the decisions in their life.  Related to the theory that emotions can interfere with decision-
making, emotional inoculation allows for individuals to see past these feelings and think more 
rationally about the situations they are presented with.  Though emotional inoculation may 
happen as an indirect by-product of an unrelated intervention or event, the effects of emotional 
inoculation can be targeted for, based on understanding of the emotions that are likely to be felt.  
Using the theory this way calls for individuals to be introduced to the emotions they may feel in 
the heat of a decision so that they can overcome the motivations resulting from these emotions, 
when faced with the decision in their lives.  This approach is anchored in the theory of emotions 
as important influences on behavior.  In essence, the approach works to make users aware of 
strong emotions they may feel that could interfere with the rational side of their mind.  For 
example, in a recent study Ferrer et al., emotional inoculation interventions were developed for 
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condom use that explained the need for receivers to remember to stop for a moment and put on a 
prophylactic device, even while they will be experiencing intense sexual emotions [35].  By 
making the receiver aware of this in a prior intervention, reports of condom use in sexual 
encounters increased significantly more than for a control group which received traditionally 
tuned appeals.   
It may be possible to similarly inoculate computer users to emotions they may feel while 
deciding to follow cybersecurity advice.  In addition to reducing or at least making users aware 
of negative emotions they could feel, like fear or frustration, emotional inoculation approaches in 
this realm may also try to increase instances of positive emotions users can feel.  Prior work has 
called for cybersecurity researchers to look to the healthcare sector to determine strategies for 
increasing overall security [83] and understanding cybersecurity behavior [72], as there have 
been noted similarities between issues of cybersecurity and some issues involved in healthcare.  
The prior success of emotional inoculation in the healthcare realm [35,60] may mean similar 
success in the context of cybersecurity advice. 
7.2 Experimental Approach 
To test the impact of videos that incorporate alternative approaches to persuasion on 
cybersecurity perceptions and behavior, the three advices that were explored in the previous 
Chapters were used again as case studies (i.e., updating software frequently, using two-factor 
authentication, and using a secure password manager). For each advice, three videos were 
developed and tested. 
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7.2.1 Video Design and Development Process 
 The first video, referred to in this Chapter as the Basic video, was different in content for 
each advice, but followed a similar style and broad outline.  Each Basic video started by 
introducing the viewer to the basic science around each advice, but in a way that is 
understandable to average users who may not have much technical knowledge.  For example, in 
the Basic video targeted at convincing viewers to begin updating software regularly, the first 
portion of the video talks about the software development cycle and how that can lead to flaws in 
software that must be patched with regular software updates.  After the basics about the advice 
are established, each video then moves into an explanation of how not following the advice could 
lead to negative consequences.  This is based on prior work’s recommendation, where 
researchers call for targeted risk communications, among other things, “describe particular 
vulnerabilities that the user may be exposed to” [12].  For example, in the two-factor 
authentication Basic video, this section focused on how the viewer’s accounts can be accessed by 
unauthorized users more easily when not activating two-factor authentication.  These scripts 
were informed by the lessons learned in the studies discussed in Chapters 3-6.  All three 
discussed security and convenience, but specific issues were varied for each advice to focus on 
the context specific issues identified in the prior Chapters. 
 Thus, all Basic videos followed a similar structure and were aimed at presenting basic 
information explaining the background as to why following the advice is important, as well as 
demonstrating how the viewer can be negatively affected by negligence.  Importantly, this 
information was all presented in a clear and easy to follow way.  The scripts were written to 
avoid technical jargon and extraneous content that may have confused or misled viewers.  These 
scripts were then recorded, and those recordings were timed to a highly-animated PowerPoint 
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presentation that provided visual demonstrations and summaries of the content being 
communicated in the recorded voice-overs.  Through this process, three videos were created that 
could be used as a common starting point for alterations that highlight either the emotions 
viewers may feel or social motivations around each advice. 
 For each advice, two additional videos were developed.  One incorporated emotional 
inoculation targeting a reduction in the various emotions users feel around each decision that can 
hinder their adoption of the advice, as well as bringing to viewer’s minds the positive emotions 
they can feel if they take up the advice.  The second video for each highlighted reasons for 
following the advice that are focused on other users, such as impacts decisions can have on 
individuals the viewers may know personally.  For each new video, the Basic script for the 
applicable advice was used as a starting point.  Changes and modifications were made, where 
possible, to tune the overall tone and message of the updated videos in a way that reflected the 
alternative persuasion methods.  This process was done carefully to preserve the overall structure 
of the videos (i.e., general explanation followed by possible negative outcome of not following).  
Care was also taken to maintain the understandability of the videos.   
In the context of the advice targeted in this study, the emotional inoculation content 
incorporated into each advice’s Emotion video was based around concerns that have been well 
documented in prior work and the exploratory work presented in Chapters 3-6 of this thesis.  For 
example, in the Emotion video for the group who reported not updating, discussion was added to 
the script that addressed possible inconvenience related to taking the time to apply updates and 
possible unintended negative consequences of applying an update, including the annoyance and 
frustration they may feel.  Viewers were reminded of the benefits of updating that they should 
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remember despite these negative feelings, as well as the positive emotions they may feel when 
utilizing the improved software that comes from software updates.  
 Social motivations were incorporated into the third video for each advice by highlighting 
places where the viewers’ decisions could impact the people they know.  For example, the 2FA 
and Password Manager Basic videos discussed how accounts can be accessed by hackers if not 
properly protected.  The Social videos for these advices accentuated that a compromised email or 
social media account could then be used to launch attacks against the friends and family of the 
viewer.7  Through this approach, these videos aim to increase the viewers’ awareness and 
appreciation for the risk to others their cybersecurity decisions can have. 
 Using the updated scripts for each advice’s Emotion and Social video, new audio was 
recorded for the additional videos.  PowerPoint presentations were used for each video, with 
slight alterations in the timing being made as needed.  Transcripts of the audio in each video can 
be found in Appendix E.   To test these videos, it is first necessary to establish the measure by 
which they will be assessed.  A survey was designed to gather data on behavior change, as well 
as key aspects of participants’ understanding and perceptions that are important towards 
impacting change. 
7.2.2 Definition of Variables 
Four variables were specifically targeted in this study: awareness, perceptions, emotions, 
and behavior.  A survey was used to gather data on each of these variables that could then be 
analyzed to assess the possible impact of each video on participants, which will be referred to as 
                                                 
7 Please note that care was taken to avoid injecting too much fear into the video appeals.  Since risks are being 
discussed in these videos, it’s possible that some participants may feel fear, but the scripts were written to merely 
mention these risks without exaggerating the possible outcomes or trying to scare the viewers into changing their 
behavior.  Instead, they are informed how to adopt behaviors to protect against risks, and how adopting those 
behaviors can lead to positive outcomes. 
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the assessment survey.  All groups, for each advice, were delivered similar assessment surveys, 
though the surveys did vary between advices.  All instruments were developed from prior work 
and were designed and tested to be straight-forward for participants.  In order to more intuitively 
analyze the data collected and reduce the number of statistical tests performed so as to reduce the 
likelihood of introducing false positive results (Type II error), intuitive scores were derived from 
the raw data collected from participants, which were then used in the analysis presented in 
subsequent sections of this Chapter. 
 Awareness instruments were true/false and multiple-choice in format, similar to what 
would appear on a basic cybersecurity quiz or test.  They were designed based on instruments 
used in other studies that looked to assess cybersecurity awareness in various circumstances, 
such as before and after attending a cybersecurity fair [61] or around mobile-phone security [71].  
For each advice, three true/false and four multiple-choice instruments were developed.  Though 
the three true/false questions were the same for each advice (albeit slightly altered to ask about 
the target advice), the multiple-choice questions did differ more drastically in content, though 
similar concepts were targeted across the three advices.  For analysis, two scores were calculated 
from these responses.  One captured the number of True/False instruments responded to with 
“False,” which is considered the more aware answer.  The second awareness score was a tally of 
a score based on the four multiple-choice instruments contained in each awareness survey.  
Scores were calculated for these based on the key of aware answers that are marked on the 
survey instruments in Appendix E.  In both cases, a higher score represented an increase in 
awareness, but each captured different components of this variable. 
 Perceptions of costs, benefits, and risks of following and not following the tested advices 
were measured using the same instruments used in Chapter 3.  Instruments were different for 
 91 
 
each advice (i.e., they asked about the costs/benefits/risks around the specific advice), but were 
similar in format.  Users’ ratings to these instruments were used to calculate 4 scores, each 
capturing a different and unique aspect of motivation around following the groups’ target 
advices.  An Individual and Social phrasing of the Motivations to Follow and Motivations to Not 
Follow were calculated from each participant’s provided set of perception ratings.  Each of the 4 
scores were calculated using the benefits, costs, and risk rating that matches the score, as noted 
in the following equation:  
Score =  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 −
(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)
2
 
Equation 7-1: Definition used to calculate each perception score used in the analysis of this study.  For example, the Individual 
Motivation to Follow for an Update participant was calculated by subtracting the mean of the participant’s rating of the costs 
and risks to them if they were to update from the participant’s rating of the benefits to them if they updated. 
 Emotions were gathered with a single, but dense instrument that asked participants to 
rank the top five emotions they anticipate they would feel when adhering to their group’s target 
advice.  Participants were given a list of 45 emotions to selection from in a drop-down list, the 
same list of emotions as used in the work presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  This method of data 
collection for emotions was chosen relative to the emotion instruments used in Chapters 4-6 to 
minimize the survey length with the goal of reducing survey fatigue in participants [80].  The 
instruments used in these prior Chapters, though detailed in their reach, were lengthy and 
required significant effort from participants.  The same list of emotions was used in the reworked 
instrument, but since participants select their top emotions rather than rate all emotions, we can 
hone in on key changes in the minds of participants as opposed to ratings for each and every 
emotion.  Using these rankings of emotions from participants, two scores were derived; one that 
measured the number and prominence of positive emotions selected, another measuring the 
number and prominence of prosocial emotions selected.  Table 7-1 below shows those emotions 
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from the full list of 45 available to participants designated as positive and/or prosocial for this 
calculation. 
Positive Prosocial 
Confident Vigorous Confident Trusting 
Secure Proud Secure Ashamed 
Surprised Triumphant Cared-For Guilty 
Cared-For Grateful Friendly Embarrassed 
Friendly Respectful Welcomed Humiliated 
Welcomed Admiring Grateful Dishonored 
Powerful Trusting Respectful  
Energetic Happy Admiring  
Table 7-1: Emotions designated "positive" and "prosocial" in our study for the purposes of calculating emotion scores. 
 For each emotion score, if participants chose an emotion that is included on the 
respective list in Table 7-1, that score would be increased by a reverse weight of the rank.  For 
example, if a participant included a positive emotion as the strongest emotion they would feel, 
then 5 points would be added to their Valence score, but if they ranked the same emotion as the 
second strongest they would feel, only 4 is added to the Valence score.  If they ranked a positive 
emotion as the third strongest, 3 would be added, and so on.  The same procedure was used for 
Prosocial scores using the emotions in the list of Prosocial emotions above. 
 Finally, behavior was assessed through a single multiple-choice instrument that directly 
asked if the participant had changed their behavior around their groups target advice since the 
last time they reported their behavior (i.e., the last complete survey response they provided).  If 
they reported a behavior change, participants were then asked to provide an open-ended 
explanation as to what motived the change.  This method of behavior change collection was 
selected due to the diversity of advice chosen and to make it safest and easiest for participants to 
take part in the study.  Though means could have been devised to gather hard data on whether 
participants started following each behavior, doing so would have been much more privacy 
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endangering due to the access the researchers would need to their computer systems.  Such 
methods may have also biased our sample since some privacy conscious individuals may be 
dissuaded from participating due to the invasive nature of the methods.  Additionally, each 
advice would require a different method of data gathering, which may also have to be tailored for 
different operating systems and device profiles (e.g., smartphones, PCs), introducing numerous 
logistical issues.  Instead, the more convenient, single instrument described was used, with 
participants also providing more detail about the change to make it harder for them to misreport 
due to bias or mistake.   
 These instruments were arranged in the order described for each advice’s assessment 
survey.  The instruments for each survey can be found in Appendix E.  Surveys were delivered to 
participants a total of 4 times through the study, across two stages to gather multiple snapshots of 
participants’ perceptions and behavior throughout the study. 
7.2.3 Study Procedures 
To allow for the most diverse population possible, the survey was administered remotely 
through the web-service Mechanical Turk (MTurk).  We used a screening procedure to collect a 
large initial sample that was then used to randomly fill unique groups of participants.  The 
screening survey was short, only asking basic demographic information and for the participant to 
report whether they follow each of the study’s 3 target advice.  This survey on MTurk was open 
to users 18 years of age or older who lived in the United States.  For each video, groups of 30 
were assembled based on their eligibility as ascertained through their screening data.  An 
additional group of 30 was created for each advice and designated the Control group, who would 
view no video, but still respond to the assessment survey at each stage of the study.  Participants 
were considered eligible for a group if they reported not following their group’s target advice on 
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their screening survey.  Random eligible participants were assigned to the groups in the study 
such that the resulting groups were all unique.  If a participant contacted did not respond to our 
survey in a timely manner, another eligible participant was selected and contacted from the 
screening sample.  To avoid bias in the analysis, participants who reported changing their 
behavior from the screening survey before the intervention stage were not considered in the final 
samples. Final sample sizes for each group were all in the 24-30 range.8  These samples of 
participants were then contacted across the two stages of the study.   
In the first stage, participants were delivered the assessment survey, then, for all groups 
except one, the participants were asked to watch their group’s video.  For the Control groups, 
this stage ended after a complete response was received to the initial assessment survey.  For the 
groups that received an intervention, after viewing the video, participants were allowed to 
proceed to the post-intervention survey, which had all the same instruments as the assessment 
survey minus the behavior question since behavior could not logically change in the short time of 
viewing the video.  All participants were compensated $4 for their complete response at this 
stage. 
The second stage took place over the month after participants were initially delivered 
their group’s intervention (or in the case of Control participants, after they responded to the 
initial assessment survey).  At two weeks and one month after the delivery of each intervention, 
each participant was contacted with their advice’s assessment survey.  For complete responses to 
each additional assessment survey, participants were compensated $2. 
                                                 
8Update: Control = 29; Basic = 24; Emotion = 26; Social = 24   
2FA: Control = 26;Basic = 29; Emotion = 29; Social = 26 
Pass. Manager: Control = 30; Basic = 30; Emotion = 30; Social = 28 
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7.3 Hypotheses of Video Impact 
 Using the data gathered as described above, we can assess the impact of the videos on 
each variable, with particular focus on how the videos that incorporates the alternative 
approaches to persuasion (i.e., emotional inoculation and social motivations) compared to the 
Basic videos and Control groups.  To guide our analysis, hypotheses were developed based on 
the results of prior work and intuition.  Hypotheses are based around how changes will be 
observed in each group across the steps and stages of the study on the scores described in the 
prior section.  Changes in scores will be discussed relative to whether the change reflects higher 
propensity for the groups to adopt the target advice.  This is intuitive in some cases, such as 
behavior, where we will look for higher rates of participants reporting following their target 
advice. For others, more specific definitions are needed to describe “changes towards following.”   
For example, for the awareness instruments, a change towards them following would be 
an increase in awareness scores since, according to prior work [51] those who better understand 
the contexts of cybersecurity advice are more likely to adopt.  Similarly to behavior, in case of 
perceptions, a change towards following would be intuitively represented by an increase in the 
motivation to follow and/or a decrease in motivation to not follow.  For emotions, an increase in 
either or both the valence and prosocial scores is considered a change towards following since, 
according to prior work on emotions and motivations [16,76], and the results in prior Chapters, 
individuals are more likely to take up a behavior if they view it in a positive light, and even more 
so if they feel a social motivation to adhere, as would be represented in a high prosocial score. 
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 Hypothesis 1 (Hypo1): We expect the groups which see the videos that incorporate 
emotional inoculation concepts to have strong impacts on emotions scores relative to other video 
groups.  Additionally, based on the results of prior work [35,53,54,60,98], we anticipate changes 
observed in the groups which see an Emotion video to be longest lasting relative to other video 
groups on all variables. 
 Hypothesis 2 (Hypo2): We expect the groups which see the videos that incorporate 
social appeals to have strong impacts on scores related to social aspects (i.e., social motivations 
to follow and not follow, prosocial score) relative to other video groups.  Based on prior work 
[91,95,104], we also anticipate that the Social videos will outperform the Basic videos, but it is 
unknown how they will compare to the Emotion videos overall. 
7.4 Evaluation of Score Changes 
 To see the differences over time in the scores calculated based on the data collected from 
participants, each variable score’s mean value is plotted in the subsequent figures at each stage of 
the study, for each group.  Referring back to the hypotheses, we will go through the results seen 
in those plots, and discuss the key statistical significance of differences using two non-parametric 
tests: Mann-Whitney U-Tests [65] and Sign Tests [26].9  In both cases, since the sample sizes are 
not exceedingly large, exact calculations of these tests are used.   
Mann-Whitney U-Tests will be used to assign significance to differences observed on a 
variable at a single stage, between the Control group and one of the video groups.  As a 
reminder, Mann-Whitney U-Tests measure if one distribution is greater than the other through 
                                                 
9 The full results for both forms of statistical testing used in this Chapter are presented in Appendix E. 
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the calculation of a rank-sum of random comparisons of cases from each group.  More detail on 
the Mann-Whitney U-Test can be found in prior literature [65].  
Sign Tests will be used to assign significance to differences seen between post-
intervention scores (i.e., those calculated based on data collected immediately after the 
intervention, 2 weeks from the intervention, or 1 month from the intervention) and the scores 
calculated from participant’s data right before they watched their group’s intervention video.  
Sign Tests are similar to Mann-Whitney U-Tests, but rather than comparing the distribution of 
two samples, Sign Tests assess the degree to which values in one set are higher than values in 
another.  Thus, the test can be used to compare repeated measures from the same participants, as 
is being done here.  More details on Sign Tests can also be found in the literature [26]. 
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7.4.1 Awareness 
Figure 7-1 shows the plots for both awareness scores, for all groups that were gathered 
for this study. 
 
Figure 7-1: Mean values for both awareness scores for each group, plotted at each stage of the study. 
The Update groups had the most pronounced awareness shift across both scores, 
according to testing.  All video groups had significantly higher scores than the Control for both 
awareness measures immediately after the intervention (∀, p ≤ 0.017).  Sign Testing confirms 
that these post-intervention scores are also significantly greater than the scores collected from 
 99 
 
Update video group participants before viewing their respective video (∀, p ≤ 0.007).    Despite 
these apparent immediate gains, only the Emotion group had the changes stay consistently 
significant over the follow-up period.  Both scores were significantly different for this group 
compared to the Control at the first and second follow-ups (∀, p ≤ 0.048).  Sign Tests showed 
that the true/false score differences were significantly different at each follow-up stage compared 
to pre-intervention scores (∀, p ≤ 0.004), but the multiple-choice scores did not test significant.  
Groups targeted at use of a password manager also all had strong changes, but not as 
consistently at the follow-ups as the Update groups.  According to Mann-Whitney U-Tests, the 
true/false awareness scores, at all stages were significantly higher than the Control (∀, p ≤ 
0.017), which was supported by Sign tests comparing the true/false scores for each Password 
Manager group at each stage with participants’ pre-intervention scores (∀, p ≤ 0.041).  The 
Password Manager groups also had significant increases for the multiple-choice score 
immediately after the intervention, but these differences were generally not very strong (For 
Basic and Social, 0.03 ≤ p ≤ 0.08), except for the Emotion group (p = 0.003).    At the follow-up 
stages, for the multiple-choice scores, the Basic and Social group’s scores were significantly 
greater at 2-weeks (Basic p = 0.031, Social p = 0.019), but not 1 month after the intervention.  
For using a password manager, the Emotion group had no significant differences compared to 
the Control at either follow-up stage.  Sign testing of the Password Manager groups data agreed 
with these U-Test results. 
Looking to 2FA, the true/false scores were greater than the Controls at each stage for 
Basic and Social groups (∀, p ≤ 0.04), but not the Emotion group.  Sign Tests found that the 
changes for all 2FA groups were not significantly higher than the participants’ pre-intervention 
responses, though, except for the Social group, which was significant at each stage (p < 0.001 @ 
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immediately after, p < 0.001 @ 2 weeks, p = 0.021 @ 1 month).  Tests found no significant 
changes in multiple-choice awareness scores for 2FA groups. 
Thus, most video groups saw the true/false scores increase after intervention and continue 
to remain higher through the follow-ups.  A notable exception was the Emotion group for 2FA.    
Changes were less consistent for the multiple-choice scores, whose instruments focused on 
deeper and more difficult aspects of the advice than the true/false instruments, possibly 
accounting for this discrepancy in performance.  Awareness is only part of motivation overall, 
though, so the other variables must be explored to see other possible impacts of the videos. 
7.4.2 Perceptions 
 Figure 7-2 shows a plot of all 4 motivation scores calculated from the perceptions data 
collected from participants.  As a reminder, these scores are the Individual Motivation to Follow 
(INDF), the Social Motivation to Follow (SOCF), the Individual Motivation to Not Follow 
(INDN), and the Social Motivation to Not Follow (SOCN).  How each of these scores is 
calculated can be found in Section 6.1.3 of this Chapter.  Please note that, in the plots, the 
Motivation to Follow scores are plotted with solid lines, while the Motivation to Not Follow 
scores are plotted with dotted lines. 
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Figure 7-2: Mean values for all scores calculated from the perception data gathered from participants plotted for each stage of 
the study.  Note: Each plot shows the Motivation to Follow (solid line) and Motivation to Not Follow (dotted line) for both the 
Individual and Social vector. 
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Statistical testing comparing the differences between each video group with the Control 
groups seen in Table 7-2 helps identify the strongest trends in the changes seen through the 
study.  In the case of updating and using a password manager, the Emotion groups, according to 
Mann-Whitney U-Tests had the strongest and most consistent results compared to the Controls.  
For 2FA, though changes were not as significant as for the other two advices, results of the 
Emotion group proved interesting.  For the Password Manager Emotion group, for all scores at 
the post-intervention and both follow-ups, except for SOCF at the first follow-up, differences 
between this group’s scores and the Controls’ were significantly greater (∀ except SOCF @ 2 
weeks, 0.001 ≤ p ≤ 0.011).   
The results for the Update Emotion group are similar, but not as consistent as with the 
Password Manager group.  Immediately after the intervention three scores tested significantly 
greater for the Emotion group (INDF p = 0.024, SOCF p < 0.001, SOCN p = 0.015).  At follow-
up points, the Social Motivation to Follow (SOCF) continued to be significant at both 2 weeks (p 
= 0.005) and 1 month (p = 0.009), and the Social Motivation to Not Follow (SOCN) tested 
significantly greater than the Control at the one month mark (p = 0.004), but not at 2 weeks.  The 
2FA Emotion group only had a slightly significant difference for one score at the intervention 
stage: SOCF (p = 0.044).  Interestingly, though they were not different than the Control at other 
stages, both Motivation to Not Follow scores from the Emotion group did test significantly 
different at the follow-up one month from the intervention (INDN p = 0.009, SOCN p = 0.043).  
In all, according to comparisons of the video groups with the Control groups, it would seem that 
those who saw emotionally aware videos had interesting changes in perceptions, particularly by 
the second follow-up, where these were generally the only groups to still see any differences.  
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 For other video groups, though the Basic and Social groups did commonly have 
significant changes immediately after the intervention.  For the Password Manager Basic and 
Social groups, the initial changes immediately after the intervention were significant (∀, 0.001 ≤ 
p ≤ 0.043), while two scores tested significantly greater for the Update Basic group (SOCF p = 
0.028, SOCN p = 0.039), and one score for the Update Social group (SOCF p = 0.007) at the 
same stage.  Unlike the Emotion groups, at follow-ups, these changes were inconsistent for 
Password Manager and Update Basic and Social groups.10  A notable aspect of these perception 
scores results for these two advices is the Social groups’ lack of consistent and strong change on 
social motivation scores, which is somewhat counterintuitive.   
Unlike these two advices, though, the 2FA Social group did garner interesting results.  
Immediately after the intervention, the 2FA Social group had significantly different scores from 
the Control for both the Social Motivation to Follow and Not Follow (SOCF p = 0.017, SOCN p 
= 0.039), but differences in the Individual Motivation scores did not test significant.  Only one of 
these held in significance at the first follow-up (SOCN p = 0.028), but the Individual Motivation 
to Not Follow score was also different for the 2FA Social group at this stage (p = 0.043).  For 
2FA, at least right after the intervention, it seems the Social video may have had the intended 
impact on social scores.  More notable than the 2FA Social group changes are the 2FA Basic 
group changes.  This group had significant differences for these Individual Motivation scores 
(INDF p = 0.028, INDN p = 0.034), but no significance for the differences in the Social 
Motivation scores.  At the first follow-up, these scores continued to be significantly different, as 
                                                 
10 According to statistical testing of the follow-up data, only one score for the Password Manager Basic group had 
changes that tested consistently significant at both follow-ups (INDF @ 2 weeks p = 0.035, INDF @ 1 month p = 
0.008).  Otherwise, only one score for each the Password Manager Social (SOCF p = 0.03) and Basic (INDN p = 
0.048) group tested significantly different at the first follow-up, and only one other score for the Password Manager 
Social group tested significantly different at the second follow-up (SOCN p = 0.022).  Update Basic and Social 
groups had no significant differences at either follow-up. 
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well as one of the social score (INDF p = 0.002, INDN p = 0.035, SOCN p = 0.041).  By the 
second follow-up, only INDN for the 2FA Basic group still tested significantly different 
compared to the Control (p = 0.019).  Thus, unlike Emotion groups for other advice, the 2FA 
Basic group changes were not consistently significant across follow-ups, which was also the case 
for the 2FA Social group, despite strong initial change for social perception scores.  To help sift 
through these mixed results, another test will look at the data from another perspective. 
The results of Sign testing mirrored these findings from Mann-Whitney U-Testing.  For 
two advices, updating and using a password manager, the Emotion groups had significant 
differences between results received before the intervention to immediately after for all scores 
calculated (Update, ∀, p ≤ 0.001, Pass. Man., ∀, p ≤ 0.013).  By 2 weeks after the intervention, 
both significant differences on 3 of the 4 scores compared to scores from before the intervention.  
For updating, all scores but the Individual Motivation to Not Follow score were still significantly 
greater (∀, p ≤ 0.013).  For using a password manager, all but the Social Motivation to Follow 
score were still significantly higher (∀, p ≤ 0.035).  At one month, 3 scores for the Update 
Emotion group were still significantly greater than before the intervention (∀ but INDN, p ≤ 
0.019), while all 4 scores for the Password Manager Emotion group were now significantly 
greater than before the intervention (∀, p ≤ 0.012).   
As before, the 2FA Emotion groups’ scores were not as consistently changed as the two 
groups just discussed.  Neither were differences in scores for other videos for all advice.  Though 
several videos had strong differences in scores from before intervention to immediately after, 
such as the Password Manager (∀ scores, p ≤ 0.009) and Update (∀ but INDN,  p ≤ 0.031) Basic 
groups, as well as the 2FA (∀ but SOCF,  p ≤ 0.027) and Password Manager (∀ but SOCN, p ≤ 
0.035) Social groups, none of these groups had more than one or two scores still test significantly 
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different at each follow-up checkpoint.  Thus, the Emotion groups for updating and using a 
password manager were the only in the study to see extended change in the perception scores 
calculated.  Also like before, the Social groups saw scores return to pre-intervention levels more 
quickly, and social scores were still not significantly raised, even at stages when individual 
scores were. 
The main take-away from these perception results is the strong changes seen for Emotion 
groups across the study for 2 advices, which contrasts with other video groups for all advice that 
may have had strong changes immediately after the interventions, but limited changes by the 
follow-up data collections.  Rational perceptions, as seen in prior Chapters, are only part of the 
picture around motivations, and so other variables measured must be examined to understand 
how the videos may have impacted emotions.  
7.4.3 Emotions 
 Two scores were extracted from the ranking of the top 5 emotions participants report they 
would feel adhering to their group’s target advice.  One measures how many positive emotions 
the participant selects, as well as how prominently those positive emotions are placed in the 
ranking.  The second score does the same, but for prosocial emotions rather than positive 
emotions.  Figure 7-3 shows the plots of the means for these scores, calculated for the data at 
each stage of the study, for each group. 
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Figure 7-3: Mean Valence (i.e., positive/negative) and Prosocial scores plotted for each group, at each stage of the study 
calculated based on participants’ ranking of emotions they anticipate feeling while following their group’s target advice. 
As can be seen in the figure, changes in scores were different across all three advices.  
Notably, the Password Manager Emotion group had the largest and most consistent changes on 
both scores for all videos, while the Update video groups all did well except the Emotion.  The 
2FA video groups exhibited little change on these scores.   
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Statistical testing confirms these conclusions.  For the Password Manager Emotion group, 
the differences of both scores with the Control group were strongly significant at all stages 
except the Prosocial score at the second follow-up (∀ except Prosocial @ 1 month, 0.001 ≤ p ≤ 
0.036).  The scores from this group immediately after and 2 weeks after the intervention were 
also found to be significantly greater than the scores garnered by the same participants before the 
video (∀, 0.001 ≤  p ≤ 0.043).  The other Password Manager groups had strong differences 
compared to the Control immediately after the intervention (∀, 0.001 ≤ p ≤ 0.011), but only the 
Valence score for the Social group’s first follow-up (p = 0.004) and the Basic group’s second 
follow-up (p = 0.013) were still significant in that stage of the study.  Sign Test results for these 
two video groups was similar, with both scores testing significantly different immediate after the 
interventions for both groups (∀, p ≤ 0.009).  The Basic group had Valence scores that were 
significantly greater at both follow-ups (p = 0.001 @ both), but only the first follow-up was 
significant for this score (p = 0.001).  Both scores were also significantly greater at the first 
follow-up compared to before the intervention for the Password Manager Emotion group 
(Valence p = 0.027, Prosocial p = 0.015). 
Similarly, the Update Basic and Social groups both had significantly higher scores 
compared with the Control at each stage after the intervention (∀, p ≤ 0.034), but none of the 
differences were significant for the Emotion group.  The results of Sign Tests found that only the 
differences in these scores immediately after the intervention were consistently significantly 
greater than the scores the same participants gave before, but this was the case for all three video 
groups (∀, p ≤ 0.035). 
For the 2FA groups, only one group at one stage had scores that were significantly 
different from the Control groups’.  This was the Basic group immediately after the intervention 
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(Valence p = 0.006, Prosocial p = 0.015).  These results are reminiscent of the 2FA perception 
score changes for video groups, which was also the lowest of all three advices.  Interestingly, the 
groups targeting updating and using a password manager had significant changes on emotion 
scores at several stages through the study, much like groups for these advices did on perception 
scores.  Unlike the perception scores, though, the significant changes were most consistent for 
Basic and Social groups, whereas the Emotion groups had the most consistent changes on 
perceptions.  The results, for the respective videos, may reflect changes impacted in participants 
that could lead them to a behavior change towards following their groups target advice sometime 
in the future.  Our study also measured changes in behavior during the execution of the study to 
see rates of behavior change, at least for the first month after intervention. 
7.4.4 Behavior 
 Behavior was measured in our study using two survey instruments, one which asked the 
participant to report if they had changed behavior.  This includes changes towards or away 
following their groups’ target advice.  Figure 7-4 shows the frequency of those who reported a 
change in each group of the study. 
 
Figure 7-4: Frequency of participants who reported beginning to follow their group’s target advice sometime during the study 
and continued to follow by the end. 
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 As seen in the figure, the advice which saw the most participants begin to follow by the 
end of the study was updating regularly, where 31 of 103 participants across all groups, 
including the Control11 reported a change towards updating without reporting in a subsequent 
survey that they had stopped.  The other advice saw lower rates of adoption across all groups. 
 Interestingly, for two of the three advices, the Basic video has the largest number of 
participants report a change after viewing, though these rates are closely followed by the 
Emotion groups in each case.  For the Password Manager, all videos performed similarly in 
terms of behavior change, but not significantly differently than change seen in that advice’ 
Control.  Using Chi-Squared tests to assess differences in the number of participant who report a 
change by the end of the study across groups within each advice yielded no significant results.  
This suggests that though some video groups had nominally higher reports of positive behavior 
change by the end of the study, these results are statistically significant. 
7.5  Discussion of Results 
Though prior work has expressed and shown the power of emotionally and socially aware 
appeals towards human behavior in other fields [35,53,54,60,91,95,98,104], work leveraging 
these concepts for cybersecurity behavior is limited [24].  To address this literature gap, this 
thesis explored the motivations users have around multiple security advices in order to design 
informed interventions that utilize these novel-for-the-field concepts and aim to encourage user 
adoption of secure behavior. 
The results discussed in the previous section provide insight into the viability of these 
concepts towards this goal.  First, we look to the behavior results with additional context 
                                                 
11 Among groups that saw a video, overall, 24 of 74 (32%) participants reported a change that was sustained until 
the end of the study. 
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provided by the qualitative data collected.  Then, the results of each experimental intervention 
approach will be discussed, with comparisons to prior work included where applicable.   
7.5.1 Digging into Behavior Change 
To better understand these trends in behavior reported by participants, the qualitative data 
collected from those who reported a change was analyzed.  If a participant reported an alteration 
in behavior on a survey, they were asked to explain why they decided to, using an open-ended 
qualitative instrument.  These responses were coded by one researcher, with the codes being 
reviewed and approved by another.  An initial codebook that contained the codes of “security” 
and “convenience” was used to begin the coding process for data for each advice.  In each case, 
specific codes were developed inductively to better capture the comments than the two initial 
codes code.  These codes differed between advices, but similarities in final codebooks were 
shared.  A total of 17 codes were developed for Update group comments, 11 for 2FA, and 7 for 
Password Manager comments.  Table 7-2 shows the top codes for each advice, as well as the 
number of comments from each group that was assigned each code. 
Advice Code 
Code Assignment Counts 
Control Basic Emotion Social 
U
p
d
a
te
 
Security 3 11 6 2 
It’s important - 3 2 - 
Inspired by our 
survey 
- 2 3 - 
Prompted to 
update/Noticed an 
update was needed 
2 1 2 - 
2
F
A
 Security 1 4 5 2 
Have more 
knowledge 
- 2 1 - 
P
a
ss
. 
M
a
n
. 
Security 1 3 2 1 
Convenience 1 1 1 2 
Have more 
knowledge 
- 1 1 1 
Table 7-2: Top codes assigned to comments from participants in each group along with the frequency of each codes’ assignment. 
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Security, one of the initial codes used in the codebook for each advice, was also the top 
code assigned to comments for all of them.  Even many Control participants, who saw no video, 
but nonetheless ended up changing through the study, cited this as their motivation, showing the 
importance of security to users.  This follows from other studies, particularly those which aimed 
to alter individuals’ behavior around cybersecurity advice.  For example, in the case of app 
permissions on Android, the researchers found that personalizing risk was effective in making 
users take more care in their decisions [42].  Arguably, this change was driven by users’ innate 
desire for security that is also reflected in the fact that even many Control participants reported 
altering behavior in this Chapter’s study due to a desire for security.  Relatedly, convenience was 
a common code for one advice, using a password manager, which is expected considering the 
findings of Chapters 3 and 4.  In all, the centrality of security and convenience in the qualitative 
data is not surprising based on the findings of all the prior Chapters and these concepts’ 
prominent track in the literature [46,47,86,92,103]. 
Patterns on other codes prove more telling.  Several Update participants were inspired to 
change behavior, in their own words, due to our survey/video.  One participant from each the 
2FA and Password Manager groups also citied our survey/video as their motivation, but even 
more participants from these two groups cited having more knowledge or information as the 
reason of their decision change.  These findings follow from prior work that found correlation 
between behavior change around 2FA after an informational video and participants’ ratings of 
how interesting and useful they found the video [4].  The C-HIP model puts emphasis on the 
necessity of messages to conform with or address gaps in receivers’ attitudes and beliefs.  It’s 
possible that the connection between informativeness and usefulness seen in this Chapters’ data 
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and the prior work may be the participants having the messages connect with and/or change their 
attitudes and beliefs, which they communicate as the videos being “informative” or “useful.”   
Looking to the Update groups, some here mention an update prompt or noticing an 
update being available in their reason for changing their behavior.  Though not shown in the 
table, two 2FA participants who changed their behavior said they did so, at least in part, due to a 
new account prompting them to activate the feature.  These results show the possible power the 
messaging contained in the videos tested, particularly if utilized in a larger and more robust 
intervention campaign.  A necessary stage of the C-HIP model is gathering the receivers’ 
attention.  Though this study did as much as possible to make sure participants’ viewed their 
video, it’s possible that some paid limited attention while viewing or had their mind wander 
during some parts of the video.  It is on this front that more regular delivery and maintenance of 
the message contained in these videos may reap gains.  If users are presented these messages on 
multiple occasions, or reminded of the core content in the future, more may adopt the advice 
being targeted since the likelihood of getting their attention with well-designed and tuned 
messages is higher. 
One final observation of the results in Table 7-2, the Basic and Emotion groups were 
more likely to mention security in their comments than the Control and Social groups.  This was 
the case for all three advices, even the Password Manager groups, where the Social group 
reported the most behavior change of any of this advice’s groups.  The Social groups’ overall 
lack of thinking around security in their comments could be a clue as to why the Social groups 
had the lowest rates of reported behavior change.  Those who did not report a change may also 
not be thinking about security, which is a key motivator to adopt the advice tested.  This finding 
is not the only notable changes for groups that saw the experimental videos.  Both the emotional 
 113 
 
inoculation and social motivation approaches had results that show the importance of each in the 
motivations of users around cybersecurity advice. 
7.5.2 Using Emotional Inoculation 
As explained in Chapter 2, emotions have been long theorized to have important 
influence on human decision-making.  Knowing this, some researchers have attempted to harness 
this fact in approaches to communication and persuasion.  One such attempt is emotional 
inoculation.  As described earlier in this Chapter, the goal of emotional inoculation is to reduce 
the propensity of individuals to feel emotions that hinder their adoption of a behavior, while 
increasing instances of emotions that encourage adoption.   
In prior work, emotional inoculation has been shown to have stronger and longer lasting 
impacts on individuals than traditional forms of communication [35], which is what inspired the 
proposition in Hypothesis 1.  Looking to the data, our results support these prior findings and this 
Hypothesis.  For the Update and Password Manager groups, the participants who saw the videos 
which incorporated emotional inoculation had increases on many scores that continued to remain 
significantly higher during the follow-up stages.  This was particularly the case at the extended 
follow-up (i.e., 1 month from intervention), where the Emotion groups had significant 
differences while groups that saw other videos did not, even for 2FA, which was the advice with 
the least amount of score change overall. 
Looking to the emotion score results in particular, part of Hypothesis 1 is not supported 
in the data.  On emotion scores, the Emotion groups sometimes had lower changes in Valence 
and/or Prosocial scores than the other video groups relative to the Controls.  It should be noted 
that most of these same groups did exhibit significant results on Sign Test comparing within 
group increases in the scores.  Thus, though changes relative to the Controls were not significant 
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according to U-Tests, scores were significantly higher when compared with responses from the 
same group before and after the intervention.  Improvement of emotion scores in anyway can 
help encourage adoption, so these results show mixed performance on change in emotion scores 
due to the videos. 
Though emotion scores did not move as expected, looking at this data in another way 
helps us understand how emotions are involved in cybersecurity decision making, as suggested 
by prior work on motivations broadly [14,16].  Based on the existing theory, it is expected that 
those who feel more positive and prosocial emotions when considering the advice would be more 
likely to adopt that advice.   To see trends in the changes in scores for participants that did not 
change their behavior by the end of the study with those that did, exact Sign Tests were 
performed to compare the differences in Emotion scores participants garnered before their 
intervention with each collection point after.  Rather than separating the data by video group, as 
in the prior Sign Tests, here, participants were placed in one of two groups for each advice: those 
who reported following by the end, and those who reported not following.  One advice had 
interesting results with this line of analysis: updating.   
For both the Valence and Prosocial scores, participants in both of these new groups had 
significantly higher (p ≤ 0.001) score immediately after the intervention compared to just before.  
Interestingly, only the sample of participants who changed their behavior towards updating by 
the end of the study reported significantly higher Prosocial scores at both follow-ups (p = 0.002 
@ 2 weeks, p = 0.004 @ 1 month), and moderately higher Valence scores, but only at the one 
month check-in (p = 0.035).  It could be that these increased positive and prosocial emotions 
individuals are reporting to still feel at follow-ups around updating are contributing to their 
collective decisions to begin updating.  Conversely, the lack of sustained changed in emotional 
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outlook of participants around updating could indicate that the appeals were not as powerful as 
would first appear when only looking immediately after then intervention.  This offers a possible 
partial explanation for why more participants did not change their behavior. One final note on 
these emotion findings is the increase in Prosocial scores among those who started updating, 
which follows on prior work demonstrating the power of such emotions [76], and social 
motivations more generally [95]. 
7.5.3 Highlighting Social Motivations 
Though emotional inoculation has been demonstrated as an effective communication 
method in other fields, this thesis presents the first investigation of harnessing this technique 
towards motivating cybersecurity advice adoption.  Social motivation, on the other hand, has 
been attempted by some studies when it comes to cybersecurity.  One notable work here found 
that Facebook notification with social cues were not more likely to promote good security 
behavior than prompts that lacked such cues [24], suggesting difficulty in harnessing these 
motivations in the computer domain.  Our results tell a similar story. 
Though deep analysis of those who began updating by the end of the study showed 
possible power in prosocial emotions, participants who saw Social videos generally did not have 
prominent nor sustained changes on scores through the study.  Neither proposition in Hypothesis 
2 was supported by the results, with the Social videos not outperforming the Basic videos, as 
predicted. 
These results should not discount the importance of social motivations around computer 
security advice in the mind of the reader.  Similar to the sustained increase in Prosocial scores 
seen for those who began updating by the end of the study, these same Sign Tests (i.e., for those 
who follow each advice, and those who do not) were run for the other scores.  For those who 
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reported updating by the end of the study, scores of the Social Motivation to Follow were both 
significantly higher (p = 0.001) at both follow-up check-points, while other perception variables 
did not see similar significant differences for this group at these stages.  Like with the Prosocial 
score result, these findings could reflect a strong and unique connection between social 
motivations to adhere to these advices and the likelihood that an individual will choose to change 
their behavior since this one social score was the only of all perception scores to be significantly 
higher at the follow-up stages. 
7.6 Summary 
Though behavior change was not as strong as would be hoped based on the expected and 
demonstrated power of emotional inoculation and social motivations towards increasing adoption 
of good, but otherwise neglected behavior, the sustained significant changes in other variables 
measured for the Emotion groups demonstrate the applicability of emotional inoculation towards 
cybersecurity advice.  Since these scores represent key pillars of motivation, as argued by models 
of human motivation and communication [14,16,21,95], sustained and significant increases in 
them for those who view the videos tested here is the first step towards behavior change.  Thus, 
future researchers would benefit from taking the lead from these findings and exploring how to 
adapt emotional inoculation to be more effective on behavior directly, possibly through the 
expansion to repeated messaging campaigns that remind users of the content presented just once 
in this study. 
The results presented here also help demonstrate the importance of emotions and notably 
social motivations towards behavior change around cybersecurity.  For participants who reported 
updating by the end of the study, at both follow-ups, Prosocial and Social Motivation to Follow 
scores were all found to be significantly higher than the scores given by participants before the 
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intervention.  These findings stand out since other perception scores did not exhibit this pattern 
for this group, and the Valence score did not exhibit the pattern nearly as strongly as the 
Prosocial score.  It should be noted that these results were not repeated for the other two advice 
tested in this study, but it is possible this is a feature of the lower number of those who reported 
using 2FA (N = 12) or a password manager (N = 12) compared to updating (N = 31) by the end 
of the study.  As such, more work into the interplay between emotions, social motivations, and 
behavior around cybersecurity is called for, with the findings here advancing our understanding 
of these relationships. 
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8 Conclusion 
Cybersecurity is an increasingly important issue in our society.  Though many value 
security and experts call for increases in it, significant portions of users have failed to adopt basic 
security advice given by these experts.  Updating software, using two-factor authentication, and 
using a secure password manager are among the numerous behaviors or tools users can adopt to 
increase their cybersecurity.  Understanding why some take these advices up while other do not 
is an important first steps towards impacting change in their behavior.  Thus, the first several 
studies presented explored users’ motivations around various security advices. 
Recalling from Chapter 1, the first research question of this thesis sought to understand 
how different cybersecurity decisions compare and contrast in users’ considerations.  The studies 
presented that looked into users’ motivations generated many findings, including that some 
advices, such as using a password manager come with added convenience that users appreciate, 
while others, such as using 2FA or updating are inconvenient for users, and they know it.  
Despite these differences, the dominance of security vs. convenience was apparent overall, 
showing the balances that users, who sometimes lack technical knowledge, must make.  The 
importance of past experiences was also found for several advices, such as 2FA and updating. 
The second research question asked how adopters and non-adopters of cybersecurity 
behavior differ in their perceptions, across all three advices.  Perception gaps were found that 
may explain why users make the decisions they do.  As some argue, non-followers could just see 
less benefit and more risk/cost in adopting, at least currently.  The comparison of users and non-
users of password managers was particularly telling, with non-users worrying about the security 
of password managers in general.  On the other hand, users say they use the tool primarily for the 
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additional convenience, showing the complexity in how people think about security issues.  
Related to 2FA, differences in perceptions of the technique were most apparent for different 
users of 2FA than between users and non-users of the feature.  Additionally, many non-users 
reported having never heard of 2FA before taking our survey, showing a possible unique 
awareness gap for this advice.  
Emotions related to these advices were the focus of the third research question, a topic 
broached in the studies presented in Chapter 4, 5, and 6.  In the case of updating, annoyance and 
confusion were prominent in survey.  Deep analysis of targeted data also revealed factors of 
variance that centered on emotional valence in response to update messages, suggesting some 
have positive reactions, while others have negative ones.  For password managers, users and 
non-users differed mostly in their emotions around their ratings of suspicion and security of the 
tool, revealing the deep rift caused by perceptions of insecurity associated with password 
managers.  Two-factor authentication offered another perspective, where the divide between 
users and non-users was more centered on having heard of the tool and thoughts on how 
convenient it is to use rather than perceptions about the security of the tool.   
Social motivations, the focus of the fourth research question, were also studied.  The 
studies that explored existing motivations found a lack of social considerations, but analysis of 
the data in the final study found potential power in social motivations towards behavior change.  
Specifically, when comparing those who followed their groups’ target advice by the end of the 
study to those who did not, the only score that was consistently higher at both follow-ups for 
those who started following was the Social Motivation to Follow.  Though interventions had 
mixed results for the application of social motivations towards encouraging good security 
behavior, this area remains ripe for future work. 
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The final research question of this thesis asked how the application of emotionally and 
socially aware persuasion concepts would perform in altering perceptions and/or behavior 
around cybersecurity.  Chapter 7 discusses a study into just this, finding mixed results for social 
appeals, but evidence for the applicability of emotional inoculation in the realm of cybersecurity.  
For key perceptions related to motivation to adhere to some of the advice tested, the groups 
which saw an emotionally tuned video had the most sustained changes through the study.  This 
final study also shows that different approaches may be warranted for different advice since 
behavior change varied between advices, as did changes in other variables.  Like with social 
motivations, these findings present a foundation for future work to further explore how to best 
utilize emotional inoculation approaches towards encouraging cybersecurity. 
In the next section, the specific contributions of this thesis will be identified in Chapters 
and sections.  Then, Section 8.2 explains in more detail some anticipated tracks of future work. 
8.1 Summary of Contribution 
The contributions of this thesis are: 
1. An analysis of the decision specific concerns across multiple cybersecurity behaviors, 
including the decision to apply updates, use a password manager, and use 2FA. 
a. As explained in Chapter 6, updating is partially reliant on update messages, which 
can be interpreted in several ways by users.  These interpretations are impacted by the 
context, including what the user is doing when they receive the message (which can 
result in annoyance or impact importance/noticeability) and by anticipated impact of 
applying the update, which can be formed by negative past experiences. 
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b. As Sections 4.3 highlighted for password managers, 5.2 showed for 2FA, and 3.3 
demonstrated for all three target advice, all decisions succumb to the balancing of 
security and convenience.  In some cases, such as the use of password managers, this 
works in the tool’s advantage since it offers a distinct convenience (e.g., secure auto-
fill) to users, while others such as 2FA and updating are hurt by the inherent 
inconvenience in using the technique. 
2. Comparison of those who decide both ways when faced with a series of cybersecurity 
decisions. 
a. Section 3.2 described how these results were repeated in the data for other decisions 
such as updating, and using 2FA, with significant perception gaps being found for 
several advices on benefits, costs, and risks.  As discussed in Section 4.2, password 
manager users looked much more kindly on the tool, finding it more secure than non-
users, who were distrustful of it.   
b. Deeper exploration into 2FA suggested that non-adopters of that advice may be 
motivated by a lack of knowledge about the tool.  In Section 5.3, some participants 
who were aware of 2FA, but did not use it cited reasons for not using that were based 
on incorrect assumptions.  Additionally, as explored in Section 5.4, many sampled 
participants reported not having heard of 2FA before taking our survey, and these 
participants reported less overall cybersecurity knowledge and access than those who 
reported having heard of the feature. 
3. Emotional responses to decisions and contexts depended on the decisions being made and 
had differing relationships with behavior. 
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a. For 2FA, as seen in Section 5.2, groups that exhibited the same behavior, but vary in 
perceptions can have different emotional perspectives on the advice.  In this case, 
those who did not find using 2FA as “more convenient” had significantly lower 
magnitudes for ratings of emotions, despite a similar overall structure in ratings given 
compared to other users of 2FA. 
b. For updating, as seen in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, annoyance and confusion were common 
and related with hesitation to apply updates across different software, which was also 
common.  Section 6.4 showed that features of the sample messages, both positive and 
negative were correlated with ratings of annoyance and confusion.  Importance and 
noticeability was also involved, but to less of a degree than annoyance and confusion. 
c. Deeper analysis presented in Section 6.4.2 showed that regardless of the stress of the 
task when delivered, users vary strongly in the valence of the emotions they feel in 
response to update messages, with ratings of positive emotions explaining much of 
the variance observed in the data, according to statistical analysis. 
d. When looking to password managers as presented in Section 4.4, key emotions such 
as security and suspicion were rated significantly differently by users and non-users.  
In addition, users were more admiring and energetic when using password managers 
based on reports, suggesting users may have more motivation around the tool than 
non-users. 
4. Social considerations, through multiple studies and methods came out consistently lower than 
individual concerns. 
a. Qualitative data presented in Section 4.3 that was collected from participants as to 
their reasons for using a password manager focused mainly on individual reasons, as 
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did the reasons given by non-users of 2FA to explain their decisions discussed in 
Section 5.3.  Qualitative data discussed in Section 3.3 for all decisions revealed a 
similar lack of social consideration in reasons given, as further explored in 3.4. 
b. Quantitative ratings of individual and social benefits, costs, and risks of following 
various cybersecurity advices discussed in Section 3.2 had significantly higher ratings 
for all individual variables than their social variables, as noted in 3.4.  This again 
suggests the current supremacy of individual considerations in thinking about these 
decisions. 
5. Interventions were developed that incorporate emotionally and socially-conscious appeals in 
an attempt to better motivate users to take up expert-advised cybersecurity practice than other 
appeals. 
a. As Section 7.4 lays out, the efficacy of several kinds of content was tested on 
multiple variables, including awareness, perceptions, and behavior, which allowed the 
identification of emotional inoculation as a potentially effective method of persuasion 
in the discussion of Section 7.5.  Additionally, as further explained in the same 
section, some value was seen in the social motivations for some advice as several 
social variables were significantly different between those who ended up following 
the target advice by the end of the study relative to those who didn’t. 
8.2 Future Work 
Though much is learned through the investigations presented in this thesis, research 
continues with the goal of further expanding our understanding of why users make the 
cybersecurity decisions they do.  Fortunately, the work presented here can serve as a guide to 
several key areas that need further investigation. 
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First, further study of the application of emotional inoculation and social motivations 
towards encouraging adoption of cybersecurity advice is needed.  Though the work here provides 
a foundation, repetition and expansion of the studies here will allow for more and deeper 
understanding of these approaches’ applicability.  These extensions can also include other advice 
to provide additional context to analysis of performance.  Investigation of the use of these 
concepts and/or interventions in more elaborate campaigns or through other modes of 
communication would also be valuable since some data indicates that behavior change may 
come from the repeated intervention as opposed to a single intervention, as was tested here.  
Finally, repetition of the study investigating these interventions will serve to confirm the results. 
These calls for expansion also include users’ motivations.  Exploration of the contours of 
user motivation around additional cybersecurity behaviors is needed.  In particular, large-scale, 
systematic gathering of data related to users’ perceptions and behavior around many decisions, as 
called for in prior work [46,47], would be welcomed and could be developed based upon the 
methods and instruments utilized in the studies here.  The more exploratory data that is collected, 
the better interventions can be in how they address the concerns users have. 
The expansion to other advice would also provide new contexts in which to learn about 
the broader patterns seen in data.  The balance of security and convenience may be common 
throughout these security advices, but could also be irrelevant in unique cases.  Only further and 
expanded investigations can determine this and other questions related to the patterns identified 
in the data collected this far.  New investigations into motivations may also reveal new patters in 
users’ thinking that are valuable towards designing effective interventions aimed at getting them 
to adopt good behavior. 
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Appendix A 
Survey instruments, sample descriptions, and complete statistical results for the study 
presented in Chapter 3 can be found in this Appendix. 
Survey Instruments 
The study in Chapter 3 was executed using an initial screening survey, as well as follow-
up instruments sent to participants after they were groups by behavior to gather their ratings of 
rational components to their decisions. 
Screening Survey 
The following instruments were used to gather basic demographics and behavior data 
from participants.  Participants were then contacted based on their responses to this survey. 
1. What is your age? _____ 
2. What is your gender?  
o Male 
o Female 
o Other 
3. Do you use a laptop of desktop computer that you or your family owns? 
o Yes 
o No 
4. How would you rate your general computer expertise? 
o Very poor 
o Poor 
o Fair 
o Good 
o Very good 
5. How would you rate your computer security expertise? 
o Very poor 
o Poor 
o Fair 
o Good 
o Very good 
6. How often would you say you use the computer? 
o Never 
o Rarely 
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o Sometimes 
o Often 
o All the time 
7. Do you keep your computer’s software up to date? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I don’t know 
8. Do you use two-factor authentication (e.g., 2-Step Verification) for at least one of your 
online accounts? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I don’t know 
9. Do you use a password manager (e.g., LastPass, OnePass, KeePass) to manage your online 
account passwords? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I don’t know 
10. Do you change your passwords frequently? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I don’t know 
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Follow-Up Survey 
Groups of participants who reported following each target advice in this study were sent 
the following survey, with the bracketed blocks being replaced as appropriate for each advice, 
using the following language: 
Update: “keep(ing) your computer’s software up to date” 
Password Manager: “us(e/ing) a password manager” 
2FA: “us(e/ing) two-factor authentication” 
Template for Follow Groups: 
1. Please explain in a few sentences why you choose to [follow the advice]. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2. How much would you say you are benefited by you [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
3. How much would you say users of other computers are benefited by you [following the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
4. How much would you say you are cost or inconvenienced by you [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
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5. How much would you say users of other computers are cost or inconvenienced by you 
[following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
6. How much would you say you are put at risk by you [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
7. How much would you say users of other computers are put at risk by you [following the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
8. How much would you say you would be benefited if you did not [follow the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
9. How much would you say users of other computers would be benefited if you did not [follow 
the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
10. How much would you say you would be cost or inconvenienced if you did not [follow the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
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11. How much would you say users of other computers would be cost or inconvenienced if you 
did not [follow the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
12. How much would you say you would be put at risk if you did not [follow the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
13. How much would you say users of other computers would be put at risk if you did not 
[follow the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
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Template for Not Follow Groups: 
1. Please explain in a few sentences why you choose not to [follow the advice]. 
2. How much would you say you are benefited by you not [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
3. How much would you say users of other computers are benefited by you not [following the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
4. How much would you say you are cost or inconvenienced by you not [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
5. How much would you say users of other computers are cost or inconvenienced by you not 
[following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
6. How much would you say you are put at risk by you not [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
7. How much would you say users of other computers are put at risk by you not [following the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
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8. How much would you say you would be benefited if you did [follow the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
9. How much would you say users of other computers would be benefited if you did [follow the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
10. How much would you say you would be cost or inconvenienced if you did [follow the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
11. How much would you say users of other computers would be cost or inconvenienced if you 
did [follow the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
12. How much would you say you would be put at risk if you did [follow the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
13. How much would you say users of other computers would be put at risk if you did [follow 
the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
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Sample Descriptive Statistics 
   Gender Age 
Computer 
Expertise 
Security 
Expertise 
 Group N Male Female Avg. St.D. Avg. St.D. Avg. St.D. 
Update 
Follow 39 20 19 38.4 14 4.15 0.7 3.56 0.8 
Not Follow 30 12 18 35.8 11 3.77 0.8 2.93 0.6 
Password 
Manager 
Follow 41 19 22 33.2 8.7 4.24 0.6 3.63 0.9 
Not Follow 38 16 22 34.0 9.7 4.30 0.7 3.50 0.7 
2FA 
Follow 36 20 16 36.6 13 4.31 0.7 3.86 0.9 
Not Follow 31 19 12 32.9 9.0 4.26 0.7 3.77 0.7 
Statistical Inference Testing Results 
Follower vs. Non-Follower Mann-Whitney U-Tests 
   …of Following … of Not Following 
   Follow Not Follow M-W U-Test Follow Not Follow M-W U-Test 
   Avg.(Med.) Avg.(Med.) U Sig. Avg.(Med.) Avg.(Med.) U Sig. 
B
en
ef
it
…
 
In
d
. 
Upd. 3.77(4) 2.97(3) 274.5 <0.001 1.51(1) 2.13(2) 347.5 0.002 
P.M. 3.78(4) 2.50(2.5) 154.5 <0.001 1.68(1) 2.70(3) 302.0 <0.001 
2FA 3.71(4) 2.90(3) 243.5 <0.001 1.59(1.5) 2.62(3) 161.5 <0.001 
S
o
ci
a
l 
 
Upd. 2.71(3) 2.39(3) 338.0 0.286 1.40(1) 1.58(1) 371.0 0.371 
P.M. 2.08(2) 1.70(1) 498.5 0.155 1.39(1) 1.68(1) 511.0 0.142 
2FA 2.48(2) 2.29(2) 390.0 0.489 1.59(1) 1.92(1.5) 313.5 0.237 
R
is
k
…
 In
d
. Upd. 1.56(2) 1.72(2) 496.5 0.335 3.42(4) 2.77(3) 336.5 0.002 
P.M. 1.83(2) 2.53(2) 342.5 <0.001 2.88(3) 1.80(2) 302.5 <0.001 
2FA 1.56(1) 1.62(1) 498.5 0.729 3.42(3) 2.61(3) 243.5 <0.001 
S
o
ci
a
l 
 
Upd. 1.13(1) 1.38(1) 369.5 0.047 2.67(3) 1.76(1) 262.5 <0.001 
P.M. 1.41(1) 1.53(1) 628.0 0.707 1.92(2) 1.29(1) 409.0 0.002 
2FA 1.31(1) 1.48(1) 433.5 0.47 2.48(3) 1.79(2) 289.0 0.013 
C
o
st
…
 In
d
. Upd. 2.03(2) 2.1(2) 527.5 0.444 2.95(3) 2.00(2) 247.5 <0.001 
P.M. 1.73(2) 2.18(2) 533.0 0.011 3.15(3) 1.75(1) 244.5 <0.001 
2FA 2.00(2) 2.39(2) 405.5 0.036 1.76(1) 1.57(1) 446.5 0.451 
S
o
ci
a
l 
 
Upd. 1.22(1) 1.29(1) 431.0 0.781 2.32(2) 1.59(1) 248.0 0.001 
P.M. 1.28(1) 1.52(1) 565.5 0.213 1.84(1) 1.03(1) 354.0 <0.001 
2FA 1.52(1) 1.44(1) 403.5 0.786 1.69(1) 1.41(1) 343.0 0.356 
Individual vs. Social Rating Sign Tests 
 … of Following … of Not Following 
 Ind.> Soc.> Tie Z Sig. Ind.> Soc.> Tie Z Sig. 
Benefit 176 10 62 -12.1 <0.001 108 38 99 -5.71 <0.001 
Cost 112 8 148 -9.4 <0.001 174 6 85 -12.45 <0.001 
Risk 165 21 75 -10.49 <0.001 102 11 140 -8.47 <0.001 
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Appendix B 
 Survey instruments, sample descriptions, and complete statistical results for the study 
presented in Chapter 4 can be found in this Appendix. 
Survey Instruments 
1. What is your gender?  
o Male 
o Female 
o Other 
2. What is your age?  
o 18-25 
o 26-34 
o 35-54 
o 55-64 
o 65+ 
3. What is the highest level of education you have received? 
o Less than High School 
o High School / GED 
o Some College 
o 2-year College Degree 
o 4-year College Degree 
o Master’s Degree 
o Doctoral Degree 
o Professional/Medical Degree (JD, MD) 
4. How would you rate your general computer expertise? 
o Very low 
o Low 
o Below average 
o Average 
o Above average 
o High 
o Very high 
5. Do you know what a password manager is? 
o Yes 
o No 
6. Have you ever used a password manager? 
o Yes 
o No 
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General Statements 
Please rate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = 
Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree) 
 I am doing a good job of protecting my computer security. 
 I could do more to protect my accounts. 
 I do not have time to pay attention to security. 
 I do not feel that my accounts are likely to be attacked. 
 I do not know where to get computer security advice. 
 I am knowledgeable about computer security. 
 I care about computer security. 
 I trust my computer. 
 I am worried about the security of some of my account/devices more than others. 
Password Manager Statements 
Please rate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = 
Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree) 
 I trust password managers. 
 Password managers are more secure. 
 Password managers help people. 
 Password managers are easy to use. 
 Password managers are more convenient. 
 I understand the theory behind password managers. 
 I understand why password managers are secure. 
 I worry that accessing my accounts may be more difficult with a password manager. 
Qualitative Instruments 
Users: Why do you choose to use a password manager? ________________________________ 
Non-Users: Why do you choose not to use a password manager? _________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 144 
 
Emotion Instruments 
Users: Imagine you are using your password manager to log into a website. 
Non-Users: Imagine you start using a password manager to log into a website. 
1. One might feel CONFIDENT (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
2. One might feel SECURE (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
3. One might feel SAD (e.g., because one’s time is being used by the password manager). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
4. One might feel DEPRESSED (e.g., because one’s time is being used by the password 
manager). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
5. One might feel DOWN (e.g., because one’s time is being used by the password manager). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
6. One might feel AFRAID (e.g., because one’s time is being used by the password manager). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
7. One might feel NERVOUS (e.g., because one’s time is being used by the password 
manager). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
8. One might feel ANXIOUS (e.g., because one’s time is being used by the password manager). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
9. One might feel ANGRY (e.g., because using the password manager is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
10. One might feel INSULTED (e.g., because using the password manager is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
11. One might feel HOSTILE (e.g., because using the password manager is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
12. One might feel SURPRISED (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy the 
password manager is to use). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
13. One might feel DAZED (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy the password 
manager is to use). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
14. One might feel CONFUSED (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy the 
password manager is to use). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
15. One might feel FREAKED OUT (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy the 
password manager is to use). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
16. One might feel DISGUSTED (e.g., because using the password manager is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
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17. One might feel DISMAYED (e.g., because using the password manager is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
18. One might feel DISTRAUGHT (e.g., because using the password manager is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
19. One might feel CARED-FOR (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
20. One might feel FRIENDLY (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
21. One might feel WELCOMED (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
22. One might feel POWERFUL (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
23. One might feel ENERGETIC (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
24. One might feel VIGOROUS (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
25. One might feel ISOLATED (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
26. One might feel LONELY (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
27. One might feel ABANDONED (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
28. One might feel PROUD (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
29. One might feel TRIUMPHANT (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
30. One might feel ARROGANT (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
31. One might feel ASHAMED (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
32. One might feel GUILTY (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
33. One might feel EMBARRASSED (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
34. One might feel SCORNFUL (e.g., because the danger is easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
35. One might feel CONTEMPTUOUS (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
36. One might feel DISDAINFUL (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
37. One might feel One might feel HUMILIATED (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
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38. One might feel DISHONORED (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
39. One might feel RESENTFUL (e.g., because the danger is not easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
40. One might feel GRATEFUL (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
41. One might feel RESPECTFUL (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
42. One might feel ADMIRING (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
43. One might feel TRUSTING (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
44. One might feel SUSPICIOUS (e.g. because the tool may be unreliable). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
45. One might feel HAPPY (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  Gender Age 
Group N Male Female Not Given 18-25 26-34 35-54 55-64 
Users 137 90 46 1 31 59 41 6 
Non-Users 111 56 55 - 31 41 30 9 
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Statistical Inference Testing Results 
Users vs. Non-Users Mann-Whitney U-Tests for Emotion Ratings 
 Average (Median) U-Test Results 
 Users Non-Users U Sig. 
Confident 3.54 (4) 3.35 (3) 6588 0.069 
Secure 3.8 (4) 3.50 (4) 6148.5 0.005 
Sad 1.50 (1) 1.55 (1) 7180 0.388 
Depressed 1.49 (1) 1.55 (1) 7089.5 0.295 
Down 1.54 (1) 1.64 (1) 7030.5 0.253 
Afraid 1.77 (2) 1.85 (2) 7425.5 0.734 
Nervous 2.00 (2) 2.12 (2) 7032.5 0.282 
Anxious 1.97 (2) 2.12 (2) 6827.5 0.224 
Angry 1.69 (2) 1.82 (2) 6742 0.122 
Insulted 1.47 (1) 1.60 (1) 6840.5 0.155 
Hostile 1.60 (1) 1.68 (2) 7123.5 0.344 
Surprised 2.31 (2) 2.45 (2) 6955 0.279 
Dazed 1.76 (1) 1.85 (2) 7249 0.496 
Confused 2.08 (2) 2.28 (2) 6522 0.057 
Freaked-Out 1.74 (2) 1.89 (2) 6891.5 0.174 
Disgusted 1.52 (1) 1.59 (1) 7039.5 0.256 
Dismayed 1.80 (2) 1.83 (2) 7315 0.581 
Distraught 1.64 (2) 1.81 (2) 6801.5 0.119 
Cared-For 3.03 (3) 2.77 (3) 6497 0.06 
Friendly 2.77 (3) 2.54 (3) 6656.5 0.102 
Welcomed 2.97 (3) 2.71 (3) 6573.5 0.055 
Powerful 2.91 (3) 2.83 (3) 7242.5 0.497 
Energetic 2.58 (3) 2.21 (2) 6111.5 0.006 
Vigorous 2.42 (3) 2.28 (2) 7028.5 0.347 
Isolated 1.66 (1) 1.65 (1) 7386.5 0.67 
Lonely 1.45 (1) 1.52 (1) 7386.5 0.755 
Abandoned 1.55 (1) 1.63 (1) 7281.5 0.518 
Proud 3.00 (3) 2.76 (3) 6561 0.07 
Triumphant 2.90 (3) 2.67 (3) 6687.5 0.09 
Arrogant 1.89 (2) 1.88 (2) 7525.5 0.882 
Ashamed 1.66 (1) 1.71 (1.5) 7207.5 0.589 
Guilty 1.74 (2) 1.85 (2) 7064.5 0.363 
Embarrassed 1.77 (2) 1.80 (2) 7288 0.633 
Scornful 1.69 (1) 1.60 (1) 7156.5 0.376 
Contemptuous 1.79 (1) 1.76 (2) 7438 0.85 
Disdainful 1.65 (1) 1.63 (1) 7334.5 0.671 
Humiliated 1.42 (1) 1.42 (1) 7517.5 0.947 
Dishonored 1.52 (1) 1.51 (1) 7585.5 0.97 
Resentful 1.70 (2) 1.90 (2) 6712.5 0.13 
Grateful 3.42 (4) 3.23 (3) 6628.5 0.068 
Respectful 2.85 (3) 2.58 (3) 6613 0.084 
Admiring 2.66 (3) 2.32 (2) 6305.5 0.017 
Trusting 3.49 (4) 3.29 (3) 6489 0.056 
Suspicious 2.39 (2) 2.80 (3) 5788 0.001 
Happy 3.46 (4) 3.26 (3) 6684.5 0.085 
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Appendix C 
 Survey instruments, sample descriptions, and complete statistical results for the study 
presented in Chapter 5 can be found in this Appendix. 
Survey Instruments 
7. What is your gender?  
o Male 
o Female 
o Other 
8. What is your age?  
o 18-25 
o 26-34 
o 35-54 
o 55-64 
o 65+ 
9. What is the highest level of education you have received? 
o Less than High School 
o High School / GED 
o Some College 
o 2-year College Degree 
o 4-year College Degree 
o Master’s Degree 
o Doctoral Degree 
o Professional/Medical Degree (JD, MD) 
10. How would you rate your general computer expertise? 
o Very low 
o Low 
o Below average 
o Average 
o Above average 
o High 
o Very high 
11. Do you know what two-factor authentication is? 
o Yes 
o No 
12. Have you ever used two-factor authentication? 
o Yes 
o No 
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General Statements 
Please rate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = 
Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree) 
 I am doing a good job of protecting my computer security. 
 I could do more to protect my accounts. 
 I do not have time to pay attention to security. 
 I do not feel that my accounts are likely to be attacked. 
 I do not know where to get computer security advice. 
 I am knowledgeable about computer security. 
 I care about computer security. 
 I trust my computer. 
 I am worried about the security of some of my account/devices more than others. 
Two-Factor Authentication Statements 
Please rate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = 
Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree) 
 I trust two-factor authentication. 
 Two-factor authentication is secure. 
 Two-factor authentication helps people. 
 Two-factor authentication is easy to use. 
 Two-factor authentication is more convenient. 
 I understand the theory behind two-factor authentication. 
 I understand why two-factor authentication is secure. 
Qualitative Instruments 
Users: Why do you choose to use two-factor authentication? ____________________________ 
Non-Users: Why do you choose not to use two-factor authentication? _____________________ 
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Emotion Instruments 
Users: Imagine you are using two-factor authentication to access an account. 
Non-Users: Imagine you start using two-factor authentication to access an account. 
1. One might feel CONFIDENT (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
2. One might feel SECURE (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
3. One might feel SAD (e.g., because one’s time is being used by two-factor authentication). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
4. One might feel DEPRESSED (e.g., because one’s time is being used by two-factor authentication). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
5. One might feel DOWN (e.g., because one’s time is being used by two-factor authentication). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
6. One might feel AFRAID (e.g., because one’s time is being used by two-factor authentication). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
7. One might feel NERVOUS (e.g., because one’s time is being used by two-factor authentication). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
8. One might feel ANXIOUS (e.g., because one’s time is being used by two-factor authentication). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
9. One might feel ANGRY (e.g., because using two-factor authentication is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
10. One might feel INSULTED (e.g., because using two-factor authentication is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
11. One might feel HOSTILE (e.g., because using two-factor authentication is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
12. One might feel SURPRISED (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy two-factor 
authentication is to use). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
13. One might feel DAZED (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy two-factor 
authentication manager is to use). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
14. One might feel CONFUSED (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy two-factor 
authentication is to use). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
15. One might feel FREAKED OUT (e.g., because one does not expect how hard or easy two-
factor authentication manager is to use). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
16. One might feel DISGUSTED (e.g., because using two-factor authentication is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
17. One might feel DISMAYED (e.g., because using two-factor authentication is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
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18. One might feel DISTRAUGHT (e.g., because using two-factor authentication is inconvenient). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
19. One might feel CARED-FOR (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
20. One might feel FRIENDLY (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
21. One might feel WELCOMED (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
22. One might feel POWERFUL (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
23. One might feel ENERGETIC (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
24. One might feel VIGOROUS (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
25. One might feel ISOLATED (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
26. One might feel LONELY (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
27. One might feel ABANDONED (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
28. One might feel PROUD (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
29. One might feel TRIUMPHANT (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
30. One might feel ARROGANT (e.g., because one knows of danger and is taking precautions). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
31. One might feel ASHAMED (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
32. One might feel GUILTY (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
33. One might feel EMBARRASSED (e.g., because one’s precautions may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
34. One might feel SCORNFUL (e.g., because the danger is easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
35. One might feel CONTEMPTUOUS (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
36. One might feel DISDAINFUL (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
37. One might feel One might feel HUMILIATED (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
38. One might feel DISHONORED (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
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39. One might feel RESENTFUL (e.g., because the danger is not easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
40. One might feel GRATEFUL (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
41. One might feel RESPECTFUL (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
42. One might feel ADMIRING (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
43. One might feel TRUSTING (e.g. because the system has given one tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
44. One might feel SUSPICIOUS (e.g. because the tool may be unreliable). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
45. One might feel HAPPY (e.g., because one is protected from possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
   Gender Age   
Group N M F N. G. 18-25 26-34 35-54 55-64 65+ N.G. 
Users Not more 
convenient 
71 54 17 - 11 30 26 3 1 - 
 Indifferent/More 
convenient 
77 50 27 - 20 36 19 2 - - 
Non-Users 22 12 10 - 7 6 6 3 - - 
Don’t Know 125 55 68 2 20 54 39 10 1 1 
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Statistical Inference Testing Results 
Not Convenient vs. Other Users Mann-Whitney U-Tests for Emotion Ratings 
 Average (Median) U-Test Results 
 Not more convenient Indifferent/More convenient U Sig. 
Confident 3.48 (3) 3.68 (4) 2388 0.206 
Secure 3.90 (4) 3.86 (4) 2706.5 0.909 
Sad 1.59 (1) 1.74 (1) 2650.5 0.725 
Depressed 1.54 (1) 1.70 (1) 2591.5 0.542 
Down 1.73 (2) 1.90 (2) 2629.5 0.667 
Afraid 1.51 (1) 1.94 (2) 2123 0.011 
Nervous 1.75 (2) 1.84 (2) 2676 0.812 
Anxious 2.10 (2) 2.09 (2) 2716 0.944 
Angry 2.15 (2) 1.96 (2) 2276.5 0.065 
Insulted 1.61 (1) 1.92 (2) 2329.5 0.154 
Hostile 1.96 (2) 1.87 (2) 2495.5 0.332 
Surprised 2.20 (2) 2.38 (2) 2484.5 0.319 
Dazed 1.70 (1) 1.87 (2) 2414 0.24 
Confused 2.27 (2) 2.08 (2) 2420 0.208 
Freaked-Out 1.65 (1) 1.88 (2) 2470 0.272 
Disgusted 1.54 (1) 1.66 (1) 2587 0.637 
Dismayed 2.14 (2) 1.95 (2) 2405.5 0.186 
Distraught 1.94 (2) 2.05 (2) 2653 0.744 
Cared-For 2.77 (3) 3.30 (3) 2002 0.003 
Friendly 2.28 (2) 3.06 (3) 1682.5 < 0.001 
Welcomed 2.56 (3) 3.25 (3) 1864.5 0.001 
Powerful 2.93 (3) 3.18 (3) 2414 0.204 
Energetic 2.14 (2) 2.92 (3) 1726.5 < 0.001 
Vigorous 2.32 (2) 2.65 (3) 2215 0.074 
Isolated 1.51 (1) 1.90 (2) 2088.5 0.006 
Lonely 1.35 (1) 1.78 (1) 2129.5 0.008 
Abandoned 1.42 (1) 1.71 (1) 2384 0.121 
Proud 2.70 (3) 3.26 (3) 2053 0.007 
Triumphant 2.69 (3) 3.19 (3) 2100.5 0.012 
Arrogant 1.87 (2) 2.06 (2) 2513.5 0.37 
Ashamed 1.46 (1) 1.84 (2) 2175 0.018 
Guilty 1.58 (1) 1.82 (2) 2344.5 0.103 
Embarrassed 1.65 (1) 1.84 (2) 2453.5 0.241 
Scornful 1.55 (1) 1.79 (2) 2313 0.074 
Contemptuous 1.52 (1) 2.04 (2) 1927.5 0.001 
Disdainful 1.61 (1) 1.81 (1) 2439 0.211 
Humiliated 1.27 (1) 1.66 (1) 2117.5 0.005 
Dishonored 1.28 (1) 1.70 (1) 2095.5 0.004 
Resentful 1.90 (2) 2.03 (2) 2651 0.737 
Grateful 3.19 (3) 3.56 (4) 2095 0.014 
Respectful 2.63 (3) 3.26 (3) 1792.5 <0.001 
Admiring 2.21 (2) 2.83 (3) 1860 0.001 
Trusting 3.55 (4) 3.49 (4) 2696.5 0.88 
Suspicious 2.24 (2) 2.30 (2) 2671.5 0.802 
Happy 3.01 (3) 3.44 (3) 2085 0.013 
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Users vs. Non-Users Mann-Whitney U-Tests for Emotion Ratings 
 Average (Median) U-Test Results 
 Users Non-Users U Sig. 
Confident 3.59 (4) 3.64 (4) 1530.5 0.67 
Secure 3.88 (4) 3.73 (4) 1530.5 0.618 
Sad 1.67 (1) 1.55 (1) 1500 0.509 
Depressed 1.62 (1) 1.55 (1.5) 1619 0.963 
Down 1.82 (2) 1.52 (1) 1305 0.198 
Afraid 1.73 (2) 1.59 (1.5) 1548.5 0.686 
Nervous 1.8 (2) 1.95 (2) 1416.5 0.291 
Anxious 2.09 (2) 2.00 (2) 1560 0.74 
Angry 2.05 (2) 2.14 (2) 1525.5 0.617 
Insulted 1.77 (1) 1.59 (1) 1437 0.382 
Hostile 1.91 (2) 1.77 (2) 1516 0.579 
Surprised 2.29 (2) 2.18 (2) 1511.5 0.573 
Dazed 1.79 (2) 1.68 (1) 1513 0.6 
Confused 2.17 (2) 2.18 (2) 1596.5 0.878 
Freaked-Out 1.77 (2) 1.82 (2) 1513.5 0.565 
Disgusted 1.61 (1) 1.5 (1) 1464.5 0.419 
Dismayed 2.04 (2) 1.95 (2) 1601.5 0.897 
Distraught 2.00 (2) 1.68 (1.5) 1335.5 0.149 
Cared-For 3.05 (3) 3.09 (3) 1577.5 0.807 
Friendly 2.69 (3) 2.41 (2.5) 1395.5 0.264 
Welcomed 2.92 (3) 2.59 (2.5) 1355 0.19 
Powerful 3.06 (3) 2.86 (3) 1466.5 0.437 
Energetic 2.55 (3) 2.38 (2) 1399.5 0.448 
Vigorous 2.49 (3) 2.59 (2) 1568.5 0.856 
Isolated 1.71 (1) 1.68 (1.5) 1604.5 0.905 
Lonely 1.57 (1) 1.50 (1) 1559.5 0.715 
Abandoned 1.57 (1) 1.41 (1) 1464.5 0.376 
Proud 2.99 (3) 2.91 (3) 1543.5 0.685 
Triumphant 2.95 (3) 2.77 (3) 1464.5 0.434 
Arrogant 1.97 (2) 1.77 (1.5) 1502.5 0.535 
Ashamed 1.66 (1) 1.59 (1) 1502.5 0.518 
Guilty 1.70 (2) 1.59 (1) 1441.5 0.342 
Embarrassed 1.75 (2) 1.64 (1) 1544 0.67 
Scornful 1.68 (1) 1.55 (1.5) 1588.5 0.839 
Contemptuous 1.79 (2) 1.82 (1) 1562.5 0.741 
Disdainful 1.71 (1) 1.32 (1) 1311 0.1 
Humiliated 1.47 (1) 1.18 (1) 1293 0.057 
Dishonored 1.50 (1) 1.36 (1) 1407.5 0.226 
Resentful 1.97 (2) 1.95 (2) 1620 0.969 
Grateful 3.38 (3) 3.50 (3.5) 1504 0.578 
Respectful 2.96 (3) 2.71 (3) 1345.5 0.325 
Admiring 2.54 (2) 2.68 (3) 1521 0.643 
Trusting 3.52 (4) 3.45 (3.5) 1578.5 0.807 
Suspicious 2.27 (2) 2.27 (2) 1614.5 0.947 
Happy 3.24 (3) 3.27 (3) 1598 0.926 
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Appendix D 
 Survey instruments, sample descriptions, and complete statistical results for the studies 
presented in Chapter 6 can be found in this Appendix. 
Survey Instruments 
University Study 
Basic Instruments 
1. What is your age? _____ 
2. What is your gender? _____ 
3. Have you ever been hesitant to apply an update? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I Don’t Know 
4. Have you ever been annoyed by an update message? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I Don’t Know 
5. Have you ever been confused by an update message? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I Don’t Know 
 
In-Depth Software Instruments 
For the software listed in the chart below, participants in the second phase of the 
University study were asked to report whether they used each.  If they reported using, the 
following survey instruments were then presented to them, with [software] being replaced with 
the specific software from the list, as appropriate. 
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Category [Software] 
Operating Systems Microsoft Windows  
Apple laptops or desktops  
Linux  
iPhone  
Android 
Web Browser Mozilla Firefox 
Google Chrome 
Internet Explorer 
Safari 
Productivity Software Microsoft Office 
Open Office 
Adobe Acrobat 
Libre Office 
Media Software iTunes 
QuickTime 
Windows Media Player 
Security Software Norton products 
McAfee products 
Malwarebytes 
Other Skype 
Video Games 
 
1. Approximately how long after you see a [software] update message do you wait to apply the 
update? 
o Immediately 
o 1 day 
o 3 days 
o A week 
o A month 
o Never 
2. On a scale of 1–7, rate how much you agree with each statement.  
1 = do not agree at all, 7 = agree completely  
 [Software] update messages are annoying. 
 [Software] update messages are confusing. 
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In-Depth Sample Message Instruments 
 Participants in the second phase of the University study were also shown a series of 
sample, real-world update and warning messages.  With each image, the following survey 
instruments were displayed to all participants. 
1. Rate from 1 = not at all, to 7 = very 
 How important is the message?  
 How annoying is the message? 
 How confusing is the message? 
 How noticeable is the message? 
2. What did you like about the message? ____________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3. What did you dislike about the message?  _________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Mechanical Turk Study 
 The following instruments were used through Mechanical Turk to gather in-depth 
emotion ratings from users related to software updates.  The emotions instruments (questions 3-
47) were shown twice, once with the Relaxed prompt preceding the instruments, then again after 
the Pressured prompt. 
1. What is your age?  
o 18-25 
o 26-34 
o 35-54 
o 55-64 
o 65+  
2. What is your gender?  
o Male 
o Female 
Relaxed: Imagine a situation where the warning to update software appears while you are surfing 
the web with no specific purpose. 
Pressured: Imagine a situation where the warning to update software appears while you are hard 
at work on an important project with a looming deadline. 
3. One might feel CONFIDENT (e.g., because one is warned of possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
4. One might feel SECURE (e.g., because one is warned of possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
5. One might feel SAD (e.g., because one's work is attacked and in danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
6. One might feel DEPRESSED (e.g., because one's work is attacked and in danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
7. One might feel DOWN (e.g., because one's work is attacked and in danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
8. One might feel AFRAID (e.g., because one's work is attacked and in danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
9. One might feel NERVOUS (e.g., because one's work is attacked and in danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
10. One might feel ANXIOUS (e.g., because one's work is attacked and in danger).   
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
11. One might feel ANGRY (e.g., because one's work is being attacked). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
12. One might feel INSULTED (e.g., because one's work is being attacked). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
13. One might feel HOSTILE (e.g., because one's work is being attacked).   
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
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14. One might feel SURPRISED (e.g., because one does not expect the interruption). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
15. One might feel DAZED (e.g., because one does not expect the interruption). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
16. One might feel CONFUSED (e.g., because one does not expect the interruption). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
17. One might feel FREAKED OUT (e.g., because one does not expect the interruption). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
18. One might feel DISGUSTED (e.g., because one's work is being attacked). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
19. One might feel DISMAYED (e.g., because one's work is being attacked). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
20. One might feel DISTRAUGHT (e.g., because one's work is being attacked).   
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
21. One might feel CARED-FOR (e.g., because one is warned of possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
22. One might feel FRIENDLY (e.g., because one is warned of possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
23. One might feel WELCOMED (e.g., because one is warned of possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
24. One might feel POWERFUL (e.g., because one is warned and can respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
25. One might feel ENERGETIC (e.g., because one is warned and can respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
26. One might feel VIGOROUS (e.g., because one is warned and can respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
27. One might feel ISOLATED (e.g., because one’s response may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
28. One might feel LONELY (e.g., because one’s response may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
29. One might feel ABANDONED (e.g., because one’s response may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
30. One might feel PROUD (e.g., because one is warned and can respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
31. One might feel TRIUMPHANT (e.g., because one is warned and can respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
32. One might feel ARROGANT (e.g., because one is warned and can respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
33. One might feel ASHAMED (e.g., because one’s response may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
34. One might feel GUILTY (e.g., because one’s response may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
35. One might feel EMBARRASSED (e.g., because one’s response may be inadequate). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
36. One might feel SCORNFUL (e.g., because the attack is easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
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37. One might feel CONTEMPTUOUS (e.g., because the attack is easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
38. One might feel DISDAINFUL (e.g., because the attack is easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
39. One might feel HUMILIATED (e.g., because the attack is not easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
40. One might feel DISHONORED (e.g., because the attack is not easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
41. One might feel RESENTFUL (e.g., because the attack is not easily countered). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
42. One might feel GRATEFUL (e.g., because the system has given one the tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
43. One might feel RESPECTFUL (e.g., because the system has given one the tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
44. One might feel ADMIRING (e.g., because the system has given one the tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
45. One might feel TRUSTING (e.g., because the system has given one the tools to respond). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
46. One might feel SUSPICIOUS (e.g., because the warning may be unreliable). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
47. One might feel HAPPY (e.g., because one is warned of possible danger). 
○ Never  ○ Rarely  ○ Sometimes  ○ Often  ○ All of the Time 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  Gender Age 
 N Male Female N. G. 18-25 26-34 35-54 55+ 
MTurk 400 190 209 1 65 155 136 44 
 
  Gender Age 
 N Male Female Avg. St.D. 
University Phase 1 71 41 30 33 14 
University Phase 2 155 62 93 22 5.4 
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Factor Loadings for ESEM Analysis 
 1. Positive  2. Anxious 3. Lonely 4. Hostile 
Emotion R P R P R P R P 
Happy 0.781* 0.803* -0.014 -0.047 0.042 0.022 -0.008 -0.048 
Confident 0.822* 0.853* 0.077 0.071 -0.170* -0.167* 0.042 -0.007 
Secure 0.813* 0.858* 0.177* 0.097* -0.220* -0.310* -0.099 -0.013 
Respectful 0.771* 0.788* -0.013 0.018 0.077 0.081 0.026 -0.03 
Grateful 0.811* 0.816* 0.228* 0.165* -0.103 -0.152* -0.119* -0.103* 
Friendly 0.705* 0.694* -0.125* -0.214* 0.214* 0.162* -0.037 0.008 
Cared-for 0.753* 0.799* 0.100* 0.003 0.028 -0.04 0.001 0.003 
Welcomed 0.705* 0.743* -0.085* -0.166* 0.148* 0.141* -0.037 0.022 
Trusting 0.755* 0.785* 0.128* 0.08 -0.071 -0.145* -0.140* -0.042 
Admiring 0.692* 0.753* -0.018 -0.081* 0.129* 0.139* 0.112* 0.016 
Triumphant 0.670* 0.698* 0.004 0.003 0.109 0.073 0.098 0.058 
Proud 0.652* 0.726* -0.072 -0.131* 0.120* 0.138* 0.175* 0.018 
Powerful 0.714* 0.757* -0.082 -0.05 -0.015 -0.003 0.206* 0.163* 
Energetic 0.620* 0.641* -0.152* -0.045 0.217* 0.214* 0.076 -0.029 
Vigorous 0.630* 0.614* 0.021 0.03 0.216* 0.108 0.068 0.096 
Confused 0.016 0.032 0.610* 0.535* 0.189* 0.213* -0.006 0.059 
Anxious 0.013 0.005 0.680* 0.723* 0.237* 0.049 0.039 0.097 
Nervous 0.023 0.062 0.692* 0.749* 0.252* 0.085 -0.054 0.069 
Freaked out -0.041 0.024 0.534* 0.654* 0.257* 0.115* 0.112* 0.121* 
Afraid 0.04 0.008 0.573* 0.727* 0.425* 0.237* -0.023 -0.071 
Surprised 0.235* 0.252* 0.469* 0.538* -0.029 -0.135* 0.117 0.155* 
Dismayed 0.037 0.006 0.451* 0.644* 0.150* 0.034 0.324* 0.242* 
Distraught 0.01 -0.051 0.434* 0.551* 0.444* 0.124* 0.106* 0.267* 
Suspicious -0.105* -0.021 0.477* 0.381* -0.026 -0.088 0.168* 0.244* 
Dazed 0.105* 0.162* 0.324* 0.484* 0.327* 0.222* 0.062 0.089 
Sad 0.026 0.029 0.195* 0.484* 0.601* 0.498* 0.104* -0.029 
Depressed -0.048 -0.064 0.225* 0.503* 0.678* 0.542* 0.016 -0.061 
Down -0.06 -0.008 0.363* 0.597* 0.512* 0.422* 0.137* -0.05 
Lonely 0.041 -0.001 -0.069 -0.038 0.821* 0.833* -0.002 0.027 
Abandoned 0.005 -0.016 0.028 0.143* 0.824* 0.761* -0.037 0.006 
Ashamed 0.061 0.028 -0.022 0.012 0.825* 0.823* -0.022 0.028 
Isolated 0.016 0.015 0.087* 0.121* 0.787* 0.774* -0.056 0.012 
Humiliated -0.018 0.034 0.032 0.100* 0.802* 0.767* 0.023 0.066 
Embarrassed 0.044 0.051 0.073 0.007 0.777* 0.795* -0.029 0.073* 
Guilty 0.012 0.096* 0.017 0.06 0.749* 0.687* 0.059 0.024 
Dishonored 0.038 0.084* -0.003 0.053 0.721* 0.570* 0.139* 0.253* 
Disdainful 0.124* 0.116* 0.014 0.021 -0.048 0.047 0.821* 0.717* 
Scornful 0.120* 0.017 0.009 -0.025 0.037 0.110* 0.747* 0.751* 
Contemptuous 0.113* 0.183* 0.062 0.017 0.027 0.057 0.676* 0.659* 
Hostile -0.068 -0.042 0.225* 0.372* 0.025 -0.037 0.634* 0.573* 
Resentful -0.025 -0.076 0.351* 0.289* 0.005 -0.075 0.574* 0.600* 
Disgusted -0.011 -0.062 0.204* 0.294* 0.110* 0.177* 0.573* 0.434* 
Angry -0.066 -0.088* 0.381* 0.466* -0.024 -0.055 0.565* 0.481* 
Insulted -0.022 0.067 0.075 0.141* 0.385* 0.306* 0.436* 0.454* 
Arrogant 0.298* 0.350* -0.106* -0.173* 0.251* 0.263* 0.405* 0.365* 
Notes: * is p<.05 significant; loadings > .4 and significant in bold. R = Relaxed, P = Pressured 
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Appendix E 
 Intervention scripts and slides, sample descriptions, and complete statistical results for 
the study presented in Chapter 7 can be found in this Appendix. 
Intervention Video Slides and Scripts 
Update Slides 
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Update Basic 
 Software development is a large task that has many accepted methods, but there are 
basics that most developers follow.  We will explain these basics to help you understand how 
security vulnerabilities arise.  Most software is developed in a cycle, meaning development never 
quite stops.  Instead, once a product is created, it is continuously tuned and improved as time 
goes on.  Sometimes this is done to add new features that weren’t needed or considered before.  
Other times, flaws and bugs in the original program need to be fixed. 
When creating a new program, the first step is to plan what the interface and outputs of 
the software will be.  This step also involves creating some kind of documentation that will serve 
as a guide in later stages. 
When the software is planned and the outlines and blueprints of the program are ready, it 
is time to actually make it.  This step can be very time-consuming, especially for software like 
operating systems or highly specific, heavyweight programs like productivity software such as 
Microsoft Word or Adobe PDF Acrobat or even entertainment and creative software, like Adobe 
Photoshop or Apple iTunes.  Software that uses the Internet or other networks that allow it to 
communicate with other machines can be even harder to create due to the larger number of 
interactions to consider. 
As development completes and a seemingly working program remains, testing usually 
follows to find issues that aren’t so apparent. This process may utilize outside organizations or 
individuals, commonly known as beta testers who purposely try to break a program to find its 
flaws. 
Once problems in the software have been identified and repaired, the software is released to the 
public, but the development cycle continues into maintenance.  Though testing will find many 
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issues, problems can be hidden, only appearing under specific circumstances when installed and 
used on personal devices.  Therefore, as these issues are reported, regular software updates or 
patches are released that address the problems. 
Creating software in this cycle presents benefits and negatives.  On one hand, software 
can be created fast and changed easily.  Additionally, products can be delivered much sooner 
than would otherwise be possible.  On the other hand, flaws on delivery are almost unavoidable 
and there is always the possibility that the cycle will end before all issues are resolved, like when 
a product is no longer supported due to it being too old. 
Thus, applying software updates in a timely manner is important to making sure security 
is the best it can be. Since flaws are unavoidable, providers utilize software updates to improve 
their products and the services they deliver. 
Though the negative aspects of the cycle can be reduced by prompt and regular updating, 
the introduction of networked components to software has made the likelihood of flaws both 
appearing and being found much higher.  When software uses networks like the Internet, it sends 
information between computers, which allows easy communication between devices and people, 
while also making computing power shareable via web-based applications.  
With easier communication comes a trade off from security.  Since machines other than 
your own are involved when the Internet is utilized, you are open to attack by remote actors.  
Such actors work hard to find flaws in software they can exploit called “back-doors.”  Like all 
flaws, back-doors are commonly patched in software updates, but even known exploits can be 
viable for attackers since so much software remains out of date. 
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Backdoor exploits can be used in many ways.  Depending on the particular software and 
flaw being utilized, attackers could access data, such as personal information, credit card 
numbers, or credentials to bank accounts.    Some flaws may also allow attackers to access other 
programs or features outside of the software that contains the flaw.  In this case, a resourceful 
attacker can do many things, such as a distributed denial of service attack, commonly known as a 
DDoS attack, or “Dee-Dos.”  Though there are other ways to execute a DDoS attack, we will see 
how flaws in software can be used as the starting point for this kind of exploit. 
Here is a representation of the internet.  On one end, you have the various web servers 
that host the content we view and services we use.  On the other end, we have the end-users and 
their devices, including PCs and smart-phones.   
Information travels easily from end to end, as well as between servers, and some end 
users. 
In the mass of information flowing in all directions, a malicious actor can arise.  The attacker 
uploads a virus to a compromised server to be downloaded by anyone who visits the website 
hosted on the server. 
Before anyone notices, the virus infects many people’s devices.  Using existing back-
doors in out-of-date software on the infected machines, the attacker might have a lot of access 
and power.  In this case, maybe they want to take out a web-service they don’t like. 
The attacker can generate tons of junk messages targeting a particular website or service.  His 
virus can send short requests over the Internet from the various infected machines.  Though each 
message or request is small, if a large number of machines partake in the attack, the cumulative 
traffic can shut down the website or service, especially if the victim is caught off guard. 
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Backdoor exploits can be used for many attacks and so closing these flaws is imperative 
towards securing the entire Internet.  Apply software updates is a key step to closing any security 
flaws in the software you use, and is among the most expert recommended actions an individual 
can take to increase their security.  Though not all updates contain security patches, keeping 
programs up to date helps stop frustration with software before it begins. 
 
Update Emotion 
Software development is a large task that has many accepted methods, but there are 
basics that most developers follow.  We will explain these basics to help you understand how 
security vulnerabilities arise.  Most software is developed in a cycle, meaning development never 
quite stops.  Instead, once a product is created, it is continuously tuned and improved as time 
goes on.  Sometimes this is done to add new features that weren’t needed or considered before.  
Other times, flaws and bugs in the original program need to be fixed. 
When creating a new program, the first step is to plan what the interface and outputs of 
the software will be.  This step also involves creating some kind of documentation that will serve 
as a guide in later stages. 
When the software is planned and the outlines and blueprints of the program are ready, it 
is time to actually make it.  This step can be very time-consuming, especially for software like 
operating systems or highly specific, heavyweight programs like productivity software such as 
Microsoft Word or Adobe PDF Acrobat or even entertainment and creative software, like Adobe 
Photoshop or Apple iTunes.  Software that uses the Internet or other networks that allow it to 
communicate with other machines can be even harder to create due to the larger number of 
interactions to consider. 
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As development completes and a seemingly working program remains, testing usually 
follows to find issues that aren’t so apparent. Since companies know how annoying, frustrating, 
and confusing problems with software can be, they may utilize outside organizations or 
individuals, commonly known as beta testers who purposely try to break a program to find flaws 
so that they can be fixed. 
Once problems in the software have been identified and repaired, the software is released 
to the public, but the development cycle continues into maintenance.  Though testing will find 
many issues, hidden annoying problems can still remain.  Software updates are therefore used to 
repair and maintain software after it is released. 
Creating software in this cycle presents benefits and negatives.  On one hand, software 
can be created fast and changed easily.  Additionally, products can be delivered much sooner 
than would otherwise be possible.  On the other hand, flaws on delivery are almost unavoidable 
and there is always the possibility that the cycle will end before all issues are resolved, like when 
a product is no longer supported due to it being too old.  Therefore, you may run into frustrating 
issues while using the software, which providers work to remedy with regular updates. 
Thus, applying software updates in a timely manner is important.  Even though an 
unexpected update message may surprise you and be annoying if it interrupts a task or you may 
fear the changes the update will make, taking notice and applying the update will help avoid 
further frustration from faulty or insecure software and also increase your satisfaction with 
software. 
Though the negative aspects of the cycle can be reduced by prompt and regular updating, 
the introduction of networked components to software has made the likelihood of flaws both 
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appearing and being found much higher.  When software uses networks like the Internet, it sends 
information between computers, which allows easy communication between devices and people, 
while also making computing power shareable via web-based applications.  
With easier communication comes a trade off from security.  Since machines other than 
your own are involved when the Internet is utilized, you are open to attack by remote actors.  
Such actors work hard to find flaws in software they can exploit called “back-doors.”  Like all 
flaws, back-doors are commonly patched in software updates, but even known exploits can be 
viable for attackers since so much software remains out of date. 
Backdoors can be used in many ways, sometimes without the victim even realizing it.  
Depending on the particular software and flaw, attackers could access personally and financially 
sensitive data, and even try to steal assets or identity.  In either case, the victim is sure to have 
significantly negative experiences and have to work hard to recover from the damages.   Some 
flaws may also allow attackers to access other programs or features outside of the software that 
contains the flaw.  In this case, a resourceful attacker can do many things, such as a distributed 
denial of service attack, commonly known as a DDoS or “Dee-Dos” attack.  Though there are 
other ways to execute a DDoS attack, we will see how flaws in software can be used as the 
starting point for this particularly annoying exploit. 
Here is a representation of the internet.  On one end, you have the various web servers 
that host the content we view and services we use.  On the other end, we have the end-users and 
their devices, including PCs and smart-phones.   
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Information travels easily from end to end, as well as between servers, and some users, 
this is something everyone involved is happy about.  This includes email, video, music, as well 
as other data. 
In the mass of information flowing in all directions, a malicious actor can arise.  The 
attacker uploads a virus to a compromised server to be downloaded by anyone who visits the 
website hosted on the server. 
Before anyone notices, the virus infects many people’s devices.  Using existing back-
doors in out-of-date software on the infected machines, the attacker might have a lot of access 
and power.  In this case, maybe they want to take out a web-service they don’t like. 
The attacker can generate tons of junk messages targeting a particular website or service.  
His virus can send short requests over the Internet from the various infected machines.  Though 
each message or request is small, if a large number of machines partake in the attack, the 
cumulative traffic can shut down the website or service, especially if the victim is caught off 
guard.  With the website being overwhelmed, legitimate users cannot access the content, causing 
widespread annoyance, frustration, and confusion, while also hurting user’s opinion of the 
website. 
Backdoors can be used for many attacks and so closing these flaws is imperative towards 
securing the entire Internet, while also avoiding frustration and confusion.  Recommended by 
security experts, applying software updates can increase security while also making you happier 
through improved performance.  Though taking the time can be annoying or you may worry 
about the changes that will come, keeping programs up to date helps stop frustration with 
software before it begins. 
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Update Social 
Software development is a large task that has many accepted methods, but there are 
basics that most developers follow.  We will explain these basics to help you understand how 
security vulnerabilities arise.  Most software is developed in a cycle, meaning development never 
quite stops.  Instead, once a product is created, it is continuously tuned and improved as time 
goes on.  Sometimes this is done to add new features that weren’t needed or considered before.  
Other times, flaws and bugs in the original program need to be fixed. 
When creating a new program, the first step is to plan what the interface and outputs of 
the software will be.  This step also involves creating some kind of documentation that will serve 
as a guide to the many diligent programmers that could be involved in later stages. 
When the software is planned and the outlines and blueprints of the program are ready, it 
is time to actually make it.  This step can involve a lot of work from many people connected to a 
project, especially for software like operating systems or highly specific, heavyweight programs 
like productivity software such as Microsoft Word or Adobe PDF Acrobat or entertainment and 
creative software, like Adobe Photoshop or Apple iTunes.  Software that uses the Internet or 
other networks can be even harder to create since many people’s devices can be involved in the 
software. 
As development completes and a seemingly working program remains, testing usually 
follows to find issues that aren’t so apparent. This process may utilize outside organizations or 
individuals, commonly known as beta testers who purposely try to break a program to find its 
flaws. 
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Once problems in the software have been identified and repaired, the software is released 
to the public, but the development cycle continues into maintenance.  Though testing will find 
many issues, problems can be hidden, only appearing under specific circumstances when 
installed and used on personal devices.  Therefore, as these issues are reported, regular software 
updates or patches are released that address the problems. 
Creating software in this cycle presents benefits and negatives.  On one hand, software 
can be created fast and changed easily to help as many people as possible by providing them 
useful programs.  On the other hand, flaws on delivery are almost unavoidable and can impact 
many users, depending on how widely used the software is. 
Thus, applying software updates in a timely manner is important to making sure your 
security, as well as the security of other people’s devices is as good as it can be.  Since flaws are 
unavoidable, providers utilize software updates to improve their products and the services for all 
their users. 
Though the negative aspects of the cycle can be reduced by prompt and regular updating, 
the introduction of networked components to software has made the likelihood of flaws both 
appearing and being found much higher.  When software uses networks like the Internet, it sends 
information between computers, which allows easy communication between devices and people, 
while also making computing power shareable via web-based applications.   
With easier communication comes a trade off from security.  Since machines other than 
your own are involved when the Internet is utilized, you are open to attack via other devices, and 
your device can be used to attack others.  This can be done using software exploits called “back-
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doors.” Like all flaws, back-doors are commonly patched in software updates, but even known 
exploits can be viable for attackers since so much software remains out of date. 
Backdoor exploits can be used in many ways.  Depending on the particular software and 
flaw being utilized, attackers could access data, such as personal information, credit card 
numbers, or credentials to bank accounts.    Some flaws may also allow attackers to access other 
programs or features outside of the software that contains the flaw.  In this case, a resourceful 
attacker can impact many users in many ways, such as a distributed denial of service attack, 
commonly known as a DDoS or “Dee-Dos” attack.  Though there are other ways to execute a 
DDoS attack, we will see how flaws in software can be used as the starting point for this kind of 
exploit and how users can be impacted by the security behavior of others. 
Here is a representation of the internet.  On one end, you have the various web servers 
that host the content we view and services we use.  On the other, we have many different end 
users and their devices, including PCs and smart-phones. 
In the mass of information flowing in all directions, a malicious actor can arise.  The 
attacker uploads a virus to a compromised server to be downloaded by anyone who visits the 
website hosted on the server. 
Before anyone notices, the virus infects many people’s devices.  Using existing back-
doors in out-of-date software, the attacker can use the infected machines as a group to do many 
things.  In this case, maybe they want to take out a web-service they don’t like. 
The attacker can generate tons of junk messages targeting a particular website or service.  
His virus can send short requests over the Internet from the various infected machines.  Though 
each message or request is small, if a large number of machines partake in the attack, the 
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cumulative traffic can shut down the website or service, especially if the victim is caught off 
guard.   In this case, because some people didn’t apply appropriate security patches, no one will 
be able to access the targeted website or service during the attack and even for some time in the   
aftermath. 
Backdoors can be used for many attacks and so closing these flaws is imperative towards 
securing the entire Internet.  Applying software updates is a key step in closing any security 
flaws that may exist is in the software you use and is among the most expert recommended 
actions a user can take to increase security.  Though not all updates contain security patches, 
keeping your programs up to date is important to everyone’s protection. 
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Password Manager Slides 
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Password Manager Basic 
Understanding your role in computer security, especially around web accounts is 
important towards taking the right steps to secure your information.  Though many attacks on 
software use some kind of backdoor that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access through 
a glitch or flaw in the software, attackers can also use stolen usernames and passwords to hack 
into an account.  Making the keys harder to guess is important to securing your information. 
Passwords are everywhere.  Most, if not all the accounts we use on the Internet require us 
to select a password.  Studies have found that creating and remembering passwords for so many 
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accounts can be hard, leading many people to use simple passwords and to reuse them across 
accounts. 
Simple and common passwords are just waiting to be cracked.  Take these for example.  
They are all short and easy to remember.  That makes them good for recalling when it’s time to 
log in, but an attacker can also very easily guess these passwords without much computing 
effort.  In most cases, attackers utilize two methods to guess passwords. 
First, they try passwords selected from a dictionary.  Dictionaries are files that contain 
common, simple, and expected passwords, such as common words, quotes, or numerical 
combinations.  Sometimes dictionaries even include passwords stolen in other ways, so if 
someone reuses passwords across accounts and one of those accounts leaks their information, 
attackers can more easily access the person’s other accounts. 
If a dictionary attack fails, attackers usually try a brute force method to guess the 
password.  This is where a computer or network of computers guesses all possible combinations 
of characters until one works.  Here, increasing complexity of passwords is the best defense.  
The longer and more random a password is, the harder it will be to guess.  Keep in mind, what 
looks random to a human may not be so random to a computer.  The best way to create truly 
random passwords is to use a random password generator. 
Length is also important towards making a password harder to guess.  Each character 
adds exponentially more time to how long it would take to guess a password.  For example, the 
following six character, random password would take about 25 years to guess, assuming a 
thousand guesses per second. 
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Adding just one random character, as for this updated password, would increase the guess 
time to twenty-two centuries!  That’s two thousand, two hundred years.  Go to eight characters, 
and the time is at two thousand centuries.  Clearly, adding only a few characters can make a 
password much harder to guess. 
But, if every password, for every account was a long, complex, random string of digits, 
letters, and symbols, how are people supposed to remember them all?  It is true, the burden of 
security can easily become too much when utilizing many accounts across many providers, but 
taking steps to preserve security is still important. 
Password managers are important tools that you can use to help manage your passwords 
in a way that increases security, while also making life easier.  Not all password managers are 
equal, though.  Many web browsers include a built in password remember and auto-fill feature.  
Be wary of this form of password manager.  In some cases, your passwords will be saved in a 
way that can be easily stolen and seen by attackers.  This is not always the case, so we 
recommend you do your research before using a web-browser’s built in password manager. 
If you do not use a browser that can securely store passwords, or you would like a 
password manager that can deliver your passwords on multiple devices, you can also consider a 
web-based, encrypted password manager, such as OnePassword or LastPass. 
In general, these managers work by storing all saved passwords on a web-server.  To 
make the passwords secure, all the passwords are encrypted using the “master password.”  The 
master password is set by the owner and used to unlock the manager and authenticate the 
legitimate owner of the account.  Secure password managers do not store this master password 
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and so, by encrypting the other passwords with it, an attacker who accesses the password 
manager database will also need master passwords to make use of that data. 
Most online, secure password managers offer two main features to help with security.  
First, they commonly include a password generator that allows users to choose many aspects of 
the password they want to produce.  These can be toggled with security in mind or to meet some 
password requirements for the account being created.  When a new password is generated, the 
password manager can automatically save the password with the entered username. 
The second core password manager feature adds the most convenience.  To ease the 
burden of remembering so many long, random passwords, password managers will auto-fill 
when they detect a browser loads a log-in screen.  In doing so, the password manager does the 
remembering and typing for the user.  This allows them to choose security over memorability 
when creating new passwords, thus making their accounts harder to access through password 
cracking. 
Though handing all your passwords off to a single password manager may seem like a 
security risk in that an attacker could get all your passwords in a single attack, if a password 
manager is secure and used with a long, complex, random master password, the benefits to 
security across all accounts is worth the very small risk in putting all passwords in this one place. 
Password managers can help you create and manage secure passwords for the many 
accounts you use.  If used right, a good password manager can vastly improve the security of 
your information online, and so using one is commonly recommended by many security experts. 
According to recent surveys, for added security and convenience, it might be worth looking into 
a password manager to manage your own accounts. 
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Password Manager Emotion 
Understanding your role in computer security, especially around web accounts is 
important towards taking the right steps to secure your information.  Though many attacks on 
software use some kind of backdoor that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access through 
a glitch or flaw in the software, attackers can also use stolen usernames and passwords to hack 
into an account.  Making the keys harder to guess is important to securing your information. 
Passwords are everywhere.  Most, if not all the accounts we use on the Internet require us 
to select a password.  Studies have found that creating and remembering passwords for so many 
accounts can be frustrating and confusing, especially when log ins fail because users can’t recall 
the specific password they have to remember. Unfortunately, this leads many users to use and 
reuse simple passwords. 
Simple and common passwords are just waiting to be cracked, leading to even more 
annoyance and anxiety later.  For example, these passwords are all short and easy to remember, 
which makes them easier to use.  Unfortunately, an attacker can also guess these passwords, 
utilizing two methods, among others. 
First, they try passwords selected from a dictionary, which contain common, simple, and 
expected passwords.  Passwords of common words, quotes, or numerical combinations, or 
passwords used by many users are also easy to guess using a dictionary and so using these 
passwords will put one at risk of the negative experiences of having an account accessed by an 
attacker. 
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If a dictionary attack fails, attackers usually try a brute force method to guess the 
password.  This is where a computer or network of computers guesses all possible combinations 
of characters until one works.  Here, complexity is the best defense.  The longer and more 
random a password is, the harder it will be to guess.  Though long passwords are harder to 
remember, making the log in process more annoying, the adding security can help avoid even 
more annoying events later that could come from using a weak password. 
Length is also important towards making a password harder to guess.  Each character 
adds exponentially more time to how long it would take to guess a password.  For example, the 
following six character, random password would take about 25 years to guess, assuming a 
thousand guesses per second. 
Adding just one random character, as for this updated password, would increase the guess 
time to twenty-two centuries!  That’s two thousand, two hundred years.  Go to eight characters, 
and the time is at two thousand centuries.  Clearly, adding only a letter or two, which should not 
add a lot of confusion or frustration, can make a password much harder to guess, increasing your 
security. 
But, if every password, for every account was a long, complex, random string of digits, 
letters, and symbols, how are people supposed to remember them all?  Too many passwords can 
easily be confusing when having to recall the right one.  Long passwords are more annoying to 
type in.  Fortunately, there are tools available to you that can help stay secure while avoid many 
of these negatives. 
Password managers can help manage your passwords automatically in a way that 
increases security.  Not all password managers are equal, though, and using some easy to access 
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forms of the tool could do more harm than good.  Some managers do not store passwords in a 
secure way.  This is not always the case, so doing research when deciding to choose a password 
manager and avoiding the easiest option without checking it out first is the best way to make a 
decision that increase how secure you feel in your choice. 
If you do not use a browser that can securely store passwords, or you would like a 
password manager that can deliver your passwords on multiple devices, you can also consider a 
web-based, encrypted password manager, such as OnePassword or LastPass. 
In general, these managers work by storing all saved passwords on a web-server.  To 
make the passwords secure, all the passwords are encrypted using the “master password.”  The 
master password is set by the owner and used to unlock the manager and authenticate the 
legitimate owner of the account.  Secure password managers do not store this master password 
and so, by encrypting the other passwords with it, an attacker who accesses the password 
manager database will also need master passwords to make use of that data.  Making sure you 
choose a secure master password will maximize your security, even though having a long, 
complex, random master password might be annoying. 
Most online, secure password managers offer two main features to help with security.  
First, they commonly include a password generator that allows users to choose many aspects of 
the password they want to produce.  These can be toggled to create stronger passwords that help 
one feel secure, or to meet password requirements for the account being created to make the 
account creation processes more pleasant.  When a new password is generated, the password 
manager can automatically save it. 
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Password managers will also auto-fill when they detect the user is at a log-in screen, and 
so, the password manager does the remembering and typing for the user.  This allows one to 
choose security over memorability when creating new passwords, since there will no longer be 
annoyance and confusion because of having to remember secure passwords. 
Handing all your passwords off to a single password manager may make you nervous in 
that an attacker could get all your passwords in one attack.  But, when using a password 
manager, since secure passwords for all your accounts can be automatically generated and typed, 
along with a long and random master password to securely store them, even though typing in this 
one password may be annoying, the cumulative security across all accounts will be worth it. 
Password managers can help you create and manage passwords for the many accounts 
you use in a way that makes you happier and more secure.  Though you may have some worries 
about the tool, using a password manager is one of the most commonly recommended secure 
actions users can take, according to recent surveys of advice from security experts.  To feel more 
secure, it might be worth looking into a password manager to manage your accounts. 
 
Password Manager Social 
Understanding your role in computer security, especially around web accounts is 
important towards taking the right steps to secure your information.  Though many attacks on 
software use some kind of backdoor that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access through 
a glitch or flaw in the software, attackers can also use stolen usernames and passwords to hack 
into an account.  Making the keys harder to guess is important to securing your information.  
Passwords are everywhere.  Most, if not all the accounts we use on the Internet require us 
to select a password.  Studies have found that creating and remembering passwords for so many 
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accounts can be hard, leading many people to use simple passwords and to reuse them across 
accounts.  
Simple and common passwords are just waiting to be cracked.  Take these for example.  
They are all short and easy to remember.  If these passwords were used for a social media or 
email account, they could easily be cracked and the accounts used to launch attacks against 
people the victim is connected with through the accounts.  For example, an attacker with access 
to an email account could send malicious emails to those in the contact list, including the 
victim’s friends and family, and these emails could ask for money or to try and compromise the 
accounts of these people as well.  
Fortunately, there are ways to protect against your passwords being cracked, but first let’s 
understand the ways an attacker can crack a password. First, they try passwords selected from a 
dictionary.  Dictionaries are files that contain common, simple, and expected passwords that are 
used by many users.  Sometimes dictionaries even include passwords stolen in other ways, so if 
you use a common password that is stolen and added to a dictionary, other users can be attacked 
more easily.  Passwords of common words, quotes, or numerical combinations are also easy to 
guess using a dictionary since these passwords are used and known by many individuals.  
If a dictionary attack fails, attackers usually try a brute force method to guess the 
password.  This is where a computer or network of computers guesses all possible combinations 
of characters until one works.  Here, increasing complexity of passwords is the best defense.  
The longer and more random a password is, the harder it will be to guess.  Keep in mind, what 
looks random to a human may not be so random to a computer.  The best way to create truly 
random passwords is to use a random password generator. Length is also important towards 
making a password harder to guess.  Each character adds exponentially more time to how long it 
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would take to guess a password.  For example, the following six character, random password 
would take about 25 years to guess, assuming a thousand guesses per second. Adding just one 
random character, as for this updated password, would increase the guess time to twenty-two 
centuries!  That’s two thousand, two hundred years.  Go to eight characters, and the time is at 
two thousand centuries.   
Clearly, adding only a few characters can make a password much harder to guess, and 
thus protect you and others from attack. But, if every password, for every account was a long, 
complex, random string of digits, letters, and symbols, how are people supposed to remember 
them all?  It is true, the burden of security can easily become too much when utilizing many 
accounts across many providers, but taking steps to preserve security is important to all Internet 
users.  
Password managers are important tools any user can use to help manage passwords in a 
way that increases the entire Internet’s security, while also making life easier for the users.  Not 
all password managers are equal, though, and using the wrong kind may put yours and others 
security at risk.  Many web browsers include a built in password remember and auto-fill feature, 
but these may save passwords in a way that can be easily stolen and seen by attackers.  This is 
not always the case, so we recommend researching before using a web-browser’s built in 
password manager.  
If you do not use a browser that can securely store passwords, or you would like a 
password manager that can deliver your passwords on multiple devices, you can also consider a 
web-based, encrypted password manager, such as OnePassword or LastPass. In general, these 
managers work by storing all saved passwords on a web-server.  To make the passwords secure, 
all the passwords are encrypted using the “master password.”  The master password is set by the 
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owner and used to unlock the manager and authenticate the legitimate owner of the account.  
Secure password managers do not store this master password and so, by encrypting the other 
passwords with it, an attacker who accesses the password manager database will also need 
master passwords to make use of that data.  
Most online, secure password managers offer two main features to help with security.  
First, they commonly include a password generator that allows users to choose many aspects of 
the password they want to produce.  These can be toggled with security in mind or to meet some 
password requirements for the account being created.  Keep in mind that using better passwords 
means your accounts are much harder for an attacker to access and use for additional malicious 
acts against others. The second core password manager feature adds the most convenience.  To 
ease the burden of remembering so many long, random passwords, password managers will auto-
fill when they detect a browser loads a log-in screen.  In doing so, the password manager does 
the remembering and typing for us.  This allows anyone who uses a password manager to more 
easily choose security over memorability when choosing a new password, further protecting 
security for all.  
Though password managers may make you susceptible to having all passwords stolen in 
one attack, if a secure password manager is used with a properly long, complex, and random 
master password, the benefit to security across all accounts and to other users is worth it. If used 
right, a good password manager can vastly improve your and other’s security, and so using one is 
commonly recommended by security experts and used by many individuals, according to recent 
surveys.  According to recent surveys, for added security and convenience, it might be worth 
looking into a password manager to manage your own accounts. 
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2FA Basic 
 Understanding your role in computer security, especially around web accounts is 
important towards taking the right steps to secure your information.  Though many attacks on 
software use some kind of backdoor that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access through 
a glitch or flaw in the program, attacks do not need to be that sophisticated.  If they can steal or 
guess a password and username, an attacker doesn’t need a “hack” to get in.  They can just use 
the log-in screen. 
Imagine the standard log-in procedure for many websites and Internet services you use.  
Most times, you must navigate to a log-in page.  There, you type in your username and 
password.  That information is sent to the server, which checks that, what you typed in matches 
what the server has on record.  If everything checks out, you’re in! 
This process relies on a few things to be secure.  First, the information sent between your 
device and the servers should be encrypted in some way.  Many times, this is done using the 
more secure HTTPS as opposed to the standard HTTP.  You can see if your connection is 
secured this way by looking for the HTTPS at the beginning of the URL in your address bar.  
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You must also trust that the server is not handling or storing information in a way that is easily 
accessible.  You cannot control this, of course, but most major providers do handle and store data 
properly.  Finally, there is your part of securing the credentials you use to log in.  If an attacker 
can get a hold of log-in credentials, any encryption or safe storage is useless to stop an attack. 
After all, they’d have the keys! 
Attackers can get your credentials in any number of ways.  Sometimes, they can trick 
people into giving up the data voluntarily through a phishing attack, where the attacker sends a 
bogus email to the victim, telling them they must log-in for some reason, but the link provided is 
to the attacker’s website rather than the real service.  So, when the person types in their 
information, it is saved, by the attacker to be used later.  Many times, attackers are not so 
sophisticated and instead resort to guessing a password using what’s called a brute-force attack.  
With a username usually known by some other means, high-powered computers and password 
dictionaries are used to guess a password.  Depending on the uniqueness and complexity of the 
password being guessed, this can be a very effective way to gain access to an account. 
With the username and password, the attack on a standard account is very easy.  The 
attacker goes to the same log-in screen everyone else uses.  They then type in the stolen 
information.  If the information is still current and passes the checks on the server’s side, the 
attacker is allowed access, the server thinking that it is the legitimate account owner logging in. 
Thus, making sure your accounts are secure is important to thwart easy attacks.  There 
are many ways to achieve this.  Though more complexity in passwords makes them harder to 
guess, as we saw, attackers have other ways to learn passwords than just guessing.  You can get 
more security through redundancy by enabling two-factor authentication, sometimes called two-
step log-in, and multi-factor log-in, among other names. 
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When using two-factor authentication, people are asked for an extra piece of information 
with their username and password.  Many times, this additional information is a one-time 
password, which is a random string of letters and numbers generated by the server and sent to the 
person logging in.  Though it looks like a regular password, a one-time password is only good 
for a short period of time, and a new one is created every time the additional piece of information 
is needed to verify a log-in.  The one-time password can be sent to people in many ways, but 
email, phone-call, or SMS text message are the most popular. 
Here’s how a two-factor authentication usually works.  First, the username and password 
are entered at the log-in screen, as usual.  If the device being used is not recognized, the service 
will ask for the individual trying to log in to enter a one-time password that will be automatically 
sent to the account owner’s other device or email account.  In this case, the one-time password is 
sent as a text message to their phone.  The message arrives within a few seconds and the account 
owner, who is the one attempting the log-in enters the additional information.  The server 
confirms that all the information is correct, and access is granted. 
The added security comes from the fact that, by entering the one-time password with a 
username and regular password, the server has additional assurance that it is really the account 
owner trying to log in, since the attacker would need to have not only the username and regular 
password, but also access to the one-time password, which means the owner’s email account or 
phone.  Though remotely accessing or guessing a regular password and username can be easy for 
some attackers, accessing the account owner’s email, and even more so their phone can be very 
difficult. 
Let’s see how using two-factor authentication can stop an attack.  The attacker has a 
paired username and password, so they try to log into the account through the standard log-in 
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screen for the service.  Since the attacker is using an unrecognized device, if the account owner 
had two-factor authentication activated, the service will request that a one-time password be 
entered as well.  That one-time password will be sent to the account owner’s device or account, 
which the attacker probably can’t access.  Thus, they enter the wrong one-time password and are 
not granted access to the account. 
By using two-factor authentication, even if an attacker has your username and password, 
they cannot access your account very easily.  It’s no surprise that using two-factor authentication 
is among the most common advice given by security experts as a way for individuals to secure 
their accounts and information.  Though more time may be needed to log-in from new devices, 
when a new device is registered, the additional factor is no longer needed.  Thus, the added one-
time effort will be worth it in terms of the protection given to your account.   
 
2FA Emotion 
Understanding your role in computer security, especially around web accounts is 
important towards taking the right steps to secure your information.  Though many attacks on 
software use some kind of backdoor that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access through 
a glitch or flaw in the program, attacks do not need to be that sophisticated.  If they can steal or 
guess a password and username, an attacker doesn’t need a “hack” to get in.  They can just use 
the log-in screen. 
Imagine the standard log-in procedure for many websites and Internet services you use.  
Most times, you must navigate to a log-in page.  There, you type in your username and 
password.  That information is sent to the server, which checks that, what you typed in matches 
 204 
 
what the server has on record.  Without too much effort, if everything checks out, you’re in, 
happily enjoying the service! 
This process relies on a few things to be secure.  First, the information sent between your 
device and the servers should be encrypted in some way.  Many times, this is done using the 
more secure HTTPS as opposed to the standard HTTP.  You can see if your connection is 
secured this way by looking for the HTTPS at the beginning of the URL in your address bar.  
You must also trust that the server is not handling or storing information in a way that is easily 
accessible by unauthorized users.  Though data can be stolen from a server if it is not 
safeguarded properly, there are other ways to steal log-in credentials. Therefore, you must also 
make sure your do your part to secure your information, even though doing so may be annoying. 
Let’s see some of the ways an attacker can try to steal a log-in.  Sometimes, they can 
confuse users by sending a bogus email telling them that they must log-in for some reason, but 
the link provided is to the attacker’s website rather than the real service, and so the attacker can 
save the data when it is typed in.  Making sure to read emails carefully and check where they are 
from, even though it may be annoying and confusing is important to avoiding phishing attacks.  
Attackers do not need to be so sophisticated and can also try to access your account by guessing 
your password in what is called a brute-force attack. 
With the username and password, the attack on a standard account is very easy.  The 
attacker goes to the same log-in screen everyone else uses.  They then type in the stolen 
information.  If the information is still current and passes the checks on the server’s side, the 
attacker is allowed access, the server thinking that it is the legitimate account owner logging in.  
From here, an attacker can cause many negative situations for users that may be frustrating, 
confusing, and tiring to deal with. 
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Thus, making sure your accounts are secure is important to thwart easy attacks.  There 
are many ways to achieve this.  Though more complexity in passwords makes them harder to 
guess, as we saw, attackers have other ways to learn passwords than just guessing.  You can feel 
more secure through redundancy by enabling two-factor authentication, sometimes called two-
step log-in. 
When using two-factor authentication, people are asked for an extra piece of information 
with their username and password.  Many times, this additional information is a one-time 
password, which is a random string of letters and numbers generated by the server and sent to the 
person logging in.  Though it looks like a regular password, a one-time password is only good 
for a short period of time, and a new one is created every time the additional piece of information 
is needed to verify a log-in.  The one-time password can be sent to people in many ways, but 
email, phone-call, or SMS text message are the most popular. 
Here’s how a two-factor authentication usually works.  First, the username and password 
are entered at the log-in screen, as usual.  If the device being used is not recognized, the service 
will ask for the individual trying to log in to enter a one-time password that will be automatically 
sent to the account owner’s other device or email account.  In this case, the one-time password is 
sent as a text message to their phone.  The message arrives within a few seconds and the account 
owner, who is the one attempting the log-in enters the additional information.  The server 
confirms that all the information is correct, and, if so, access is granted, with the user happily 
enjoying the service, secure in the knowledge that two-factor authentication is helping keep their 
account safe. 
The added security comes from the fact that, by entering the one-time password with 
username and regular password, the server has additional assurance that it is really the legitimate 
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user trying to log in, since the attacker would need to have not only the user’s username and 
regular password, but also access to the one-time password, meaning the user’s email or phone, 
which is much harder than guessing a password.   Thus, though having to type in the additional 
piece of information can be annoying, using two-factor authentication can help a user feel more 
secure, even if secure passwords are already used. 
Let’s see how using two-factor authentication can stop an attack.  The attacker has a 
paired username and password, so they try to log into the account through the standard log-in 
screen for the service.  Since the attacker is using an unrecognized device, if the account owner 
had two-factor authentication activated, the service will request that a one-time password be 
entered as well.  That one-time password will be sent to the account owner’s device or account, 
which the attacker probably can’t access.  Thus, they enter the wrong one-time password and are 
not granted access to the account. 
By using two-factor authentication, even if an attacker has your username and password, 
they cannot access your account very easily.  It’s no surprise that using two-factor authentication 
is among the most common advice given by security experts as a way for individuals to secure 
their accounts and information.  Though using two-factor authentication may be more work and 
annoying, this added one-time effort will make you and your account more secure. 
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2FA Social 
Understanding your role in computer security, especially around web accounts is 
important towards taking the right steps to secure your information.  Though many attacks on 
software use some kind of backdoor that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access through 
a glitch or flaw in the program, attacks do not need to be that sophisticated.  If they can steal or 
guess a password and username, an attacker doesn’t need a “hack” to get in.  They can just use 
the log-in screen. 
Imagine the standard log-in procedure for many websites and Internet services you use.  
Many times, a user must navigate to a log-in page.  There, they type in their username and 
password.  That information is sent to the server, which checks that it matches what it has on 
record.  If everything checks out, they’re in! 
This process relies on a few things to be secure.  First, the information sent between the 
device and the servers should be encrypted in some way, such as using HTTPS.  You can see if 
your connection is secured this way by looking for the HTTPS at the beginning of the URL in 
your address bar.  Users must secure their credentials because, if these are stolen, an attacker can 
access an account very easily. Depending on the account, this can impact many people.  For 
example, an attacker with access to an email account could send malicious emails to those in the 
contact list, including the victim’s friends and family that may ask for money or to try and 
compromise their accounts as well.   
Attackers can get credentials in any number of ways.  Sometimes, they can trick users 
into giving up the data voluntarily through a phishing attack, where the attacker sends a bogus 
email telling the user they must log-in for some reason, but when the user types their information 
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in to the bogus webpage, it is saved, by the attacker to be used later.  These kinds of attacks can 
be launched against those in the contact list of a user whose account has been broken into, so 
securing your account is important to stopping threats to others too.  Many times, attackers are 
not so sophisticated and instead resort to guessing a password using what’s called a brute-force 
attack.  With a username usually known by some other means, high-powered computers and 
password dictionaries are used to guess a password.  Depending on the uniqueness and 
complexity of the password being guessed, this can be a very effective way to gain access to an 
account. 
With the username and password, the attack on a standard account is very easy.  The 
attacker goes to the same log-in screen everyone else uses.  They then type in the stolen 
information.  If the information is still current and passes the checks on the server’s side, the 
attacker is allowed access, the server thinking that it is the legitimate account owner logging in. 
Once in, the attacker may be able to use the account to gain information or further attack not 
only the user, but those who are linked to the attacked account. 
Thus, making sure our accounts are secure is important to thwart easy attacks that can 
impact many other people.  There are many ways to achieve this.  Though more complexity in 
passwords makes them harder to guess, as we saw, attackers have other ways to learn passwords 
than just guessing.  More security can be gained through redundancy in the form of two-factor 
authentication. 
When using two-factor authentication, people are asked for an extra piece of information 
with their username and password.  Many times, this additional information is a one-time 
password, which is a random string of letters and numbers generated by the server and sent to the 
person logging in.  Though it looks like a regular password, a one-time password is only good 
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for a short period of time, and a new one is created every time the additional piece of information 
is needed to verify a log-in.  The one-time password can be sent to people in many ways, but 
email, phone-call, or SMS text message are the most popular. 
Here’s how a two-factor authentication usually works.  First, the username and password 
are entered at the log-in screen, as usual.  If the device being used is not recognized, the service 
will ask for the individual trying to log in to enter a one-time password that will be automatically 
sent to the account owner’s other device or email account.  In this case, the one-time password is 
sent as a text message to their phone.  The message arrives within a few seconds and the account 
owner, who is the one attempting the log-in enters the additional information.  The server 
confirms that all the information is correct, and access is granted. 
The added security comes from the fact that, by entering the one-time password with a 
username and regular password, the server has additional assurance that it is really the account 
owner trying to log in, since the attacker would need to have not only the username and regular 
password, but also access to the one-time password, which means the owner’s email account or 
phone.  Though remotely accessing or guessing a regular password and username can be easy for 
some attackers, accessing the account owner’s email, and even more so their phone can be very 
difficult.  By securing accounts with two-factor authentication, it makes it harder for attackers to 
use your account to threaten others. 
Let’s see how using two-factor authentication can stop an attack.  The attacker has a 
paired username and password, so they try to log into the account through the standard log-in 
screen for the service.  Since the attacker is using an unrecognized device, if the account owner 
had two-factor authentication activated, the service will request that a one-time password be 
entered as well.  That one-time password will be sent to the account owner’s device or account, 
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which the attacker probably can’t access.  Thus, they enter the wrong one-time password and are 
not granted access to the account. 
By using two-factor authentication, even if an attacker has a username and password, 
they cannot access an account very easily, this protects not only the account owner’s data, but the 
data of others as well.  It’s no surprise that using two-factor authentication is among the most 
common advice given by security experts as a way for users to secure accounts and information 
online, and has been adopted by many users already.  Though more time may be needed to log-in 
from new devices, this added one-time effort will be worth the extra security for everyone. 
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Screening Survey 
The following instruments were used to gather basic demographics and behavior data 
from participants.  Participants were then contacted based on their responses to this survey. 
1. What is your age? _____ 
2. What is your gender?  
o Male 
o Female 
o Other 
3. Do you use a laptop of desktop computer that you or your family owns? 
o Yes 
o No 
4. How would you rate your general computer expertise? 
o Very poor 
o Poor 
o Fair 
o Good 
o Very good 
5. How would you rate your computer security expertise? 
o Very poor 
o Poor 
o Fair 
o Good 
o Very good 
6. How often would you say you use the computer? 
o Never 
o Rarely 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o All the time 
7. Do you keep your computer’s software up to date? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I don’t know 
8. Do you use two-factor authentication (e.g., 2-Step Verification) for at least one of your 
online accounts? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I don’t know 
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9. Do you use a password manager (e.g., LastPass, OnePass, KeePass) to manage your online 
account passwords? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I don’t know 
 
Follow-Up Survey 
Behavior Instruments 
Note: [following advice] was replace as appropriate for each advice, with the following 
phrasings: 
 Update: “keeping your computer’s software up to date” 
Password Manager: “using a password manager (e.g., LastPass, OnePass, KeePass) to 
manage your online account passwords” 
2FA: “using two-factor authentication (e.g., 2-step verification, 2-step log-in) for at least 
one of your online accounts” 
1. Since the last survey, have you started or stopped [following advice]? 
o Yes, I’ve started 
o Yes. I’ve stopped 
o No, I have not changed my behavior 
o I Don’t Know 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
2. Why did you start or stop [following advice]?  _____________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Awareness Instruments 
Unique surveys were developed for each advice to assess awareness around core concepts 
related to that advice.  The awareness instruments for each advice are given below, with the 
correct response(s) marked. 
Update Instruments 
1. Applying updates doesn't usually help your system's security. 
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
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2. My decision to update my device's software only affects me.  
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
3. Since software updates mainly focus on superficial changes, many are worth skipping. 
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
4. Which of the following are the usual benefits of updating your computer's software? (select 
all that apply) 
□ Get the newest features 
□ Increase software security 
□ Delete private information  
□ Remove malware such as viruses 
□ No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
5. In general, which software is the most important to update? 
o Operating system (i.e., Windows, Android, iOS, OSX) 
o Browser (e.g., Firefox, Chrome) 
o Anti-virus software 
o Updating software isn't important 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
6. Which of the following are stages of the software development cycle? (select all that apply) 
□ Create 
□ Plan 
□ Network 
□ Profit 
□ No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
7. Which of the following attacks can utilize out-of-date software to shut-down a website? 
o Brute-Force password cracking 
o DDoS attack 
o Use of stolen credentials 
o Phishing attack 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
Password Manager Instruments 
1. Using a password manager doesn't usually help your account security. 
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
 214 
 
2. My decision to use a password manager only affects me.  
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
3. Since password managers centralize passwords, any password manager is automatically 
insecure. 
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
4. Which strategy is best to produce and store secure passwords? 
o Use different sentences from your favorite books as passwords and only store them 
by writing them on a piece of paper 
o Use a secure password manager with a secure master password to create long, 
random, unique passwords for all accounts 
o Use names of friends and meaningful numbers (i.e., birthday, apartment number, etc.) 
to create complex, unique passwords and store them in a note file on your smartphone 
o All methods are equally secure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
5. Which are the most important qualities of a good password? (select all that apply) 
□ Easy to remember 
□ Short 
□ Unique 
□ Random/complex 
□ No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
6. Which of the following features of secure password managers are most helpful for security? 
(select all that apply) 
□ Random password generation 
□ Account management and auto-fill features 
□ Access to account credentials from anywhere 
□ Centralization of credentials 
□ No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
7. Which of the following attacks is easiest when short, simple passwords are used? 
o Brute-Force password cracking 
o DDoS attack 
o Use of stolen credentials 
o Phishing attack 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
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2FA Instruments  
1. Using two-factor authentication doesn't usually help your account security. 
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
2. My decision to use two-factor authentication only affects me.  
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
3. Since using two-factor authentication takes extra time, it's not worth it. 
o True 
o False 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer  
 
4. In general, which accounts are most important to secure? 
o Financials and other accounts that touch money 
o Email 
o Social Media 
o Account security isn't important 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
5. Which of the following can best secure your online accounts? 
o Scan your computer for viruses weekly 
o Delete cookies regularly 
o Activate two-factor log-in on as many account as possible 
o None of the above 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
6. Which of the following are forms of two-factor log-in? (select all that apply) 
□ Entering a one-time password sent to your smart-phone with username and password 
□ Entering the response to a security question in addition to username and password 
□ Checking "remember me" when logging in with a username and password 
□ Using a password manager to save and manage usernames and passwords 
□ No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
7. Which of the following attacks is thwarted by using two-factor log-in? 
o Brute-Force password cracking 
o DDoS attack 
o Use of stolen credentials 
o Man-in-the-Middle attack 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
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Perceptions Instruments 
Note: [following the advice] was replace as appropriate for each advice, with the following 
phrasings: 
 Update: “keeping your computer’s software up to date” 
Password Manager: “using a password manager” 
2FA: “using two-factor authentication” 
Prompt: For each question below, respond as if you use a password manager, even if you do not. 
1. How much would you say you are benefited by [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
2. How much would you say users of other computers are benefited by [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
3. How much would you say you are cost or inconvenienced by [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
4. How much would you say users of other computers are cost or inconvenienced by [following 
the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 217 
 
5. How much would you say you are put at risk by [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
6. How much would you say users of other computers are put at risk by [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
Prompt: For each question below, respond as if you did not use a password manager, even if you 
do. 
7. How much would you say you are benefited by not [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
8. How much would you say users of other computers would be benefited by not [following the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
9. How much would you say you are cost or inconvenienced by [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
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10. How much would you say users of other computers are cost or inconvenienced by not 
[following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
11. How much would you say you are put at risk by not [following the advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
12. How much would you say users of other computers are put at risk by not [following the 
advice]? 
o None 
o Little 
o Some 
o A lot 
o Not sure 
o No Answer/I prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 219 
 
 
Emotion Instrument 
Note: [follow the advice] was replace as appropriate for each advice, with the following 
phrasings: 
 Update: “keep your computer’s software up to date” 
Password Manager: “use a password manager” 
2FA: “use two-factor authentication” 
 
List of emotions to select from: 
(1) Confident 
(2) Secure 
(3) Sad 
(4) Depressed 
(5) Down 
(6) Afraid 
(7) Nervous 
(8) Freaked-Out 
(9) Anxious 
(10) Angry 
(11) Insulted 
(12) Hostile 
(13) Surprised 
(14) Dazed 
(15) Confused 
(16) Disgusted 
(17) Dismayed 
(18) Distraught 
(19) Cared-For 
(20) Friendly 
(21) Welcomed 
(22) Powerful 
(23) Energetic 
(24) Vigorous 
(25) Isolated 
(26) Lonely 
(27) Abandoned 
(28) Proud 
(29) Triumphant 
(30) Arrogant 
(31) Ashamed 
(32) Guilty 
(33) Embarrassed 
(34) Scornful 
(35) Contemptuous 
(36) Disdainful 
(37) Humiliated 
(38) Dishonored 
(39) Resentful 
(40) Grateful 
(41) Respectful 
(42) Admiring 
(43) Trusting 
(44) Suspicious 
(45) Happy 
 
1. Image you are faced with the decision to [follow the advice], please rate the top 5 emotions 
you predict you would feel: 
a. The emotion I would feel most strongly is __________ 
b. The emotion I would feel second most strongly is __________ 
c. The emotion I would feel third most strongly is __________ 
d. The emotion I would feel fourth most strongly is __________ 
e. The emotion I would feel fifth most strongly is __________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 220 
 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
   Gender  Age 
 Group N Male Female Other Avg. St.D. 
Update 
Control 27 12 15 - 33.2 9.6 
Basic 24 9 15 - 35.7 13.3 
Emotion 26 12 14 - 34.3 10.6 
Social 24 11 13 - 34.6 9.7 
Password 
Manager 
Control 30 18 11 1 34.7 10.6 
Basic 30 20 10 - 35.0 9.7 
Emotion 30 12 18 - 35.8 11.2 
Social 28 17 11 - 35.0 10.2 
2FA 
Control 26 16 10 - 37.3 11.3 
Basic 27 18 9 - 37.7 14.0 
Emotion 29 20 9 - 40.0 12.8 
Social 26 10 16 - 35.1 10.8 
 
Statistical Inference Testing Results 
 Results for the three advice are given in3 tables for each.  First, the average and median 
scores, for all groups at each stage are presented.  Then, the distributions for each score, for each 
video Group are compared at each stage with the Control group using exact Mann-Whitney U-
Tests.  U statistics and significance values are given for each test.  Finally, exact Sign Test 
results comparing scores from each group at each stage with scores from the same group gather 
before intervention.  Here, the number of score decreases, increases, and ties are given (i.e., in 
the format: Decreases-Increases-Ties), as well as the significance values of the test. 
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Results for Update Groups 
   Average and (Median) Scores for Update Groups 
   Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  N T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
Before 29 
2.2  
(2) 
1.7  
(2) 
1.0  
(1) 
0.8  
(0.5) 
-1.0  
(-1) 
-0.9  
(-0.5) 
6.7  
(7) 
5.5  
(6) 
After - 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
2 Weeks 23 
2.3  
(3) 
1.6  
(1.5) 
0.9  
(1) 
0.6  
(1) 
-0.6  
(-0.5) 
-0.7  
(-1) 
5.2  
(4) 
4.1  
(3) 
1 Month 25 
2.2  
(3) 
1.7  
(1.5) 
1.1  
(1) 
0.9  
(1) 
-0.3  
(0) 
-0.6  
(-1) 
5.0  
(4) 
4.0  
(3) 
B
a
si
c 
Before 24 
2.0  
(2) 
1.9  
(2) 
0.6  
(0.5) 
0.4  
(0) 
-0.5  
(-0.5) 
-0.8 
(-0.8) 
7.1  
(5) 
6.7  
(5) 
After 24 
2.8  
(3) 
2.6  
(2.8) 
1.5  
(1.8) 
1.5  
(1.5) 
-0.9  
(-1) 
-1.4  
(-1.5) 
11.4  
(14.5) 
9.6 
(11.5) 
2 Weeks 24 
2.7 
(3) 
2.2 
(2.5) 
1.4 
(1.5) 
1.2 
(1) 
-1.0 
(-1) 
-1.1 
(-1) 
10.1 
(11.5) 
8.8 
(9.5) 
1 Month 22 
2.6 
(3) 
2.0 
(2) 
1.3 
(1.5) 
1.0 
(0.8) 
-0.7 
(-0.8) 
-0.8 
(-1) 
11.5 
(15) 
10.3 
(12) 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 
Before 26 
1.8 
(2) 
2.1 
(2) 
0.8 
(1) 
0.7 
(1) 
-0.4 
(0) 
-0.6 
(-0.5) 
4 
(1.5) 
2.7 
(0.5) 
After 26 
2.8 
(3) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.5 
(1.5) 
2.1 
(2.3) 
-1.1 
(-1) 
-1.5 
(-1.5) 
9.4 
(10) 
7.8 
(6.5) 
2 Weeks 22 
2.8 
(3) 
2.6 
(2.5) 
1.4 
(1) 
1.6 
(1.8) 
-0.5 
(-0.5) 
-1.2 
(-1.5) 
6.6 
(4) 
5.4 
(2) 
1 Month 20 
3.0 
(3) 
2.5 
(2.5) 
1.6 
(1.5) 
1.8 
(2) 
-0.8 
(-0.5) 
-1.6 
(-1.5) 
6.1 
(4) 
5.1 
(3.5) 
S
o
ci
a
l 
Before 24 
1.8 
(2) 
1.6 
(1.5) 
0.8 
(1) 
0.4 
(0.3) 
-0.6 
(-0.5) 
-0.3 
(0) 
7.0 
(6) 
6.0 
(5.5) 
After 24 
2.8 
(3) 
2.4 
(2.5) 
1.3 
(2) 
1.6 
(2.3) 
-0.9 
(-1) 
-1.1 
(-1.5) 
11.1 
(15) 
9.6 
(10) 
2 Weeks 21 
2.3 
(3) 
2.0 
(2) 
1.0 
(1) 
1.2 
(1.5) 
-0.5 
(0) 
-1 
(-1) 
9.5 
(15) 
7.8 
(9) 
1 Month 23 
2.6 
(3) 
2.2 
(2.5) 
1.0 
(1) 
1.1 
(1) 
-0.5 
(-1) 
-0.7 
(-0.5) 
9.3 
(12) 
8.0 
(10) 
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  Mann-Whitney U-Test Results for Update Groups 
  Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
B
a
si
c 
Before 
282 
0.31 
307.5 
0.60 
277 
0.2 
263 
0.12 
269 
0.16 
343 
0.93 
310 
0.82 
288 
0.52 
After 
195.5 
0.003 
168.5 
0.001 
242 
0.06 
227.5 
0.03 
344 
0.95 
234 
0.04 
173.5 
0.002 
185 
0.005 
2 Weeks 
213.5 
0.18 
170.5 
0.04 
209 
0.15 
208 
0.15 
225.5 
0.28 
226 
0.29 
124 
0.002 
136 
0.004 
1 Month 
205 
0.14 
196.5 
0.21 
260 
0.75 
263.5 
0.81 
236.5 
0.42 
260.5 
0.76 
82 
< 0.001 
90.5 
< 0.001 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 
Before 
278.5 
0.13 
298 
0.25 
309 
0.25 
367.5 
0.88 
272.5 
0.08 
315 
0.29 
257.5 
0.06 
230 
0.02 
After 
215 
0.002 
159 
< 0.001 
245.5 
0.02 
139.5 
< 0.001 
354.5 
0.71 
234.5 
0.02 
266 
0.09 
286.5 
0.18 
2 Weeks 
173.5 
0.05 
119 
0.003 
178 
0.09 
134 
0.005 
243 
0.83 
172 
0.06 
205.5 
0.54 
204.5 
0.51 
1 Month 
139 
0.003 
143 
0.02 
192.5 
0.19 
138 
0.009 
199 
0.25 
128.5 
0.004 
212 
0.51 
212 
0.51 
S
o
ci
a
l 
Before 
253 
0.12 
312.5 
0.67 
347 
0.99 
275 
0.19 
293.5 
0.33 
249 
0.07 
325.5 
0.85 
335 
0.97 
After 
187.5 
0.001 
208.5 
0.02 
252 
0.08 
201.5 
0.007 
336.5 
0.84 
273 
0.18 
178 
0.003 
184.5 
0.005 
2 Weeks 
226.5 
0.93 
181 
0.33 
221 
0.64 
168 
0.08 
224 
0.69 
221 
0.63 
134 
0.02 
145.5 
0.03 
1 Month 
213.5 
0.12 
195 
0.08 
265 
0.65 
256 
0.52 
250.5 
0.45 
284.5 
0.96 
166 
0.02 
156.5 
0.009 
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  Sign Test Results for Update Groups 
  Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
After 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2 Weeks 
3-7-13 
0.34 
10-8-5 
0.82 
8-7-8 
1.0 
11-5-7 
0.21 
10-11-2 
1.0 
9-8-6 
1.0 
13-4-6 
0.05 
12-5-6 
0.14 
1 Month 
4-5-15 
1.0 
10-10-4 
1.0 
8-9-8 
1.0 
9-7-9 
0.80 
5-16-4 
0.03 
7-12-6 
0.36 
14-4-6 
0.03 
13-3-8 
0.02 
B
a
si
c 
After 
0-14-10 
< 0.001 
4-17-3 
0.007 
3-17-4 
0.003 
4-14-6 
0.03 
12-6-6 
0.24 
14-4-6 
0.03 
2-16-5 
0.001 
4-14-5 
0.03 
2 Weeks 
1-16-7 
< 0.001 
7-11-6 
0.48 
5-15-4 
0.04 
6-15-3 
0.08 
15-6-3 
0.08 
12-7-5 
0.36 
7-13-3 
0.26 
5-12-6 
0.14 
1 Month 
1-13-8 
0.002 
7-9-5 
0.80 
6-11-5 
0.33 
4-15-3 
0.02 
9-7-6 
0.80 
11-9-2 
0.82 
5-12-4 
0.14 
3-12-6 
0.04 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 After 
1-19-6 
< 0.001 
4-18-4 
0.004 
3-20-3 
< 0.001 
2-22-2 
< 0.001 
16-5-5 
0.03 
18-2-6 
< 0.001 
2-18-6 
< 0.001 
1-19-6 
< 0.001 
2 Weeks 
2-14-6 
0.004 
6-13-3 
0.17 
3-14-5 
0.01 
4-15-3 
0.02 
9-10-3 
1.0 
16-5-1 
0.03 
4-11-6 
0.12 
3-10-8 
0.09 
1 Month 
1-14-5 
0.001 
4-12-4 
0.08 
2-14-4 
0.004 
4-15-1 
0.02 
11-7-2 
0.48 
14-2-4 
0.004 
5-12-3 
0.14 
2-12-6 
0.01 
S
o
ci
a
l 
After 
0-16-8 
< 0.001 
3-16-5 
0.004 
5-13-6 
0.10 
4-18-2 
0.004 
11-6-7 
0.33 
15-4-5 
0.02 
0-13-11 
< 0.001 
3-12-9 
0.04 
2 Weeks 
2-9-10 
0.07 
7-9-4 
0.80 
7-10-4 
0.63 
3-11-7 
0.06 
8-12-1 
0.50 
11-5-5 
0.21 
4-11-6 
0.12 
5-11-5 
0.21 
1 Month 
1-15-7 
0.001 
2-13-8 
0.007 
7-11-5 
0.48 
6-15-2 
0.08 
11-7-5 
0.48 
12-10-1 
0.83 
3-9-11 
0.15 
3-12-8 
0.04 
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Results for Password Manager Groups 
   Average and (Median) Scores for Password Manager Groups 
   Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  N T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
Before 30 
1.5 
(1.5) 
2.3 
(2.5) 
0.5 
(0.5) 
0.9 
(0.8) 
-0.1 
(0) 
-0.2 
(0) 
7.8 
(7) 
6.8 
(6.5) 
After - 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
2 Weeks 27 
1.6 
(2) 
2.3 
(2.5) 
0.3 
(1) 
0.5 
(1) 
0.1 
(0) 
-0.1 
(0) 
7.7 
(8) 
6.9 
(8) 
1 Month 27 
1.8 
(2) 
2.5 
(2.5) 
0 
(0.5 
0.4 
(1) 
-0.1 
(0) 
-0.2 
(0) 
7.9 
(8) 
7.5 
(8) 
B
a
si
c 
Before 30 
1.7 
(2) 
2.3 
(2.5) 
0.7 
(1) 
1.0 
(1) 
0.2 
(0) 
0.3 
(0) 
6.2 
(5) 
5.5 
(4.5) 
After 30 
2.5 
(3) 
2.9 
(3) 
1.8 
(2) 
1.6 
(2) 
-1.0 
(-1.3) 
-1.1 
(-1.5) 
12.3 
(15) 
10 
(11) 
2 Weeks 27 
2.6 
(3) 
2.8 
(3) 
0.9 
(1.5) 
1.3 
(1.5) 
-0.7 
(-0.5) 
-0.5 
(-0.5) 
10.0 
(13) 
7.9 
(9) 
1 Month 26 
2.6 
(3) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.1 
(1.5) 
1.5 
(1.8) 
-0.5 
(-0.5) 
-0.5 
(-0.5) 
11.4 
(15) 
9.7 
(12) 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 
Before 30 
1.7 
(2) 
2.4 
(2.5) 
0.9 
(1) 
0.7 
(1) 
-0.1 
(0) 
-0.3 
(0) 
8.4 
(10.5) 
7.1 
(8) 
After 30 
2.3 
(2) 
3.1 
(3) 
1.7 
(2) 
1.7 
(2) 
-1.2 
(-1) 
-1.3 
(-1.3) 
12.2 
(15) 
10.0 
(12) 
2 Weeks 26 
2.3 
(2) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.5 
(2) 
1.4 
(1.5) 
-0.8 
(-0.5) 
-1.0 
(-1) 
12.3 
(15) 
10.7 
(12) 
1 Month 23 
2.5 
(3) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.6 
(1.5) 
1.7 
(2) 
-1.0 
(-1) 
-1.3 
(-1.5) 
11.1 
(15) 
10.2 
(11) 
S
o
ci
a
l 
Before 28 
1.8 
(2) 
2.2 
(2.3) 
0.5 
(0.5) 
0.6 
(0.5) 
0 
(0) 
-0.5 
(-0.5) 
7.3 
(6) 
6.2 
(4.5) 
After 28 
2.5 
(3) 
2.9 
(3) 
1.8 
(2) 
1.7 
(2) 
-0.6 
(-0.8) 
-0.9 
(-1) 
12.8 
(15) 
10.6 
(12) 
2 Weeks 26 
2.3 
(3) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.3 
(1.5) 
1.4 
(1.5) 
-0.3 
(-0.5) 
-0.3 
(-0.5) 
11.9 
(15) 
9.9 
(10.5) 
1 Month 22 
2.5 
(3) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.3 
(1.5) 
1.4 
(1.5) 
-0.3 
(-0.5) 
-0.8 
(-1) 
9.9 
(13) 
8.4 
(10) 
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  Mann-Whitney U-Test Results for Password Manager Groups 
  Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
B
a
si
c 
Before 
411.5 
0.59 
448.5 
0.99 
472.5 
0.74 
417.5 
0.63 
414 
0.60 
376 
0.27 
371 
0.24 
383 
0.32 
After 
213 
< 0.001 
311 
0.04 
213.5 
< 0.001 
262 
0.007 
248 
0.004 
241.5 
0.003 
239 
0.001 
280 
0.01 
2 Weeks 
183.5 
0.001 
270 
0.10 
271.5 
0.11 
224 
0.01 
220.5 
0.01 
284.5 
0.16 
275.5 
0.12 
340 
0.68 
1 Month 
193.5 
0.002 
278.5 
0.19 
177.5 
0.001 
174 
0.001 
270 
0.15 
283.5 
0.23 
216.5 
0.01 
272 
0.16 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 
Before 
411.5 
0.58 
438.5 
0.87 
378.5 
0.29 
418 
0.64 
438 
0.86 
436 
0.84 
424 
0.70 
433 
0.80 
After 
281.5 
0.008 
259.5 
0.003 
245.5 
0.003 
267.5 
0.009 
236 
0.002 
201.5 
0.001 
243.5 
0.001 
283.5 
0.01 
2 Weeks 
225.5 
0.02 
258.5 
0.09 
179.5 
0.001 
240.5 
0.03 
206.5 
0.005 
193.5 
0.002 
185 
0.002 
190.5 
0.004 
1 Month 
185.5 
0.009 
271.5 
0.44 
97.5 
< 0.001 
122 
< 0.001 
166 
0.004 
126 
< 0.001 
206.5 
0.04 
222.5 
0.09 
S
o
ci
a
l 
Before 
363 
0.36 
404.5 
0.81 
405 
0.82 
377.5 
0.51 
416 
0.95 
332.5 
0.17 
392.5 
0.67 
391 
0.65 
After 
205 
< 0.001 
281 
0.03 
214 
0.002 
249.5 
0.01 
284.5 
0.05 
256 
0.02 
204.5 
< 0.001 
228.5 
0.002 
2 Weeks 
219 
0.01 
250.5 
0.07 
216.5 
0.02 
223 
0.02 
283 
0.23 
301.5 
0.38 
196.5 
0.004 
244 
0.06 
1 Month 
166.5 
0.004 
230.5 
0.18 
146 
0.002 
166 
0.007 
275 
0.66 
199 
0.05 
234 
0.20 
274.5 
0.66 
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  Sign Test Results for Password Manager Groups 
  Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
After 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2 Weeks 
6-8-13 
0.79 
9-12-6 
0.66 
13-10-4 
0.68 
13-9-5 
0.52 
9-13-5 
0.52 
11-12-4 
1.0 
9-8-10 
1.0 
12-10-5 
0.83 
1 Month 
5-8-14 
0.58 
8-9-10 
1.0 
15-8-4 
0.21 
13-9-5 
0.52 
7-15-5 
0.13 
9-12-6 
0.66 
9-10-8 
1.0 
9-12-6 
0.67 
B
a
si
c 
After 
1-18-11 
< 0.001 
5-18-7 
0.01 
3-22-5 
< 0.001 
6-20-4 
0.009 
21-3-6 
< 0.001 
22-2-6 
< 0.001 
0-24-6 
< 0.001 
6-20-4 
0.009 
2 Weeks 
2-20-5 
< 0.001 
4-14-9 
0.03 
7-17-3 
0.06 
5-16-6 
0.03 
15-7-5 
0.13 
17-8-2 
0.11 
3-18-6 
0.001 
8-14-5 
0.29 
1 Month 
1-17-8 
< 0.001 
7-12-7 
0.36 
6-13-7 
0.17 
5-13-8 
0.10 
17-5-4 
0.02 
17-7-2 
0.06 
3-18-5 
0.001 
7-15-4 
0.13 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 After 
4-15-11 
0.02 
7-19-4 
0.03 
3-18-9 
0.001 
4-22-4 
0.001 
23-4-3 
< 0.001 
22-4-4 
0.001 
3-19-8 
0.001 
7-18-5 
0.04 
2 Weeks 
3-12-11 
0.04 
6-14-6 
0.12 
5-17-5 
0.02 
8-14-5 
0.29 
17-5-5 
0.02 
17-6-4 
0.04 
5-69-5 
0.03 
6-19-1 
0.02 
1 Month 
1-11-11 
0.006 
5-13-5 
0.10 
4-16-3 
0.01 
2-18-3 
< 0.001 
18-2-3 
< 0.001 
17-4-2 
0.007 
7-13-3 
0.26 
9-13-1 
0.52 
S
o
ci
a
l 
After 
3-17-8 
0.003 
4-18-6 
0.004 
3-21-4 
< 0.001 
6-19-3 
0.02 
17-6-5 
0.04 
15-9-4 
0.31 
3-18-7 
0.001 
4-17-7 
0.007 
2 Weeks 
5-15-6 
0.04 
4-15-7 
0.02 
7-15-4 
0.13 
6-15-5 
0.08 
13-9-4 
0.52 
10-12-4 
0.83 
2-16-8 
0.001 
6-15-5 
0.08 
1 Month 
3-12-7 
0.04 
8-11-3 
0.65 
4-13-5 
0.05 
6-11-5 
0.33 
12-6-4 
0.24 
10-5-7 
0.30 
5-9-8 
0.42 
7-11-4 
0.48 
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Results for 2FA Groups 
   Average and (Median) Scores for 2FA Groups 
   Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  N T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
Before 26 
2.0 
(2) 
2.5 
(2.5) 
1.2 
(1.5) 
1.3 
(1) 
-0.1 
(0) 
-0.2 
(0) 
11.1 
(15) 
9.3 
(11) 
After - 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
- 
(-) 
2 Weeks 24 
1.9 
(2) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.1 
(1.3) 
1.6 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
10.8 
(15) 
9 
(11.5) 
1 Month 24 
2.1 
(2) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.5 
(1.5) 
1.5 
(1.5) 
0 
(0.3) 
-0.6 
(-0.8) 
10.5 
(15) 
9.3 
(11) 
B
a
si
c 
Before 29 
2.2 
(2) 
2.6 
(2.5) 
1.5 
(1.5) 
1.1 
(1) 
-0.5 
(-1) 
-0.5 
(-0.5) 
11.4 
(15) 
10.2 
(12) 
After 29 
2.5 
(3) 
3.0 
(3) 
2.2 
(2.5) 
1.8 
(2) 
-0.8 
(-1) 
-0.6 
(-1) 
14.3 
(15) 
12.4 
(13.5) 
2 Weeks 26 
2.5 
(3) 
3.1 
(3) 
2.1 
(2) 
1.8 
(2) 
-0.5 
(-1) 
-0.5 
(-0.8) 
13.3 
(15) 
11.2 
(12) 
1 Month 20 
2.6 
(3) 
2.9 
(2.8) 
1.9 
(2) 
1.8 
(2) 
-0.7 
(-1) 
-0.6 
(-1) 
12.3 
(15) 
10.5 
(11) 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 
Before 29 
2.3 
(3) 
3.0 
(3) 
1.2 
(1) 
1.3 
(1) 
-0.3 
(0) 
-0.4 
(0) 
8.9 
(14) 
7.9 
(9) 
After 29 
2.4 
(3) 
3.0 
(3) 
1.7 
(2) 
1.9 
(2) 
-0.7 
(-1.5) 
-0.7 
(-1) 
10.7 
(14) 
9.3 
(10) 
2 Weeks 27 
2.3 
(2) 
2.7 
(3) 
1.4 
(1.5) 
1.5 
(1.5) 
-0.3 
(-0.5) 
-0.8 
(-1) 
11.1 
(15) 
9.2 
(11) 
1 Month 25 
2.4 
(2) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.5 
(1.5) 
1.6 
(2) 
-0.8 
(-1) 
-1.1 
(-1) 
11.8 
(15) 
9.6 
(10 
S
o
ci
a
l 
Before 26 
2.1 
(2) 
2.9 
(3) 
1.1 
(1.5) 
1.5 
(1.8) 
-0.1 
(-0.3) 
-0.2 
(-0.3) 
10.1 
(13) 
8.2 
(9) 
After 26 
2.8 
(3) 
3.0 
(3) 
2.0 
(2.5) 
1.8 
(2.5) 
-0.6 
(-1) 
-1.0 
(-1.3) 
12.0 
(15) 
10.1 
(11) 
2 Weeks 24 
2.8 
(3) 
2.9 
(3) 
1.4 
(2) 
1.6 
(2) 
-0.9 
(-0.8) 
-0.9 
(-0.8) 
12.8 
(15) 
11.0 
(12) 
1 Month 23 
2.6 
(3) 
2.8 
(3) 
1.6 
(2) 
1.7 
(2) 
-0.7 
(-0.5) 
-0.5 
(-0.5) 
12.4 
(15) 
10.4 
(11) 
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  Mann-Whitney U-Test Results for 2FA Groups 
  Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
B
a
si
c 
Before 
343 
0.55 
356 
0.73 
316.5 
0.43 
339 
0.69 
295.5 
0.24 
308 
0.34 
372.5 
0.94 
333.5 
0.47 
After 
285 
0.09 
253 
0.03 
178 
0.001 
253 
0.05 
252.5 
0.05 
287.5 
0.19 
236.5 
0.006 
226 
0.02 
2 Weeks 
177 
0.004 
277 
0.49 
138 
< 0.001 
285 
0.60 
227 
0.10 
261 
0.32 
249 
0.17 
269 
0.40 
1 Month 
156 
0.03 
222.5 
0.68 
165 
0.07 
196 
0.30 
155.5 
0.04 
238 
0.97 
210 
0.44 
222 
0.68 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 
Before 
314 
0.26 
253.5 
0.03 
355.5 
0.91 
348 
0.80 
349 
0.82 
348 
0.80 
311 
0.24 
330.5 
0.44 
After 
304.5 
0.20 
276.5 
0.08 
264.5 
0.08 
254.5 
0.06 
254 
0.06 
264.5 
0.09 
358 
0.74 
367 
0.87 
2 Weeks 
243 
0.10 
301.5 
0.67 
266.5 
0.28 
308 
0.76 
283.5 
0.45 
230 
0.08 
318.5 
0.91 
315.5 
0.88 
1 Month 
248 
0.27 
278.5 
0.66 
279.5 
0.68 
259.5 
0.42 
186.5 
0.02 
214 
0.08 
274 
0.58 
293 
0.89 
S
o
ci
a
l 
Before 
330 
0.94 
241 
0.07 
322 
0.96 
278 
0.38 
321 
0.94 
316.5 
0.88 
297.5 
0.44 
294 
0.42 
After 
176.5 
0.001 
240.5 
0.06 
166.5 
0.002 
206.5 
0.02 
256.5 
0.20 
222 
0.05 
284 
0.39 
304.5 
0.70 
2 Weeks 
116 
< 0.001 
284 
0.94 
224.5 
0.19 
269 
0.69 
185.5 
0.03 
200 
0.07 
237 
0.24 
262.5 
0.60 
1 Month 
185 
0.04 
238.5 
0.41 
240.5 
0.45 
210 
0.16 
194 
0.08 
249.5 
0.58 
227.5 
0.24 
254.5 
0.65 
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  Sign Test Results for 2FA Groups 
  Awareness Perceptions Emotions 
  T/F M-C INDF SOCF INDN SOCN Valence Prosocial 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
After 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2 Weeks 
6-3-15 
0.51 
5-8-11 
0.58 
8-4-11 
0.39 
8-6-9 
0.79 
8-11-4 
0.65 
10-10-3 
1.0 
7-7-10 
1.0 
8-10-6 
0.82 
1 Month 
6-6-12 
1.0 
6-9-9 
0.61 
4-9-10 
0.27 
3-7-13 
0.34 
7-10-6 
0.63 
13-6-4 
0.17 
5-7-12 
0.77 
7-14-3 
0.19 
B
a
si
c 
After 
3-9-17 
0.15 
8-16-5 
0.15 
2-16-11 
0.001 
3-16-10 
0.004 
15-6-8 
0.08 
14-9-6 
0.41 
0-12-16 
< 0.001 
6-15-7 
0.08 
2 Weeks 
3-8-15 
0.23 
4-12-10 
0.08 
4-11-11 
0.12 
2-11-13 
0.02 
9-10-7 
1.0 
9-12-5 
0.66 
5-10-11 
0.30 
9-12-5 
0.66 
1 Month 
2-5-13 
0.45 
6-9-5 
0.61 
5-7-8 
0.77 
4-8-8 
0.39 
9-6-5 
0.61 
8-7-5 
1.0 
3-6-11 
0.51 
9-8-3 
1.0 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
 After 
2-3-24 
1.0 
10-7-12 
0.63 
4-14-11 
0.03 
4-14-11 
0.03 
16-6-7 
0.05 
16-7-6 
0.09 
2-10-17 
0.04 
8-14-7 
0.29 
2 Weeks 
6-7-14 
1.0 
13-7-7 
0.26 
12-9-6 
0.66 
8-11-8 
0.65 
14-9-4 
0.41 
15-3-9 
0.008 
2-7-18 
0.18 
8-14-5 
0.29 
1 Month 
3-6-16 
0.5 
11-7-7 
0.48 
7-10-8 
0.63 
4-8-13 
0.39 
17-7-1 
0.06 
16-5-4 
0.03 
3-9-13 
0.15 
7-15-3 
0.13 
S
o
ci
a
l 
After 
0-16-10 
< 0.001 
11-8-7 
0.65 
2-18-6 
< 0.001 
5-14-7 
0.06 
16-5-5 
0.03 
18-4-4 
0.004 
2-8-15 
0.11 
6-12-7 
0.24 
2 Weeks 
0-14-10 
< 0.001 
9-6-9 
0.61 
6-12-6 
0.24 
9-9-6 
1.0 
15-8-1 
0.21 
17-6-1 
0.04 
2-11-11 
0.02 
5-12-7 
0.14 
1 Month 
3-13-7 
0.02 
9-5-9 
0.42 
4-12-7 
0.08 
6-10-7 
0.45 
14-5-4 
0.06 
12-8-3 
0.50 
2-9-12 
0.07 
5-10-8 
0.30 
 
